

For my Parents

QAIDU AND THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT MONGOL STATE IN CENTRAL ASIA

Michal Biran

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Note on Dates and Transliterations

Dates are generally given according to the Gregorian calendar. *Hijri* and Chinese dates are given only when they have a specific importance to the study.

Names and terms of Mongolian origin have been transliterated according to Antoine Mostaert's scheme as modified by F.W. Cleaves, except for these deviations: c is rendered as ch; s is sh; g is gh; and j is j. I have not changed the q into a kh except in the word Khan and its derivatives, which look more familiar to the English reader in this fashion, * to the left of a name represents an uncertain transliteration.

Chinese names and terms have been transliterated according to the Pinyin system. Wherever relevant, the Chinese form of a Mongolian name was added in parentheses after its Mongolian form.

Arabic words, titles, and names have been transliterated according to the system used in *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Words and names of Persian origin have been transliterated as if they were Arabic (e.g. Juwaynī, not Juvaynī, ʿAlizādah not ʿAlizāde). Common words and place names, such as sultan, mamluk, Bukhara, Kashgar, etc., are written without diacritical points.

List of Abbreviations

CAJ	<i>Central Asiatic Journal</i>
En	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i> , 1st edition. Leiden and London, 1913-36 (Rpt. 1987).
EI2	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i> , 2nd edition. Leiden and London, 1960.
Elr	<i>Encyclopedia Iranica</i> . London, Boston and Hanley, 1985-
HJAS	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
POFEH	<i>Papers of Far Eastern History</i>
Y\$	Song, Lian. <i>Yuan shi</i> . Rpt. Beijing, 1976.

Introduction

Qaidu (1236-1301), one of the great Mongol Khans, is better known as a rebel than as a state builder. Grandson of Chinggis Khan's designated heir, Ögodei (r. 1229-41), Qaidu became an active player in the Mongol arena only after the house of Ögodei lost its supremacy to the Toluids, descendants of Chinggis's younger son. The coup of the Toluids culminated in 1251 with the ascension of Tolui's son, Möngke, to the post of the Qa'an, the Great Khan of the Mongol empire.¹ It was accompanied by purges of many of the Ögödeids, who had to give up most of their army and territories. Against this background Qaidu strove to revive the Ögödeid cause. By virtue of his political and military skills, from the 1270s onward Qaidu succeeded in establishing a kingdom of the house of Ögodei in Central Asia and in becoming a formidable adversary to the Great Khan Qubilai, Möngke's brother and successor (1260-94) and his successor, Temür Öljeitu (1294-1307). Qaidu's activities undermined the Qa'an's authority, shifted the balance of power in the Mongol empire and accelerated its dismemberment. Though the house of Ögodei departed from the stage of history after Qaidu's death, the Mongol state that he established in Central Asia, a state independent of the Qa'an's authority, survived him under the rule of the Chaghadaids, his erstwhile rivals, allies, and successors.

We know hardly anything about Qaidu as an individual. The sources left us a sketch of his physical appearance, according to which he was of medium height and build, his beard consisted only of nine grey hairs, and (unlike his father and grandfather) he never took wine, kumyss, or salt.² The sources also record that Qaidu preferred Islam to other religions, held discussions with the learned and wise and used to rise every night before dawn and meditate. He is also credited for his kindness and generosity.³ Apart from those general details, the

only anecdotes that seem to reveal glimpses of Qaidu's character are those that are related to his daughters, the energetic Qutulun and her unfortunate sister Qutuchin. Qutulun, Qaidu's favourite, took part in her father's campaigns and excelled over most of his generals. Qaidu allowed her to choose her own husband, and she declared she would only marry the one who would win her by beating her in battle. Many princes responded to the challenge, but were unable to vanquish the damsel, and had to pay with many horses for their defeat. Even when a real prince charming appeared, and the parents begged the girl to allow him to win so that she could marry him, Qutulun could not resist the temptation to show her power. Only when her long celibacy gave rise to rumors about her relations with her father, did she choose to marry his steward.⁴

Qutuchin married earlier, but when she was pregnant her husband fell in love with a slave girl. The princess found out, and while rebuking her husband was bitten by him and died on the spot. Qaidu's sons demanded to avenge their sister's death and forced him to summon his son-in-law. The latter's father sent him in chains to Qaidu's court. The sons insisted on killing him, but Qaidu asked if this could benefit their sister, and suggested instead to set him free due to the important services his father had provided him in the past. The son-in-law's punishment was reduced to 100 lashes, and he was given another of Qaidu's daughters to marry since Qaidu's sons "could not allow a stranger to take their sister's place."⁵

While Qutulun's story can be viewed as representing Qaidu as a typical nomadic chief, enchanted by fights and horses, who gives plenty of freedom to the women in his family,⁶ her sister's fate reveals a pragmatic Qaidu who, unlike previous Mongols, is not motivated by revenge and who care little for a woman's life.⁷ The two anecdotes, however, resemble folk stories so much that the best interpretation of them seems to be that legends and myths began to circulate around Qaidu during his lifetime and certainly after his death.⁸

Yet myths are not necessarily absent from the way in which Qaidu is treated by modern historians. Modern scholarship, Western and Chinese, repeatedly presents Qaidu as a defender of traditional Mongol nomadic values against the trend of sedentarization and identification with the local, non-Mongol sedentary populations, represented by Qubilai and to some extent by the Ilkhans, the Mongol rulers of Iran. Qaidu is also portrayed as an aspiring rival Qa'an to Qubilai, laying claim to this position by virtue of the rights of the house of Ögödei to the throne.⁹ In other words, modern research

presents the confrontation between Qaidu and the other Mongol branches on one hand as an ideological conflict, and on the other as a struggle for the office of Qa'an. Those evaluations, however, appear in studies dealing mainly with the Mongol empire in general or with Yuan China, that discuss Qaidu only in passing. To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to focus on Qaidu alone while thoroughly integrating information from East and West.¹⁰ While I will certainly deal with the ideological questions, I believe that it is worthwhile examining the more practical aspects of Qaidu's activities, such as the economic and territorial considerations behind his revolt, and that this will lead to the conclusion that the Chaghadaid Khanate in Central Asia was in a real sense Qaidu's legacy.

The Sources

The lacuna in the research on Qaidu, and on the Mongol state in Central Asia in general, derives from the limited nature of the sources dealing with this region, which is in a sharp contrast to the detailed chronicles of the Mongol states in China and Persia. The only work known to have been written in Qaidu's territory is Jamāl Qarshī's *Mulhaqāt al-surāh* ("Supplement to the *surah*"), written in Kashgar in the first years of the fourteenth century independently of the Mongol court. This Arabic book was intended as an appendix to Qarshī's Persian commentary (*surah*) to the famous lexicon of Jawharī, that he had translated from Arabic into Persian. It contains historical information on various dynasties in Central Asia," including the Mongols, together with biographical references to prominent Central Asian sheikhs and scholars and descriptions of various cities. Some of the material has a legendary quality, but Qarshī also provides valuable historical and chronological information.¹² Despite the importance of Qarshī's book, it is, as its name implies, merely an appendix to a dictionary, and cannot substitute for an orderly chronicle.

For a more complete picture of Qaidu's life, one must gather information from sources that were written in other parts of the Mongol empire, mainly in the Toluid states in China and Persia, and elsewhere, under the Mamluks in Egypt, or by European and other travellers. In collating this material, the limitations of these sources must be taken into full consideration. Both Persian and Chinese works were written by people who saw Qaidu as a rebel and enemy, and are consequently highly tendentious. Moreover, and this is especially true

for the Chinese sources, their information is mostly limited to those activities of Qaidu that directly influenced their own country. Other sources which there is no reason to suspect were prejudiced against Qaidu (such as Mamluk or Armenian texts) lack full and detailed information about him, although their sparse data is valuable. Even more important is the information preserved in the travelogues, prominent among which is that of Marco Polo, who dedicated a long chapter to "King Caidu, The King of Great Turkey."¹³ But even for travellers, Qaidu's realm was only a station in their journey, not a prominent destination.

The most important Persian sources for Qaidu's life are Rashid al-Dīn's *Jāmi' al-tawārikh* ("Collection of Histories") and Wassaf's work, known usually simply as *Ta'rikh-i Wassaf* ("The History of Wassaf"), both completed in the first decades of the fourteenth century. Rashid al-Dīn (1247-1318), a vizier in the Ilkhanid realm who prepared his work at the request of his Mongol patrons, wrote a sweeping universal history, the major part of which was dedicated to the Mongols. This part included not only a history of the Ilkhanate but also the history of the Mongol and Turkic tribes, and the life of Chinggis Khan and his successors up to the first years of the fourteenth century. The information about Qaidu is scattered among those different parts. As a devout supporter of the Toluid line, Rashid al-Dīn stressed the illegitimacy of Qaidu's actions, portraying him as a rebel and abrogator of the *jasagh*,¹⁴ though even he had to acknowledge his merits.¹⁵ Wassaf, on the other hand, though also an official in the Ilkhanate realm and Rashid al-Dīn's protegee, compiled a very different history. His work, covering the years 1257-1328, purports to be a continuation of the work of the great Persian historian Juwaynī.¹⁶ Though his focus was on Iran, Wassaf dedicated considerable space to the Mongols in Central Asia. Wassaf is much more sympathetic towards Qaidu, perhaps counting on the fact that his over-flowery style would prove incomprehensible to the Mongol rulers.¹⁷ Together with Wassaf, Qāshānī's *Ta'rikh-i Oljaitu*, compiled in the 1320s, is of special importance for the study of the turmoil in Central Asia following Qaidu's death. Among later, post-fourteenth-century Persian sources, Mīrkhwānd, as noted already by Barthold, is of distinct importance, since he preserved unique information about Qaidu that is unavailable in earlier sources.

The most important Chinese source for the study of Qaidu is the official history of the Yuan (the Mongol dynasty in China), the *Yuan*

shi, compiled about 1370 during the first two years of the subsequent Ming dynasty.¹⁹ Despite his importance to Yuan history, as a rebel Qaidu was ineligible to have his own biography in this work.²⁰ Yet information about him is scattered among the different chapters of the *Yuan Shi*, mostly among the annals and the biographies sections. The literary collections of Yuan scholar-officials sometimes add important contemporary data about Qaidu. Yet these sources, mostly epitaphs dedicated to generals who fought against Qaidu, seek, just like the biographies in the *Yuan shi*, to praise their subjects and should not always be taken at face value.

Later Chinese scholarship certainly contributed to our knowledge of Qaidu. The first attempt to collate the references to Qaidu scattered through the *Yuan Shi* was done by Chen Bangzhan (d. 1636) in his 1606 work, *Yuanshi jishi benmo* (The Official History of the Yuan retold in topical format), which is considered to be the most important contribution to Yuan history compiled under the Ming (1368-1644).²¹

The study of Yuan history flourished in the Qing period (1644-1911) both because the Manchus, themselves foreign invaders, took an interest in the fate of the first nomadic dynasty that conquered all of China, and out of recognition that the *Yuan shi* does not exhaust the history of the period, not least because of its hasty composition. Among the Qing works that devoted a biography to Qaidu, two types of studies can be discerned: the first includes works based only on Chinese sources such as the books of Shao Yuanping, (ca. 1664); of Wei Yuan (1794-1857); and of Zeng Lian, (b.1860), whose work is highly dependent on Wei's. In addition to the *Yuan shi* these writers used Yuan period writings of many kinds (travel accounts, collections of documents, literary collections, etc.), the *Secret History of the Mongols* and works on dynasties preceding the Yuan.²² The second type includes works that also integrated "Western" information on the Mongols such as the books of Hong Jun (1840-93), Tu Ji (1856-1921) and Ke Shaomin (1850-1933).²³ The book by Hong Jun, who served as a Chinese diplomat in Berlin and St Petersburg, is merely a collection of passages translated into Chinese mostly from the works of Rashid al-Dīn (in Russian translation) and of d'Ohsson's classic study on the Mongols,²⁴ accompanied by notes on whether or not they correspond to passages appearing in the *Yuan shi*.²⁵ Tu Ji's book, the most detailed work on the history of the Mongol nation in Chinese, is important above all for its attempt to collate and integrate fragments of information from various Chinese sources. It is weaker on Western

sources. Although Tu Ji, who relied heavily on Hong Jun, quotes Marco Polo and nineteenth-century European scholarship (e.g. d'Ohsson, Howorth, Curtin), he had read them only in the sometimes inaccurate Chinese translations prepared for him. He did not have access to primary sources not written in Chinese. Yet his biography of Qaidu is the most comprehensive one from China.²⁶ In 1921 Ke Shaomin's *Xin Yuan shi* ("The New Official History of the Yuan") took its place among the official histories alongside the *Yuan shi*. Among its sources are Erdman's German translation of Rashid al-Din's work, d'Ohsson's book (both in translation to Chinese) and Japanese scholarship. He refers extensively to the works of Wei Yuan and Hong Jun, but unlike Tu Ji, does not bother to document his sources.²⁷ In the biographies that they devoted to Qaidu, the Qing dynasty historians considerably augmented the information on Qaidu, but not always accurately. I have, accordingly, cited the Ming and Qing works in the footnotes only when they can supplement the Yuan sources.

Among modern studies, apart from the classic works of Barthold,²⁸ one should mention especially Dardess' article, "From Mongol Empire to Yuan Dynasty: Changing Forms of imperial rule in Mongolia and Central Asia", which reviews Yuan efforts to control Mongolia and Central Asia and their significance to Yuan legitimation, and the various articles by Liu Yingsheng that combine Chinese and Muslim information to explicate Yuan-Chaghadaï relations.²⁹

The purpose of this study

This book attempts to put together a substantial portion of the various pieces of information on Qaidu that appear in the sources. Its aim is to construct through systematical comparison as complete a picture as possible of Qaidu's deeds and motives. It will also sketch some aspects of the internal administration of the independent Mongol state in Central Asia in its formative stages under Qaidu. On the foundation of this picture I will then attempt to assess Qaidu's impact on the Mongol world of his time, and to examine the fate of the entire Ogödeid ulus³⁰ after it lost its leading position. I will also reexamine the prevailing views of Qaidu in the literature and try to reinterpret his objectives, i.e., whether he indeed aspired to the position of Qa'an, and if he was indeed a defender of nomadic values.

Introduction

In view of the nature of the sources it is clear that parts of the picture will be missing, that other parts will not fit, and that sometimes the connections among the pieces of information will be open to differing interpretations. Presumably, however, a correlation of the Arabic, Persian and Chinese sources will provide a clearer picture than the one regnant today in the study of Qaidu's deeds and motives, of thirteenth-century Central Asia and of the Mongol empire in its stages of disintegration.

Historical Background

A short sketch of the relations among the major Mongol *uluses* on the eve of Qaidu's rise to power will provide a useful background for Qaidu's activities. This outline covers the period from the death of Chinggis (1227) to the death of Möngke (1259). One should bear in mind, however, that just as in the case of Qaidu, the mostly Toluid sources for this period retained the "official version" of the winners and should therefore be treated with a certain amount of skepticism.³¹

Chinggis and his successor Qa'ans were the supreme rulers of the Mongol empire. Yet according to the Mongol tradition this empire was a joint property of the whole family of Chinggis Khan, among whom the Qa'an was only *primus inter pares*. The conquered lands were regarded as a common pool of wealth, that should benefit all the family members, and this principle was expressed in granting to individual princes local rights, mainly revenues from the conquered areas or lordship over a certain segment of the population. The collegiality of the empire was further manifested in the *tamma* system of the organization of the armies: the prince in command of an army detailed to conquer new territories was accompanied by representative of the other major branches of the family. A diet (*quriltai*) of all the princes under the responsibility of the Qa'an planned the campaigns; and from the time of Ogödei, the government of the conquered sedentary territories had representatives of the main *uluses* and the Great Khan working in cooperation.³²

The collegial concept certainly limited the Qa'an's centralized control over the empire. Moreover, it was at odds with the need of each prince to use a wide and specific area for the grazing of his herds. As a compromise, apart from the scattered appanages, each of Chinggis's four sons by his chief wife received from his father rights to a specific region that would serve as his territorial base. Those rights were apparently limited to the pasture lands while the sedentary

territories remained under the joint authority of the family. The coexistence of regional and collective rights encouraged internal and personal tensions: due to the *tamma* system, sizeable portions of the troops stationed within the *ulus* of a certain prince owed alliance not to him, but to some external authority whether the Qa'an or another prince.³³

In addition, there was an inherent tension between the Qa'an and the regional khans, each of them tempted to extend his authority at the expense of the other, and a greater regional independence was especially apparent in the interregnums following the death of each Qa'an.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Mongols, like other nomads, lacked an orderly system of succession. According to the Mongol custom, the youngest son by the chief wife succeeded to his father's hearth, but not necessarily to his political superiority.³⁴ Seniority played a certain role, but it could have been expressed not merely in primogeniture but also in lateral succession: the elder male in the family, the *aga*, usually the late Khan's brother, was preferred candidate for the throne, or at least played an influential role in the election process.³⁵ In fact the succession was decided by "tanistry," as Fletcher termed the principle according to which the most talented male member of the royal clan should inherit the throne. Any transfer of power was an open-to-all struggle among the different branches of the family.³⁶ The Mongol custom demanded that after the succession struggles were concluded, the election was formally reconfirmed by representatives of all the lines of the family in a *quriltai*.³⁷

Chinggis had tried to avoid the instability caused by the lack of an ordered succession system by adding a new principle, nomination,³⁸ and in his lifetime he appointed his third son, Qaidu's grandfather, Ogodei, to be his heir. Although the sources portray the succession as a matter determined only among Chinggis's sons by his chief wife (Jochi, Chaghadaï, Ogodei and Tolui), it can be attested that Chinggis's brothers as well as his sons by other wives saw themselves as eligible candidates.³⁹ Ogodei's election was due to his qualities as a generous and peaceful man, talents thought to have the best chance of preserving the unity of the Mongol empire.⁴⁰ He was preferred to his senior brothers, Jochi and Chaghadaï.

Jochi was passed over probably because of his questionable legitimacy: he was born soon after Chinggis's wife was released from a period of captivity among the Merkids, and it had been always open to doubt whether he was really Chinggis's son. In any case, Jochi had

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died in early 1227, a few months before his father, and was therefore obviously excluded from the potential successors.⁴¹

Chaghadaï is described as a strict adherent of the *Jasagh*, known for his harsh character,⁴² not an advantage for someone who had to practice the delicate art of keeping the family together. Moreover, his bitter dissensions with Jochi, mostly based on the same legitimacy issue, made it obvious that neither of the two would willingly accept the elevation of the other.⁴³ Chaghadaï, too, was therefore disqualified from being Qa'an. Tolui, the best fighter of the family, might have been a serious candidate. Yet Chinggis's hesitation in choosing between Ogodei and Tolui and his final decision in favor of the former, as Rashid al-Din alleged, can be a mere interpolation that foreshadows later developments.⁴⁴ In the course of the nomination, Chinggis stressed the priority of his sons over his brothers in regard to succession rights.⁴⁵ Ogodei's nomination allegedly received the solemn and wholehearted acceptance of his brothers. Though the sources retained different versions about the time, place, and participants in the nomination's scene or scenes,⁴⁶ Chinggis's nomination of Ogodei remained an undisputed fact even in the course of the Toluid effort to deny the right of the Ogodeids to a permanent occupation of the Qa'an's throne.⁴⁷

Another measure taken by Chinggis during his lifetime, as already mentioned, was to assign territories and people to his sons: Jochi, the eldest, was the first to receive his territory, the Irtysh valley, already in 1208, and his territory was to be extended to the northwest "as far in that direction as the hoof of the Tatar horse had penetrated".⁴⁸ Under his descendants this territory was extended to Western Eurasia and the Russian principalities and was known as the Golden Horde. The other family members got their territories later, probably in the early 1220s. Chaghadaï received the region between the land of Uighuria and Samarkand and Bukhara, i.e., Western Turkestan and the Tarim Basin, to which Transoxania was added during Ogodei's reign. Ogodei received Jungaria and the western slopes of the Altai mountains, and Tolui, as the youngest son, received his father's original land in Mongolia.⁴⁹ In this allocation most of North China and the lands south of the Oxus, both of which were incorporated into the empire well before Chinggis's death, remained unassigned. Those probably remained under Chinggis's supreme authority, and were due to be passed subsequently to his successor.⁵⁰

Besides the territories, Chinggis also divided the army among his relatives, assigning 4,000 troops to each of his three eldest sons and

lesser numbers to other kinsmen. The lion's share of the army, 101,000 soldiers, fell to Tolui, again because he was the youngest son.⁵¹ Tolui's control of most of the army certainly contributed to the victory of his descendants in later succession struggles.⁵²

Chinggis's death in 1227 was followed by an interregnum of two years; only at its end was Ogödei's elevation confirmed by a *quriltai*. The *Yuan Shi* attributes the delay to the opposition of Tolui, who according to the same source served as the regent until his brother's enthronement.⁵³ Even though Rashīd al-Dīn testifies to a certain confusion during the interregnum, when the issue of electing a Great Khan was raised, Chinggis's nomination made Ogodei the sole candidate, and he was elected without discord.⁵⁴

Ogodei was enthroned by his potential competitors: Chaghadai, Tolui, and Temüge Odchigin, Chinggis's younger brother. During the enthronement ceremony he received from his brothers the "domain of the centre", probably the previously undivided territories under Chinggis's authority, and Chinggis's personal guard (*kesig*), containing more than 18,000 soldiers.⁵⁵

When Ögodei was elected, he took the title Qa'an to express his supreme authority *vis-a-vis* his brothers. As Qa'an, Ogodei had the exclusive right to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the empire, and the right to nominate, or confirm the nomination of, the heads of his brothers' *uluses*.⁵⁶ Yet in order to maintain his primacy over the other *uluses*, Ogodei had to find means to support his establishment and his power base, i.e. to fill the empty treasury he inherited from his father. He tried to ensure a steady stream of revenue by initiating a reform in the regional administration of the empire. In 1229, Ogodei established two branch secretariats⁵⁷ in his richest sedentary territories, Turkestan and North China, and another was established in Iran in the 1240s. Unlike the regional administration under Chinggis, these branch secretariats were led by civilians, who replaced the former military commanders as the administrative authority. Their main task was to regulate the assessment and the collection of taxes in the territories under their jurisdiction. Through them and the legal and organizational changes associated with their introduction, Ogodei was able to concentrate the lion's share of the local revenues in the hands of his imperial agents, thereby strengthening his powers *vis-a-vis* the regional khans.⁵⁸ The latter's rights, however, could not be ignored, and a dispute between the Qa'an's agents and the regional Khan in Turkestan encouraged the development of a joint administration in the sedentary territories toward the end of Ogodei's reign:

each of the branch secretariats included representatives of Chinggis's four sons. The influence of the local khan was greater than that of the others in each region, while the Qa'an remained *primus inter pares*, and held the power to nominate the chief officials in the branch secretariats.⁵⁹

The collegial character of the empire found further expression in generous grants of private appanages from the conquered states to the princes, especially from the middle 1230s. This measure in the long run undermined the Qa'an's authority as well as his reform measures.⁶⁰

Another institution that preserved its collegial character was the army. Mongol expansion continued under Ögodei and its main achievements were the final destruction of the Jin dynasty in north China (1234), the conquest of the Qipchaq steppe and the Russian principalities (1237-41) and continuous advancement into Western Asia.⁶¹ The list of princes that took part in these campaigns decisively proves Ogodei's ability to allocate and dispatch troops from all the *uluses*.⁶² It is also possible that already in his time there were certain units, probably those originating from Chinggis's *kesig*, that were directly subject to the Qa'an *ex-officio*.⁶³

Ogodei was, however, aware of Tolui's military superiority. Rashīd al-Dīn mentions his attempt to transfer Toluid troops to the command of his son Köten, an attempt that even after Tolui's death could not have been implemented without the troops' opposition.⁶⁴ This superiority might also have been a major reason for Ogodei's offer to marry his eldest son, Güyüg, to Sorghaghtani Beki, Tolui's widow since 1233, thus hoping to unite the two important Mongol lines, an offer which Sorghaghtani proudly dismissed.⁶⁵ Making his capital in the vicinity of Qara Qorum, originally in Tolui's territory, Ogodei could keep a close watch on Tolui's domains, especially since the latter spent most of his time fighting in north China.⁶⁶ There was nevertheless no open conflict between Ogodei and Tolui and, in general, Ogodei's reign was a time of achievements and internal peace.⁶⁷

Ogodei died in December 1241 and according to the Mongol custom his wife, Toregene, served as a regent until a *quriltai* could nominate his successor. This time the interregnum was much longer, and it took Toregene almost five years to secure the throne for her eldest son, Güyüg. Rashīd al-Dīn and the *Yuan shi* claim that Ogodei nominated Shiremün, his grandson by his deceased third son, Köchü, to be his heir, and the Ögödeids' abrogation of the Qa'an's will later

served as one of the main Toluid arguments to justify their elevation to the Qa'anate.⁶⁸ Shiremün's nomination might not have been as clear-cut a matter as Rashīd al-Dīn would have us believe.⁶⁹ Even if Shiremün was nominated, installing a "mere child"⁷⁰ (as he was at the time of Ogodei's death) at the head of the Mongol empire was a highly problematic decision, especially for those who wanted the Qa'an to retain his power. Güyüg had seniority on his side, and he also enjoyed the support of the military commanders. Giyyig might have tried to secure a formal nomination from his father, hurrying back to Mongolia when he heard about Ogodei's illness, but death reached the Qa'an before him. The main factor that delayed Güyüg's election was the opposition of Batu, Jochi's son and, since Chaghadaï's death in 1242, the *aqā* of the Mongol empire.

The enmity between Batu and Giyyig originated in personal dissensions that arose during the Russian campaign (1237–41), when Giyyig and the Chaghadaïd prince Būri refused to accept Batu's leadership despite the latter's seniority, probably due to the Jochids' questionable legitimacy. The discord was so grave, that it forced Ogodei to intervene in favor of Batu; this episode might have caused him to refrain from nominating Giyyig as his heir. Batu did his best to postpone his rival's nomination, declining invitations to attend the *quriltai* on the excuse of ill health. Even after Töregene had managed to recruit enough support for her son and a *quriltai* was convened in the summer of 1246, Batu did not take part in it.⁷¹

Even though so far the contestors for the Qa'an's post came only from among the Ogodeids, the first who during the interregnum had tried to seize the throne "without election" was Chinggis's brother, Temüge Odchigin.⁷² Although he was foiled and eventually brought to trial and executed, this episode implies that already the exclusive right of the Ogodeids to the Qa'anate was not beyond question. Indeed, after Temüge's incident Giyyig insisted on getting from his kinsmen a written commitment that the Qa'anate would thereafter reside in his family.⁷³

Despite this written commitment, the newly enthroned Qa'an was much weaker than his predecessors, and yet he had to cope with the daunting task of restoring the central authority, which had eroded considerably during Töregene's regency. Giyyig started by renominating the heads of the branch secretariats, previously deposed by his mother, and by asserting the collegial character of these bodies.⁷⁴ He also deposed the Chaghadaïd khan, Qara Hülegü, a nomination of both Chaghadaï and Ogodei, in favour of his personal friend,

Chaghadaï's eldest living son, Yesü Möngke, claiming that a grandson (like Qara Hülegü) could not succeed to the throne as long as a son was alive.⁷⁵ This claim, perhaps indirectly referring also to Shiremiin, reflects Giyyig's attempt to enhance the seniority principle and attests to the fluid position of nominations in the Mongolian society. No action of Güyüg against the Toluids is recorded, and they are praised in the sources as the only ones who did not offend the Qa'an's prerogatives during the interregnum.⁷⁶

Nonetheless, it was harder to enforce the Qa'an's authority on his old enemy, Batu. This was true especially since the latter's territories were significantly enlarged after the conquests in Europe during Ogodei's last years, conquests that were incorporated into the Jochid realm in accordance with Chinggis's previous instructions. Juwaynī attests to Batu's general liberality in regard to the issue of *jarlighs* (edicts) and of assignment of revenues, functions that should have been determined by the joint administration. Perhaps the fact that no branch secretariat is known to exist in Batu's newly conquered territories was the reason for Giyyig's decision to cope with his rival. Giyyig sent troops to the West to arrest Batu's viceroys in the Caucasus, and he himself went from Mongolia to "inspect" the Ili region, apparently to prepare himself for a showdown with Batu. Batu was warned in advance about Giyyig's intentions by Sorghaghtani Beki, Tolui's widow, and he gathered his troops to oppose the Qa'an. Open conflict was avoided only by Giyyig's death on the road in 1248.⁷⁷

Giyyig's death found the Ogodeids divided among several candidates: Giyyig's sons, Naqu and Qoja, both saw themselves as rightful heirs of their father. They formed different courts, separated from that of their mother, Giyyig's wife, the regent Oghul Qaimish. This might have been related to the latter's support for Shiremiin, now an adult, who was another leading candidate.⁷⁸ More important than those struggles, however, was the fact that by the time of Giyyig's demise, Batu was still the *aqā* of the Mongol empire, and he was determined to solve the succession problem quickly and according to his own interests. After Güyüg's death, Batu called for the convening of a *quriltai* in his own territories. Most of the Ogodeids, together with the Chaghadaïd princes that supported them, refrained from participating in this assembly, claiming that the nominating *quriltai* should take place in the area of the Onon-Kerulen rivers where Chinggis Khan was enthroned in 1206. At last Giyyig's sons, Qoja and Naqu, were persuaded to send representatives, whom they

instructed to agree to any decision accepted by the majority. The *quriltai* was held in the summer of 1250. The Ogodeids seemed to have expected another internal Ogodeid contest for the Qa'anate, and Batu's proclamation that Mongke, Tolui's eldest son, would be the next Qa'an, came to them as a complete surprise.⁷⁹ Batu justified his choice on the basis of Mongke's being of the lineage of Chinggis Khan and of his merits as an experienced fighter famous for his bravery and sagacity.⁸⁰ The other princes accepted this decision probably owing to Batu's prestige (according to Juwaynī he chose Mongke only after he declined having the throne for himself⁸¹), and to the firm advocacy of Mongke's candidacy by his assertive mother, Sorghaghtani Beki.⁸² Other important factors might have been the recent edict issued by Oghul Qaimish in July 1250, that multiplied the tax levied on the nomad's herds tenfold⁸³ as well as the decline of the Ogodeid prestige due to Güyüg's ineffectual rule and the disunity among the Ogodeids.

The surprising news eventually led the Ogodeids to close ranks behind Shiremün, but this unity came too late. Moreover, Güyüg's sons had, theoretically at least, accepted the majority decision through their representatives.⁸⁴

After Mongke had accepted the nomination, it was decided to hold another *quriltai* in the Onon-Kerulen region to reconfirm the election "constitutionally". Most of the Ogodeids and Chaghadaids refused to come, trying to delay the nomination just as Batu had done prior to 1246. Gradually, the Toluids and Jochids, counting on personal grudges and opportunist interests, convinced several minor Ogodeid and Chaghadaid princes to attend the *quriltai*. Their presence gave the diet, held in the Mongol lands in 1251, its required legitimate character.⁸⁵ Mongke's election was reconfirmed and he launched a propaganda campaign to ensure his legitimacy, and that of the transfer of the Qa'anate from the Ogodeids to the Toluids. The crucial issue was whether Chinggis Khan, while indubitably nominating Ogodei to be his heir, had meant the post of the Qa'an to be reserved exclusively for the Ogodeids thereafter. The Toluids naturally argued, that although Chinggis Khan had designated Ogodei to be his heir, he explicitly meant that after him the post would settle upon the most talented candidate among the whole Chingissid family. The *Secret History* puts this argument into Chinggis's mouth as an integral part of the nomination scene, yet even external textual evidence implies that it was fabricated.⁸⁶ The Toluids therefore emphasized Mongke's qualification for the position of the Qa'an, stressing his fidelity to the *jasagh* and the Mongol traditions, and portraying him as "a true

universal sovereign in the Chingissid mold, endowed with heaven's favor and protection."⁸⁷

To strengthen further their legitimacy certain aspects in both Mongke's and Tolui's biographies were adjusted to accord with Mongke's new position. The propaganda emphasized Tolui's special position as Chinggis's youngest son, celebrated him as the successful regent and even posthumously conferred the title Qa'an upon him. Mongke initiated special rites in his memory as well as another cult for Chinggis Khan. Mongke's biography specially emphasized his close relationship with Ogodei and the latter's high appreciation of his merits. The Toluids also enhanced Mongke's legitimacy by stressing the fact that he was elected in a properly conducted *quriltai* and that he enjoyed the consensus of all the Chinggisid lines.⁸⁸ The mere need to conduct such a legitimization campaign asserts that the Ogodeid claim, later revived by Qaidu, still enjoyed a certain support.

Indeed, Mongke did not limit himself to this rather successful propaganda campaign. The rivals were literally purged, and it was at this stage that the Toluids benefitted greatly from their military superiority. The convenient justification for the purges was an alleged attempt of Shiremiin and Naqu to assassinate Mongke, a plot revealed by mere chance.⁸⁹ Using this excuse Mongke started a comprehensive purge directed against the Ogodeids and their supporters, the Chaghadaids. Troops of Mongke and Batu marched to various locations in Mongolia, Jungaria and Central Asia to track down and arrest the suspected conspirators. They were brought to trial, and after being found guilty were mostly exiled, many of them with the troops that went to China. Mongke ordered Shiremün executed shortly after his exile, and he exiled the Chaghadaids Buri and Yesü Mongke to Batu's camp, where they were also executed. Oghul Qaimish and Shiremün's mother were put to death in Sorghaghtani Beki's *ordo*. Nothing more is heard about the other exiled princes. The purges were by no means limited to the conspirators or to the imperial family, but included leading members in the Ogodeid central administration, many of whom were executed. Travelling tribunals were sent to China, Central Asia and even as far as Iran to judge Ogodeid loyalists in the army and the administrative apparatus; and local rulers loyal to the former Qa'ans also paid with their lives for supporting the losing side. Although the exact number of the victims is unknown, it was certainly large, and the sources make it clear that the ranks of the Ogodeids and Chaghadaid princes, as well as their supporters, were significantly thinned.⁹⁰

The Ogodeids were the big losers of the purges. They lost both their private property and the rights held in their *ulus ex-officio*, i.e. the territories and armies that were under the Qa'an's direct control. The Ogodeid territories were mostly incorporated into the new Qa'an's domains. Only a few princes who had supported Mongke, and among them Qaidu, received small, widely spaced territories (about which see Chapter I). Most of the Ogodeid troops, with the exception of the Toluid army of Kōten, were taken away and redistributed among the other branches of the imperial family.⁹¹ There is no indication that after Mongke's accession the Ogodeids retained their *ulus* structure: no Ogodeid regional khan or head of *ulus* was elected and Ogodeid princes had no representation in the regional administrations or in the *tamma* forces that were sent under Mongke to conquer West Asia. This was the situation from which Qaidu had to start in his efforts to revive the Ogodeid cause.

Unlike the Ogodeids, the Chaghadaids retained their *ulus* structure after the purges. Mongke rewarded Qara-Hülegü, the senior Chaghadaid prince who supported him, by nominating him to be the head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*, the office he had held in 1244-46 prior to his deposition by Güyüg. Qara Hülegü, however, died before reaching Turkestan, and Mongke appointed his widow, Orghina (who was related by marriage to both the Toluids and the Jochids), to act as a regent for their infant son, Mubarak Shāh.⁹² Although the Chaghadaid army was not redistributed, many of their military commanders went into exile.⁹³ Yet one Chaghadaid prince, Tegüder, accompanied Hülegü on his Western campaign,⁹⁴ and though no Chaghadaid representative is mentioned for the regional administration of China or Iran, they might have had representatives in the Turkestan administration about which no data survive. The Chaghadaids' relative weakness was quickly manipulated by the Jochids to extend their control to Transoxania and Western Turkestan, hitherto important parts of the Chaghadaid realm.⁹⁵

The Jochid lot was quite different from that of the Ogodeids and the Chaghadaids, due to their contribution to Mongke's rise. Nonetheless, as Allsen shows, Batu and Mongke did not hold the Mongol empire as a condominium, and the Great Khan was certainly able to enforce his authority in the Golden Horde. Yet a branch secretariat was apparently installed in Russia only after Batu's death in 1257, and even after that Mongke had to work in close cooperation with the regional khan.⁹⁶

After his accession Mongke placed his brothers Qubilai and Hulegii in charge of China and West Asia respectively, thereby

creating the basis for two new regional khanates.⁹⁷ Those regions seem to be the territories previously held by the Qa'an *ex-officio*. By thus installing his brothers, Mongke assured Toluid dominance on the most productive areas of the empire, and his own relatively firm control over them.⁹⁸ Mongke's brothers expanded the empire's borders each in his own direction: Qubilai subdued the Yunnan kingdom of Dali in 1254, and together with Mongke he attacked Song posts in Sichuan in 1258-59. Hulegii wiped out the Assassins in 1256, the Abbasid Khalifate in 1258 and continued to advance into Syria.⁹⁹ This impressive, twofold expansion, that was halted by Mongke's death in 1259, was possible because of the Qa'an's efficient control of the empire's resources. In the long run, the swift expansion encouraged regional ambitions.

Mongke's administration was basically modelled on the Ögodeid one, but his firm central control and his administrative measures enabled the system to function much more effectively.¹⁰⁰ In the central secretariat Toluid loyalists, mainly recruited from Mongke's personal guard, replaced the former Ögodeid officials. In the regional administration, however, the main administrators of the branch secretariat retained their posts due to their experience and qualifications. A certain nominal collegiality survived in the regional administrations, since the interested princes could add their representatives to the branch secretariat, though, significantly enough, the sources mention only Toluid or Jochid representatives. Yet outside the Golden Horde the influence of those representatives, or their nominators, was rather meager. The administrators in China, Iran and Turkestan owed their positions to Mongke alone, and the Qa'an kept them under close surveillance lest they take the collegial aspects of their duties too seriously. The greater centralization, therefore, came to a certain extent at the expense of the collegial principle.¹⁰¹

On the eve of Mongke's death the Mongol empire was apparently a unified body under a strong Toluid-Jochid dominance, and the Ögodeids and Chaghadaids were reduced to various degrees of impotency. Nonetheless, the old tensions between the center and the regional khans, the lack of an effective succession system and personal grudges were still apparent behind the scenes, and even tended to increase due to the broad expansion of the empire. The Toluid-Jochid rivalry regarding the right to rule in Iran¹⁰² was one manifestation of the inherent problems. Much more decisive, however, was the intra-Toluid succession struggle that followed Mongke's death.¹⁰³ Mongke's

brothers, Qubilai and Arigh Böke, both saw themselves qualified to succeed him. The bitter contest between them changed once more the balance among the different *uluses*, and gave Qaidu his chance to step into the front lights of Mongol history.

Chapter I

The Rise of Qaidu

Qaidu (Haidu) was born circa 1235–36,¹ the son of Ögodei's fifth son Qashi (Heshi) and Sebkine of the Bekrin, a tribe that dwelt in the mountains near Uighuria, but which was neither Uighur nor Mongol.² Qashi, the youngest son of Ögodei by his chief wife, *Töregena*, was named after the land of the Tanguts (Chinese: Hexi) to which Chinggis had led a victorious campaign just before his birth. It may thus be concluded that he was born circa 1210.³ Xu Ting, a Chinese traveller who visited Qara Qorum in the year 1235, indicates that Ögodei viewed Qashi as his heir.⁴ Yet Qashi died of drink in Khurasan at an early age,⁵ soon after Xu Ting's visit.

Qaidu was born after his father's death and grew up in Ögodei's *ordo*.⁶ Qarshi relates how the infant Qaidu was brought before Ögodei, who kissed him and said: "Would that my young son will succeed me." He ordered that the child's every need be provided.⁷ At the time of Ögodei's death (1241), however, Qaidu was about six years old, far too young to take part in any succession struggles. Rashid al-Dīn notes that after Ögodei's death Qaidu accepted Mongke's authority,⁸ and indeed we know nothing of Qaidu's reaction to Güyük's death (1248) and the subsequent power struggle between the houses of Ögodei and Tolui, which concluded with Mongke's rise to power (1251). The reason may well have been that Qaidu judged that he could not obtain much at his young age, and thus preferred to wait and see what the outcome would be.

Qaidu's patience bore fruit: Möngke eliminated and banished many Ögödeid princes who opposed him,⁹ but in 1252 he distributed appanages to Ögödeid princes who had not contested his succession:¹⁰

Qadan (Hedan), the sixth son of Ögodei by a concubine, received Besh Baliq (Bieshi bali), the capital of the Uighurs. Melik (Mieli), the seventh son of Ögodei, also by a concubine, received the region of the

Irtish river (Yeerdeshi he). Qaidu received Qayaliq (Haiyali) northwest of Almalıq (Alimalı), between the Emil and the Ili rivers, in the region of present-day Kopal in Southern Kazakhstan.¹¹ Totaq (Tuotuo), the son of Qarachar, the fourth son of Ogödei, received the region of the Emil river (Yemili).¹² Möngetü (Menggedu), the son of Ogodei's second son, Koteń, received together with Ogodei's wife, an appanage in the west of Koteń's dominion. According to Rashid al-Din, Koteń's appanage was in the land of the Tanguts,¹³ and during Mongke's reign he also ruled a portion of Tibet.¹⁴

The Muslim sources indicate the distribution of lands only to Qadan, Melik and the sons of Koteń. They give no details as to the location of their territories, but implies that they were originally part of Ogodei's appanage. Juwayni, who refers only to Qadan and Melik, adds that with the land they also received some of Ogödei's personal troops.¹⁵

Certain troops may well have been distributed to, or have joined Qaidu as well, since the *Shajarat al-atrak* mentions that a senior Ogodeid commander, the head of the Arulad tribe, accompanied Qaidu.¹⁶ In any case, Mongke must have ensured that the troops distributed to the far-flung dominions of the princes could pose no threat to his rule.¹⁷

Qayaliq constituted Qaidu's first territorial base, and from there he could begin to assemble men and build up his force. The *Yuan shu* describes Qayaliq as a rich grazing, fishing and hunting land.¹⁸ William of Rubruck, who visited Qaidu's Qayaliq in 1253, describes it as a city with busy markets, churches and temples.¹⁹ Despite its resources Qayaliq was, however, a small restricted base even in relation to the appanages distributed to other Ogodeid princes such as Besh Baliq or the Irtish region. Indeed, there is no evidence that Qaidu occupied a senior position among the Ogödeids, although achieving such a position was not that difficult after Mongke's purges. At this stage it is clear that Qaidu could not constitute any threat to the Qa'an.

Yan Fu, a Yuan scholar (1236-1312), claimed that Qaidu was recalcitrant since Mongke's time.²⁰ The only evidence of tension between Qaidu and Mongke is the fact that in 1256, when Mongke sent the judge Shi Tianlin to Qayaliq, Qaidu took him captive and released him only some twenty years later.²¹ The object of the mission, and the reason for Shi's captivity are both unclear. The very sending of the envoy may, however, have constituted an expression of a certain tension in relations, as in the case of Mongke's envoys to Qubilai in 1257 or other envoys sent by Mongke to enforce his authority, as

indicated in the *Yuan shi*.²² Mongke did not respond to the holding of his envoy, perhaps because he was occupied with his campaigns against the southern Song dynasty.²³

The important stages in Qaidu's rise were thus in the 1260s and 1270s, years for which the chronology of the many recorded events is not always clear. Reconstruction of the order of events is, accordingly, somewhat problematic.

Mongke's death in August 1259 led to a struggle for the throne between two of his brothers, Qubilai and Arigh Boke (Ali buge), and in 1260 two rival *quriltais* enthroned both brothers as rival Qa'ans.²⁴ According to Rashid al-Din and later scholarship, Qaidu supported Arigh Böke,²⁵ but his support may not have been unqualified, since by 1260 Qaidu was also among the princes to whom Qubilai distributed allowances a short time after his enthronement. This custom continued, according to the *Yuan shi*, subsequently every year.²⁶ The princes who received allowances were mainly from the *uluses* of the descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers and several Chaghadaid and Ogodeid princes. Most of them supported Qubilai subsequently as well.²⁷ There is evidence that later Qubilai, as the undisputed Qa'an, also gave allowances to a prince who had previously rebelled against him,²⁸ but it is doubtful whether at this stage he could be so generous or had a special reason to seek Qaidu's support. The *Yuan shi* does not mention Qaidu supporting Arigh Boke. Possibly this is because Qaidu's position was not important at this stage, but clearly, the evidence of Qaidu's support of Arigh Boke is not as decisive as modern scholars have maintained.

The fact that Qaidu received an allowance may indicate that initially he adopted a neutral stance in the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Boke. If he did remain neutral, then Alghu's subsequent revolt gave him a good reason to go over to Arigh Böke's side: Alghu, the grandson of Chaghadaı, was appointed by Arigh Boke as head of the Chaghadaid *ulus* and in 1261 the latter sent him westward to organize supply shipments from Transoxania and Turkestan to Mongolia. Alghu rapidly imposed his rule over Central Asia, seizing control of areas taken from the Chaghadaid *ulus* in Mongke's time and of areas that were never in their possession, at the expense (especially) of the Golden Horde and of the remains of the Ogodeid dominion. He also sent his commissioners to the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, which until then had been ruled by the joint administration, i.e., were subject to the Qa'an. After accruing power

and territories, **Alghu** openly rebelled against **Arigh Boke** and fought several battles against him in 1262-63. **Alghu** obtained the support of **Mas'ūd Beg**, head of the regional administration in Turkestan under the **Qa'ans**, who entered his service and helped him to recruit the resources his army required. He also found a supporter and wife in **Orghina**, the widow and successor of **Qara Hülegü**, the previous head of the **Chaghadaid ulus**. **Alghu's** revolt was thus one of the main reasons for **Arigh Böke's** surrender to **Qubilai**, who sought the support of the new head of the **Chaghadaid ulus**.²⁹

Alghu, whose base in the region of the **Hi** and of **Almaliq**³⁰ was not far from **Qayaliq**, presented a greater danger to **Qaidu** than did the struggle between the **Qa'ans**. **Rashid al-Din** claims that after turning to **Qubilai** (ca. 1263), **Alghu** attacked **Qaidu** for his siding with **Arigh Böke**.³¹ This is the only evidence for **Qaidu's** active support of **Arigh Böke**, albeit not on the former's initiative. Yet these battles can also be interpreted in terms of local Central Asian politics as part of **Alghu's** struggle to consolidate his rule in the region. Inevitably, **Qaidu's** program was to support whoever opposed **Alghu**.

When **Arigh Böke's** power weakened and he capitulated to **Qubilai**, **Qaidu** turned to **Berke**, the Khan of the Golden Horde (1257-67), for assistance against their shared enemy, **Alghu**. **Berke** agreed to accept **Qaidu** as an ally, according to **Mīrkhwānd** only after verifying that **Qaidu's** horoscope was promising. He provided **Qaidu** with an army and wealth, and promised him the leadership of the **Chaghadaid ulus** if he vanquished **Alghu**.³² With **Berke's** aid, **Qaidu** seized control of new territories and attacked **Alghu**. He was victorious in the first battle, but was defeated in the second one, and only **Alghu's** death in late 1265 or early 1266 prevented him from paying a heavier price for this defeat.³³

Earlier, in 1264, **Arigh Boke** surrendered to **Qubilai**. **Qubilai** thus consolidated his position as the **Qa'an** and summoned the Mongol princes to his court to recognize his authority. **Qaidu** ignored **Qubilai's** repeated summonses to the court, claiming that the distance between them was great and his cattle too thin to cover it.³⁴ The great distance was partially the result of **Qubilai's** transferral of the Mongol capital from **Qara Qorum** to **Shangdu** in Northern China, a step that impaired the **Qa'an's** ability to rule effectively in Central Asia, and enabled **Qaidu** to refuse his summons.³⁵ Despite this refusal, in 1266 **Qubilai** distributed to **Qaidu** part of the revenues of the newly conquered province of **Nanjing**, those of the city of **Caizhou** (**Kaifeng**).³⁶ Still **Qaidu** had good reasons not to come to the court:

even before **Arigh Boke's** surrender, **Qubilai** had divided the empire among its major leaders, with the aim of ensuring their support: the territory from the banks of the **Oxus** to the gates of **Egypt** went to **Hülegü**, the **Qipchaq** plain and the other areas related to **Batu's** name to **Berke**, the area between the **Altai** mountains and the banks of the **Oxus** to **Alghu**, and everything from the **Altai** eastward was under **Qubilai's** direct authority.³⁷ Under this new arrangement troops and territories were allocated to the sons of **Tolui**, **Chaghadaï** and **Jochi** but not to the house of **Ogödei**, whose appanage was absorbed into that of **Qaidu's** rival, **Alghu**.

Alghu's death (1265/6) occurred in close proximity to the deaths of **Berke** (1266/7) and **Hulegii** (1265), and consequently the great Mongol *uluses* were occupied with matters of succession. As already mentioned, the transfer of **Qubilai's** capital to **China** further complicated matters. The vacuum thus created in Central Asia provided **Qaidu** with the opportunity that he needed to expand his jurisdiction.

There is no clear evidence regarding the territories of which **Qaidu** then seized control, but it may be supposed that in the west he reached at least **Talas**, which subsequently became his power center.³⁸ He also may well have exploited the struggles among the sons of **Chaghadaï** in order to continue to advance in the direction of the **Jaxartes** river.³⁹ Yet it seems that most of **Qaidu's** expansion in this period was eastward: he seized control of **Almaliq**, where **Alghu** had been buried circa 1266 and from which **Qaidu's** forces were expelled by **Yuan** armies about two years later.⁴⁰ From **Almaliq** he advanced towards **Uighuria**. At that time or perhaps earlier, he became the leader of his mother's tribe, the **Bekrins**, who inhabited the mountains near **Uighuria**.⁴¹ **Qaidu's** troops did great harm to the **Uighurs**, thereby encouraging them to abandon their cities,⁴² and they even threatened their capital **Besh Baliq**. As already noted, **Besh Baliq** was allotted to **Ogödei's** son **Qadan**, whose son **Qipchaq** was already one of **Qaidu's** supporters in the late 1260s.⁴³ After the abortive attempt to invade **Besh Baliq**, **Qaidu** was constrained to retreat in 1268 before the **Qa'an's** army, first to **Almaliq** and subsequently more than two thousand *li* further.⁴⁴ The movement of the **Qa'an's** army against him compelled **Qaidu** to move west from **Talas**.⁴⁵

Qaidu reached the west after new rulers had already consolidated themselves in the Mongol *uluses*. Once again, **Qaidu** had to deal with events in the house of **Chaghadaï**: after **Alghu's** death, his widow **Orghina** enthroned as leader of the **Chaghadaid ulus** **Mubarak Shah**,

her son from her first marriage to Qara Hülegü, apparently without the Qa'an's authorization.⁴⁶ According to Qarshī, The enthronement occurred in March 1266, but by September Mubarak Shah was banished by Baraq, Chaghadaī's great-grandson, who emerged as the Chaghadaid Khan.⁴⁷

Baraq was to play an important role in Qaidu's rise. Baraq's father had supported the house of Ogōdei during the succession struggle of 1251,⁴⁸ and had been exiled by Mongke to China. Baraq grew up in Qubilai's camp and won his favor by performing "praiseworthy services" for him.⁴⁹ In 1263, according to the *Yuan shi*, Qubilai ordered that 129 horses be given to Baraq's soldiers who had remained without mounts.⁵⁰ Rashīd al-Dīn states that when Qubilai heard that Mubarak Shah had been crowned without his authorization, he sent Baraq with a *jarligh* (decree) appointing him as joint ruler with Mubarak Shah over the Chaghadaid *ulus*.⁵¹ Another motive for sending Baraq, Rashīd al-Dīn and al-ʿUmarī indicate, was the Qa'an's wish to send a loyal follower to fight against Qaidu. Rashīd al-Dīn also suggests that the initiative for the mission came from Baraq, who felt that he deserved a reward for his services.⁵² When Baraq arrived and found that Mubarak Shah and Orghina had firmly established their power, he kept the decree in his possession a secret and presented himself as returning to his appanage and seeking refuge. Mubarak Shah allowed him to settle on his patrimonial estate (apparently in the Chaghāniyān region north of the Oxus, near Tirmidh). Baraq gradually gained the loyalty of the members of Mubarak Shah's army and finally fought against him, and on the pretext of some crime sent him into exile with the rank of hunting inspector.⁵³

Rashīd al-Dīn's narrative does not correspond with Qarshī's dates: it is improbable that the rumor of Mubarak Shah's enthronement could have reached Qubilai, that he responded by appointing Baraq as a joint ruler, and that the latter could then have reached Mubarak Shah in the Jaxartes region, won his trust and then exiled him, all within the space of six months. (According to Waṣṣāf, the journey from Qubilai's territories to Qaidu's territories alone took six months⁵⁴.) It may be assumed that Baraq returned to the region earlier, perhaps when he heard of Alghu's illness and perhaps close to the date on which the *Yuan shi* notes that he received horses, 1263.⁵⁵ It is difficult to determine whether and when he received the decree from Qubilai, which is not mentioned at all in the *Yuan shi*. Inasmuch as he rebelled against the Qa'an's army immediately after Mubarak

Shah's banishment, it seems unlikely that the decree played a decisive role in his attaining the *ulus* leadership.

If Qubilai expected Baraq to represent his interests faithfully, he was to be disappointed: according to Rashīd al-Dīn, Baraq sent his own governor to replace Moghultai, the representative of the Qa'an in Chinese Turkestan. At the sight of the fighting force, the latter fled back to China to acquaint his master with the situation. To restore order, the Qa'an then sent an officer, *Qonichi, to his aid with 6,000 horsemen. When Baraq sent out a far larger force against him, *Qonichi preferred to retreat without fighting and allowed Baraq's forces to plunder a now defenceless Khotan, which had hitherto been under Qubilai's rule.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, in 1268 Baraq received a grant from Qubilai,⁵⁷ perhaps designed to win his loyalty or at least his neutrality in the impending fight against Qaidu.

Baraq had his own reasons for attacking Qaidu: when the latter moved westward from Talas and advanced towards Baraq, Baraq feared that he was interested in Samarkand and Bukhara and decided to attack him.⁵⁸ As already noted, Qubilai had allocated to Alghu and the Chaghadaid house the territories ruled by Qaidu, and this was also a reason for tension.⁵⁹ It would thus seem that it is very doubtful whether Rashīd al-Dīn is right to suggest that fulfilling the Qa'an's mission was the main reason for the confrontation between Baraq and Qaidu.⁶⁰

In the first battle between Qaidu and Baraq, on the banks of the Jaxartes, the latter set an ambush for Qaidu's troops, who suffered a crushing defeat. Qaidu subsequently turned for assistance to the Golden Horde, whose new ruler, Mongke Temür (1267-80), perhaps fearing the rise of a second Alghu, sent his uncle Berkecher to Qaidu with 50,000 men. In the second battle Qaidu and his reinforcements won a victory over Baraq near Khojand on the banks of the Jaxartes and apparently overran Transoxania.⁶¹

The defeated Baraq fled to Samarkand and to Bukhara. He tried to rebuild his force by plundering the cities and employing craftsmen around the clock to prepare new weapons. While he was still preparing for battle, Qaidu's envoy Qipchaq, who was Ogōdei's grandson and Baraq's friend, arrived with a proposal for peace in the name of the unity of Chinggis Khan's family.⁶² The sources agree that the main reason for Qaidu's peace proposal was fear that the demands that Baraq was making on Samarkand and Bukhara and the war that must follow would bring further destruction of a region already greatly harmed by Alghu's revolt.⁶³ It is also possible that Qaidu was

interested in minimizing the confrontation with Baraq so that he could devote maximum efforts to consolidation in the east and perhaps to war against Qubilai.

Under the influence of the governors of the populated areas of his kingdom (Mas'ūd Beg and Daifu⁶⁴), Baraq accepted the peace proposal. It also seems that he felt unable to defeat Qaidu on the battlefield. The princes agreed to hold a *quriltai* in the spring, and indeed this took place either in the spring of 1269 in Talas (according to Rashīd al-Dīn), or around 1267 on the plain of Qatwān, south of Samarkand (according to Waṣṣāf).⁶⁵ In addition to Qaidu and Baraq, Berkecher, Mongke Temür's representative, also participated in the *quriltai*.⁶⁶ At the *quriltai* Qaidu appealed for unity in the name of the shared heritage of Chinggis Khan. Baraq maintained that in the name of that same heritage the Chaghadaids were also entitled to an appanage and pasture lands that others would not menace. It was determined that two-thirds of Transoxania would devolve to Baraq, and one third to Qaidu and Mongke Temür. Qaidu and Baraq divided the "Thousands" (*hizārah*)⁶⁷ and the workshops (*kārkhānah*)⁶⁸ of Samarkand and Bukhara between them, and this would seem to have been the spoil that Qaidu demanded for his victory in battle. For Baraq's army, and possibly also for the other armies, pasture areas were assigned for summer and winter. Qaidu stationed forces in the Bukhara region and thus prevented Baraq's army from encamping there. The princes decided that henceforth they would dwell only in the mountains and deserts and not in the cities; they would not graze their cattle in cultivated areas and would not make exaggerated demands on their subjects. The sedentary area was entrusted to Mas'ūd Beg, who was ordered to restore it to prosperity. The decisions were submitted for Mongke Temiir's approval (or the approval of his representative). Baraq, who could not deploy his forces eastward and northward, proposed to traverse the Oxus the following spring, and take possession of some of Abaqa's lands, which he defined as areas seized by force, and not by virtue of an inheritance. Qaidu and the Golden Horde agreed to this proposal, by which Baraq hoped to solve the problem of the shortage of pasture lands for his troops.⁶⁹ Qaidu and Baraq called each other *anda* (blood brothers, eternal friends) and the princes "drank gold", namely exchanged gold cups, from which they drank to mark the agreement.⁷⁰

Despite the apparent friendship, in fact the *quriltai* took place in a climate of mutual distrust. Before leaving to attend it Baraq commanded his son Beg Temiir to be ready to set out after him with

50,000 men in case he summoned him or if he was harmed.⁷¹ Already at the time of the *quriltai* Baraq was displeased at his expulsion from Bukhara and plotted to breach the agreement.⁷²

For his part, Qaidu agreed to Baraq's plan to attack Abaqa, deeming that whatever the consequences of the battle, it would distance Baraq from him and cause harm to both sides: if Abaqa were vanquished, Baraq would be occupied in Khurasan, and his control of Transoxania would be more weak; if, on the other hand, Baraq were vanquished, so much the better.⁷³ Similar calculations probably also guided Mongke Temiir, who apparently at the time already maintained a kind of "peace" or "truce" with Abaqa.⁷⁴ The fact that Abaqa was the grandson of Tolui and a supporter of Qubilai may have encouraged Qaidu's agreement, but it appears that the main consideration was the removal of Baraq. Thus it seems that one should not interpret the *quriltai* decisions as a kind of agreement of the houses of Ogodei and Chaghadaid to rebel against the house of Tolui, with Qaidu fighting against Qubilai and Baraq against Qubilai's nephew Abaqa, as Rashīd al-Dīn suggested in one of his references to the matter, and Howorth and others subsequently reiterated.⁷⁵

Even if an anti-Toluid covenant was not made at the *quriltai*, the *quriltai*'s decisions constituted an attack on the Qa'an's authority, not only because the princes reached a territorial agreement without asking his opinion, but also because they divided up among themselves even sedentary territories such as the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara which until Möngke's time had been subject to the Qa'an, thereby creating a substitute to the joint administration that developed under Ogodei and Möngke.⁷⁶ Moreover, during the *quriltai* Baraq referred to Qubilai as a "regional" Khan ruling in the east, and not as the Qa'an deploying his authority also over the other territories of the Mongols.⁷⁷

Zhou maintains that the princes who assembled at Talas sent a strong message to Qubilai, condemning him for the sinicization changes that he was introducing in his kingdom. He attributes to them the following statement, that appears in the biography of the Tangut Gao Zhiyao in the *Yuan shi*:⁷⁸

The assembly of the vassal princes of the northwest sent a messenger to the court [of Qubilai] saying: "The old customs of our dynasty are not those of the Han laws.⁷⁹ Today, [when you] remain in the Han territory, build a capital and construct cities,

learn a method of reading and writing and use the Han laws, what will happen to the old [customs]?

This quotation is important because it is the only explicit textual evidence of Mongol opposition to Qubilai's sinicization steps. It is, however, difficult to establish the identity of the author of this statement from the *Yuan shi*. As is often the case in Chinese biographies, the anecdote is presented without a date, whereas the "northwest region" of the text covers everything that is northwest of China, including both Turkestan and Mongolia. Consequently, different scholars arrived at different conclusions as to the identity of the speakers.⁸⁰

Leaving aside the chronological divergences (which I shall discuss in the notes), a detailed study of the material dealing with the *quriltai* of 1269 casts doubt on any desire of the princes assembled at Talas to complain about the breaking with the old customs. Indeed, the very fact of gathering and deciding to allocate territories and cities without asking the Qa'an's opinion was also a breach of the customary usage of the Mongol empire. Moreover, the princes in Talas were able to take this liberty only because Qubilai had "remained in the Han's territories," since the transfer of the Mongol capital from Qara Qorum to Shangdu (and subsequently to Dadu, Beijing) had greatly impaired his ability to rule effectively in Central Asia. The princes in Talas were interested in acquiring their realms at the expense of the empire, and many of the decisions dealt not with "conserving the old customs," but with ensuring the minimal welfare of the residents of these territories, the people whose relative prosperity was vital for the economic consolidation of the appanages. It is doubtful that the princes were interested in the internal administration in China beyond the relative freedom that it accorded them.⁸¹

According to Barthold and to many subsequent scholars, the Talas *quriltai* marks the date of Qaidu's rise to the throne of the Khan (leader of the *Ogödeid ulus*) or the Qa'an (the Great Khan, head of all the Mongols) and the "coming into being of a separate Mongol state in Central Asia."⁸² Barthold himself notes that there is no evidence of enthronement or of Qaidu being called Khan or Qa'an, but he cites two proofs of the fact that Qaidu saw himself as Baraq's lord and the ruler of all Transoxania. First, Qaidu claimed after the battle that Baraq had refused to give money to his revenue collectors and even beat them; this claim demonstrates, said Barthold, that Qaidu saw himself already as ruler over all Baraq's lands. The second claim is

that the sedentary areas fell into the hands of Mas'ūd Beg, Qaidu's representative.⁸³ However, when Qaidu complains of the attitude to the revenue collectors, he clearly distinguishes between his territories and Baraq's, and his complaint is that Baraq refuses to allow his men to collect taxes from the territories that belong to him (such as Bukhara), not to Baraq.⁸⁴ The sources also clearly indicate the territorial distribution, and Qaidu's part, as already noted, is limited to a third of Transoxania, which he was to share with Mongke Temür. As regards Mas'ūd Beg, he served Baraq at that time just as he served Alghu before him; this is clear because he accompanied Baraq at the time of the invasion of Khurāsān.⁸⁵

It would seem that the *quriltai* was presented as the date of Qaidu's enthronement as Qa'an - the legitimate Great Khan successor of the house of Ogödei and a rival to Qubilai - a theme that Howorth developed extensively,⁸⁶ partly because of the mention of the word *quriltai*, which appears generally in the context of the election of a Qa'an. The word itself, however, means only an assembly of Mongol princes convened to deal with prevailing problems, not necessarily related to the election of a Qa'an.⁸⁷ The event in question was apparently merely the occasion at which Qaidu, assisted to a great extent by the representative of his ally the Golden Horde, compelled Baraq to accept a peace agreement in keeping with Qaidu's objectives. The agreement included a "declaration of intentions" by Qaidu as regards administration of the territories in his possession. It is difficult to establish whether indeed Baraq did become Qaidu's vassal (Dardess even interpreted the *quriltai* as a considerable attainment for Baraq⁸⁸), and there is no evidence that Qaidu was enthroned at that time.

While the *quriltai* enhanced Qaidu's economic and political status, one should not exaggerate its importance, if only because most of its decisions were disregarded a short time after it was held. Mongke Temür's army soon moved toward Transoxania, probably to take possession of the part to which he was entitled by virtue of the agreement (or more?). Qaidu used the forces that he had stationed in Bukhara to prevent this, and Baraq exploited the redeployment of the troops and perhaps also the dispute between Qaidu and the Golden Horde to reoccupy Bukhara.⁸⁹ The sources mention no response by the Golden Horde to Qaidu's actions, but it seems that Mongke Temür never gained possession of the territory.⁹⁰ Nor is there any evidence of the transfer of income from Qaidu to Mongke Temür.

The passage in the *Yuan shi* referring to Qubilai's consultation with Mongke Temür on the subject of Qaidu at the beginning of the *Zhi*

yuan period (1264–94),⁹¹ may well be related to this tension between Qaidu and the Golden Horde. Mongke Temür's reply to Qubilai's envoys was that according to the law of Chinggis Khan rebels were to be put to death, and he proposed cooperating with Qubilai in a joint attack on Qaidu. The envoy, who also passed through Qaidu's territories, advised Qubilai against fighting Qaidu's large and well-trained army. Qaidu, who apparently knew the results of the mission, considered fighting against Mongke Temür, but refrained in the knowledge that Mongke Temür was fully prepared for war.⁹² Since there is no evidence of further cooperation between Qubilai and the Golden Horde, but only of tension between them,⁹³ and since, on the other hand, there are testimonies of cooperation between Qaidu and Mongke Temür even after the aforementioned dispute, it is difficult to place Qubilai's embassy in the course of events.⁹⁴

Baraq, as already mentioned, exploited the dispute to enter Bukhara. He prepared to invade Iran and resumed his maltreatment of his subjects: he confiscated the local cattle and grazed his horses in the fields. Only with great difficulty did Mas'ūd Beg prevent him from plundering Samarkand and Bukhara.⁹⁵ Despite these blatant breaches of the *quriltai* decisions, Baraq asked Qaidu's assistance in invading Iran.⁹⁶

Qaidu complied with Baraq's request, hoping to push him into Abaq's hands, as the sources explicitly indicate.⁹⁷ He sent to Baraq's aid the aforementioned Qipchaq and Chabat, Güyüg's grandson, together with a force of 4000 men, but instructed them to find a pretext to return before the battle commenced.⁹⁸ Baraq placed Qaidu's forces in the the army's vanguard⁹⁹ and crossed the Oxus in early 1270 (according to Rashid al-Dīn), or in 1268–69 (according to Waṣṣāf, Harawī and Mamluk sources);¹⁰⁰ in other words, the invasion occurred only a few months after the *quriltai*, if the chronology of Rashid al-Dīn is reliable,

Baraq gained an initial victory in Khurasan over Abaq's forces, who were led by Abaq's brother Tüshin, the local governor, and by Arghun Aqa, the chief administrator of the region. This victory was facilitated by the fact that Abaq had much of his army in the west, and was occupied at that time also with quelling the insurgency of Tegüder, a Chaghadaid commander in the service of the Ilkhans, who had revolted at Baraq's encouragement.¹⁰¹ When Tüshin realized that he could not tackle Baraq's army, he fled to Māzandrān, sent a message to Abaq and left Khurasan to Baraq.¹⁰² After this victory, Qipchaq quarreled with one of Baraq's generals, Jalayirtai, and this

provided him with the required pretext to return to Qaidu. Baraq sent his brother after him and after a while sent also Jalayirtai with 3,000 horsemen, but they did not succeed in overtaking Qipchaq. Soon, Chabat also found an opportunity to return to Qaidu, although he lost most of his soldiers in a clash with Baraq's son in Bukhara. Baraq protested to Qaidu at the desertion of his forces.¹⁰³

Qaidu ignored Baraq, but according to Rashid al-Dīn he did send a message to inform Abaq of Qipchaq's return, and subsequently "friendship foundations were then established" between Abaq and Qaidu and they called each other *ortogh* (here - ally, friend).¹⁰⁴ The desertion by Qaidu's troops, and the fact that much of Baraq's army was sent after them gave Abaq a breathing space, so that it is not surprising that he was prepared for an alliance with Qaidu. Particularly interesting is Qaidu's initiative in establishing ties with Abaq, who undoubtedly recognized Qubilai as Qa'an. (Qubilai's envoys came to enthrone him immediately after the battle with Baraq.) This leads us to conclude that Qaidu did not present himself then as the "legitimate Qa'an" and did not act exclusively (or even mainly) out of ideological considerations, but also out of tactical ones. Here he clearly went over to Abaq's side.

Qaidu's judgement proved sound: when the two armies met at Herat on the first of Dhū al-Hijja 668/July 22nd, 1270, Abaq won an overwhelming victory.¹⁰⁵ Subdued and wounded, Baraq fled to Bukhara, while some of his troops chose to join Abaq and two princes, Ahmad son of Būri and Negübei – preferred to ride east, to Turkestan. Baraq sent loyal princes after the two deserters and entrusted to his brother, Basar,¹⁰⁶ a letter to Qaidu, in which he explained his situation, attributed his defeat to a great extent to Qipchaq's and Chabat's desertion, and requested assistance.¹⁰⁷ Qaidu imprisoned the envoy but sent a message to Baraq informing him that he would send troops to his assistance. He himself set out with the force, estimated at 20,000 men, hoping to take advantage of Baraq's weakness and the rivalries among the Chaghadaids. He also wished to prevent Baraq from joining forces again with Qubilai. Baraq learned of Qaidu's approach after his princes had already subdued the rebels, and tried to convince him that his assistance was no longer needed and that he should return home. Qaidu had no intention of doing so: his forces surrounded Baraq's camp and planned to attack him, but when they reached the camp on the following day they found that Baraq had died in the night. After the burial ceremony, most of Baraq's commanders, and with them his army, estimated at about

30,000 after his defeat, chose to enter into Qaidu's service. He allocated lands to the commanders and divided Baraq's wealth among them.¹⁰⁸ According to Wassāf's alternative version of the story, most of Baraq's army commanders had chosen to enter into Qaidu's service while Baraq was still alive, and Baraq had been obliged to seek refuge with Qaidu, who poisoned him.¹⁰⁹

Baraq's death occurred, according to Jamāl Qarshī, in early 670/ August 1271, and at the end of Muharram of that year / August-September 1271 Qaidu was crowned Khan in Talas.¹¹⁰ It should be noted that he was crowned Khan and not Qa'an, although in addition to being the Khan of the house of Ogodei, Qaidu was also empowered to appoint the head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*.¹¹¹ In other words, the Chaghadaid *ulus* lost its independence, becoming subordinate to Qaidu.

Baraq's defeat at the battle of Herat played a decisive role in Qaidu's rise to the throne, far more so than the *quriltai* of 1269. Qaidu for the first time attained a senior political position and greatly increased his military force. Further, he gained another important advantage from Baraq's defeat - the loyalty of Mas'ūd Beg, who exploited the confusion after the battle in order to move to Qaidu's service.¹¹² The cooperation between the two continued until Mas'ūd's death in 1289, and his sons served Qaidu after him.¹¹³ Under Qaidu, Mas'ūd Beg introduced a currency reform in Central Asia, commencing in the year 1271,¹¹⁴ which gradually led to the economic rehabilitation of the region.

Even after his coronation, it took Qaidu several years to consolidate his rule: a certain resistance may have come from the house of Ogodei, since Rashīd al-Dīn notes that after Baraq's commanders entered into Qaidu's service, Ögödei's grandson Chabat chose to enter into Qubilai's service with several commanders.¹¹⁵ Clearly most of the resistance to Qaidu's new status came from the Chaghadaids centered in Transoxania: Though Rashīd al-Dīn maintained that the former Chaghadaid Khan, Mubarak Shah, and Alghu's sons were the first to pledge alliance to him in 1271,¹¹⁶ shortly after the enthronement Mubarak Shah surrendered to Abaqa¹¹⁷ and the sons of Baraq and Alghu rebelled against Qaidu, and wrought destruction from Khojand to Bukhara. Qaidu was victorious in all his encounters with them, but could not prevent them from threatening his revenues and challenging his authority.¹¹⁸

Abaqa feared that the quarrels between the Chaghadaid princes and Qaidu would again endanger his eastern border. On January

29th, 1273 Abaqa's troops entered Bukhara, and although apparently they did not find there any of the troops of Qaidu or Chaghadaid princes, they plundered and burned everything that came to hand. They continued their assault for a week before returning to Khurasan. Alghu's sons arrived in Bukhara as the troops left and succeeded only in rescuing the captives taken by Abaqa's forces.¹¹⁹ In 1276 the sons of Alghu and Baraq again attacked Bukhara and its environs, and this attack devastated all of Transoxania for seven years.¹²⁰ The hardships of Rabban Sauma and his companions on their journey from Talas to Khurāsān in 1275/6 testify to the instability in Transoxania at this time.¹²¹ Some time later, perhaps following Qaidu's response to the invasion of 1276, Alghu's sons decided to join with Qubilai's forces. This step occurred prior to 1283, when they appear in the *Yuan shi* as princes loyal to the Yuan dynasty.¹²²

Another member of the house of Chaghadaid who rebelled against Qaidu was Negubei the son of Sarban, the Khan appointed by Qaidu over the Chaghadaid *ulus* in early 1271 after the latter's enthronement. A year after his appointment, Negiubei rebelled against Qaidu, possibly at the same time as the sons of Alghu and Baraq. Qaidu sent an army against Negubei, who fled eastward, and subsequently paid with his life for the revolt.¹²³ Qaidu then appointed Buqa Temiir as leader of the *ulus*, possibly as a reward for his killing of Negubei. Buqa Temiir, however, fell ill soon after his appointment and was a feeble ruler, unable to impose his authority on the sons of Alghu and Baraq.¹²⁴

Conciliation between Qaidu and Baraq's sons was achieved only in 1282, after Qaidu appointed Du'a (Duwa), Baraq's second son, as the *ulus* leader.¹²⁵ Du'a's appointment inaugurated a twenty-year period of cooperation between the houses of Ogodei and Chaghadaid, in the course of which Du'a served as Qaidu's right-hand man, and stability returned to Transoxania.¹²⁶ This notwithstanding, already in the mid-1270s Qaidu consolidated his position as a powerful factor in Central Asia east of Transoxania, as shown by the fact that the princes who revolted against Qubilai turned to Qaidu in 1276.¹²⁷ Most of the events of the 1270s concern more specifically the confrontation between Qaidu and Qubilai, with which I shall deal in the next chapter.



Even if it took Qaidu several years to stabilize his rule, his enthronement in 1271 marked the establishment of a state under his leadership in Central Asia.¹²⁸ It is difficult to define fixed borders for

this state, if there ever were such, and the changes in the location of the border will come under review in Chapter II. Generally speaking, his realm reached as far west as the Oxus river, although in the 1290s the forces of Qaidu and Du'a also controlled more western areas.¹²⁹ The eastern border was along the Mongolian Altai mountains, although Qaidu and Du'a also raided east of there. Contrary to the claims of several Muslim authors, Qaidu never reached (or got close to) the Yuan capital, Dadu, and the easternmost point which his troops raided was Qara Qorum.¹³⁰ From the late 1280s on the southern border passed through the area of Kashgar and Khotan in the Tarim basin with the southeast border advancing over time to Besh Baliq and Qara Qocho. In the 1290s Du'a extended the southern border in the direction of Ghazna and India.¹³¹ The northern border seems to have been near the high tributaries of the Irtysh river and along lake Balkhash, joining the frontier of the White Horde, a little north of the cities of Talas and Qari Sairam.¹³² The northernmost city mentioned by Qarshi¹³³ as part of Qaidu's kingdom is the city of Jand in north Transoxania.¹³³

This state, most of whose territory corresponds to Turkestan and Transoxania, closely parallels the appanages which Qubilai allocated to Alghu, and is made up mostly of territories belonging to the realms of Ogodei and Chaghadaï, as defined by Chinggis Khan. There is no evidence of a division between the Ogodeid (Qaidu) and the Chaghadaï (Du'a) territories in this area, all of which were subject to the former.¹³⁴



The main factor that allowed Qaidu to obtain his kingdom was his ability to read correctly the Mongol political map, which underwent great changes in his time. Qaidu drew maximum benefit from the rivalries between Berke and Alghu, between Baraq and Abaqa, in the latter case also helping to turn the rivalry into an open war, and within the house of Chaghadaï. He also profitably exploited both the transfer of the capital of the Mongol empire from Qara Qorum to Shangdu and the various succession struggles within the Mongol *ulus*es.

In addition to his political astuteness, Qaidu excelled as a soldier, capable of transforming a motley collection of troops into a disciplined, trained army whose name became a legend.¹³⁵ Certainly it was partly because of this ability that he became a desirable ally for some Mongols, and that others joined his army. It is easy to agree with

Rashīd al-Dīn's description of Qaidu as an exceedingly intelligent, competent, and cunning man, who by conquest, subjugation and trickery succeeded in consolidating an appanage for himself, despite his inferior starting point.¹³⁶

The role in Qaidu's rise to power played by his membership in the house of Ogodei remains to be examined. Wassāf notes that Qaidu justified his defiance of Qubilai by claiming that in his *Jasagh* Chinggis Khan had stipulated that "as long as there existed a live descendant of Ogodei, he would be entitled to inherit the emperor's (*Shah*) standard and crown." He adds that princes and an army rallied under Qaidu's standard as a result of this claim.¹³⁷ The view that Chinggis Khan had intended to leave the position of the Qa'an in the hands of the Ogodeid *ulus* was expressed both during the struggle preceding Möngke's rise and in the time of Qaidu,¹³⁸ and was certainly encouraged by the latter. Such an encouragement was probably the source of the tradition given by Qarshi, namely that Ogodei intended the succession to go to Qaidu.¹³⁹ Representing himself as the successor of the Qa'ans Ogodei and Güyüg doubtless offered Qaidu many advantages as regards the consolidation of his state: this claim legitimized his rule over territories that he had acquired by cunning and by force, as well as his supremacy over the Chaghadaïd *ulus*. Since Qaidu waged war against Qubilai he could not receive legitimation from him, and if he relied initially on the favors of the Golden Horde, this dependence was not convenient over a long period, particularly after the Golden Horde fell into internal conflicts beginning in the 1280s.¹⁴⁰

Moreover, an important part of the territories over which Qaidu seized control, the cities, had been under the direct rule of the Qa'an until the end of Mongke's reign. As the census which Qubilai conducted circa 1265 shows, a large part of the army, at least in Bukhara, consisted of units that did not belong to a particular *ulus* but were subject directly to the occupant of the Qa'an's throne.¹⁴¹ Styling himself as the Qa'ans' heir could help Qaidu win the allegiance of these military forces.

During the course of his rise, Qaidu nevertheless rarely expressed himself as the legitimate Qa'an. When, for example, Qaidu promoted the establishment of friendship ties with Abaqa, Tolui's grandson, and received a position of comparative seniority from the Golden Horde in the *quriltai*, he behaved as a realist and not as a pretender to the throne of the Qa'an. Qarshi explicitly says that Qaidu was crowned Khan and not Qa'an, and the only source attributing to him "the

pretension to be Qa'an" is Qāshānī who wrote only after Qaidu's death.¹⁴²

One should remember, moreover, that before Qaidu could contend for the Qa'an's crown he had to reassert the right of the house of Ogodei to independent existence. The fact that no accepted Ogodeid *ulus* leader is known from Möngke's time until the rise of Qaidu; that Berke promised the leadership of the Chaghadaid *ulus* and not of the Ogodeid *ulus* to Qaidu if he vanquished Alghu; that the distribution of the territory among the *uluses* in Qubilai's time excluded the house of Ogodei; all these testify to the poor situation of the Ogodeid *ulus* prior to Qaidu's rise. In order to establish the right of the Ogodeid *ulus* to an appanage and status commensurate with that of the other branches of the Mongol royal family, it was necessary to stress the legacy of Ogodei and Güyüg. This emphasis also proved advantageous to Qaidu's internal policy. Certainly the prospect of reconso-lidating the Ogodeid *ulus* encouraged most of the Ogodeid princes to accept Qaidu as their leader.

One must draw a distinction, then, between a policy seeking to restore the house of Ogodei, for the benefit of which Qaidu could recall its days of glory and use them to his own advantage, and one attempting to set himself as Qa'an at the head of the entire Mongol empire. A realist like Qaidu certainly knew the latter task to be hopeless.

A closer examination of Qaidu's aims will follow in greater details after discussion of his relations with the other Mongol *uluses* and especially with the Qa'an.

Chapter II

Qaidu and the Mongol *uluses*

1. The Confrontation with the Qa'an

The tension between Qubilai and Qaidu began at the time of the latter's support of Arigh Boke, and his subsequent refusal to appear at Qubilai's court following Arigh Boke's surrender in 1264. Qubilai nevertheless allocated Qaidu his share in the revenue of the province of Nanjing in 1265, and again summoned him to court. Qaidu's persistent refusal to attend Qubilai's court, and his appropriation of territories in Central Asia, exploiting the vacuum left by Alghu's death, led to the beginning of an armed confrontation between Qubilai and Qaidu. In 1268, an army sent by Qubilai defeated Qaidu in the Almaliq region and drove him far to the west. Even if no anti-Toluid covenant was made at the Talas *quriltai* (1269), as shown in Chapter I, the *quriltai* certainly challenged the Qa'an's authority. In 1271, Qaidu was enthroned as leader of the Ogodeid *ulus* without seeking the Qa'an's permission.¹

Aware of the developments in the west,² and of Qaidu's emergence as potentially "serious border problem"³ and thus a threat to the Mongolian homeland itself - "the rising place of the ancestors",⁴ Qubilai in 1271 sent a coalition of princes under his fourth son Nomuqan (Nanmuhan) to Almaliq, in order to guard against the danger posed by Qaidu.⁵ In 1266, Nomuqan had been appointed as the "Prince of the Pacification of the North" (*Beiping wang*), and was sent to Mobei (North of the desert),⁶ in order to oversee the princes who dwelt in this region. Mobei, formerly under Tolui's rule, was inhabited mainly by the sons of Möngke and Arigh Boke. Since Arigh Boke's surrender, Qubilai had distributed appanages, titles, and money in an intensive effort to acquire the support of these princes, among other reasons because of the importance of the control of

Mongolia for his legitimization as Qa'an. When Nomuqan set out for Almaliq, by then one of the western posts of Qubilai's state, these princes accompanied him.⁷

Parallel to Nomuqan's mission, the Qa'an troops worked to strengthen their hold on the oases in the southern Tarim basin - the region of Khotan, Yarkand and Kashgar, and in the Gansu corridor. The object of these activities was not only to defend a region which was also liable to be attacked by Qaidu and his allies, but principally to create short supply lines, thus lessening Nomuqan's dependence on supply from the remote center in Dadu.⁸ In 1271 a population census was taken in Khotan and in the Hexi region, probably for taxation purposes,⁹ and in 1272 Qubilai sent artisans to Khotan and Kashgar to mine jade.¹⁰ In early 1274, thirteen postal stations were set up on the rivers close to Khotan and Yarkand, and another two in the Shazhou (Dunhuang) region at the entrance to the Gansu Corridor, probably to allow the transfer of supplies from these rivers to the southern bank of the Tarim basin, and from there to Almaliq.¹¹ Later that year, Qubilai issued an order to be lenient with the residents of Khotan, Kashgar and Yarkand, in other words, partially to exempt them from taxes.¹²

Nonetheless, the two last mentioned steps actually illustrate the limits of Yuan power in these areas. In 1274/5, prince Hoqu (Huohu), the son of Güyüg, rebelled in Hexi and fled from the Shazhou region to Khotan. Rabban Sauma, who met him in Khotan, described the destruction wreaked by Hoqu there and in Kashgar.¹³ Hoqu, whose appanage was in Emil, supported Qubilai in the struggle against Arigh Böke, and fought on Alghu's side.¹⁴ In 1268 he received together with Baraq a grant from Qubilai.¹⁵ It may be assumed that Hoqu's revolt in 1274/5 was a response to attempts to impose Yuan rule in the region of the Gansu corridor and south of the Tarim basin. It is uncertain whether Hoqu acted in coordination with Qaidu, by then the Khan of the house of Ogödei, or if the cooperation between them commenced only after the quelling of the revolt.

Until the preparation of his supply lines from the Tarim basin, between the years 1271 and 1276, Nomuqan received supplies from China. These supplies also included arms but consisted mostly of tens of thousands of horses and sheep.¹⁶ Nomuqan did not clash with Qaidu's troops in Almaliq, since the latter was fighting against the Chaghadaids in the Talas region in 1271. The *Yuan shi* does not mention any clash between Nomuqan and Qaidu, but does mention an isolated skirmish, dated early 1274, between a force accompanying

Nomuqan and the "rebel vassal" Niegubai. The latter is probably identical with Negübei, the first Chaghadaid Khan appointed by Qaidu, who apparently fled eastward after rebelling against his master.¹⁷ The *Yuan shi* also affirms that several commanders of Nomuqan's army planned circa 1275/6 to desert and join Qaidu's army, but his other troops thwarted them.¹⁸ Evidence of a battle between Qaidu and Nomuqan appears in only two questionable narratives: of Marco Polo and of the Mamluk author al-Nuwayrî. In both cases there seems to be a confusion with later battles.¹⁹

Qubilai's response made it clear that Nomuqan had not succeeded in his mission: in early 1275 Qubilai demanded that Qaidu and Baraq (who was long since dead) restore to him the gold tablets (*paiza*) that he had bestowed upon them.²⁰ At the same time he dispatched the general An Tong to assist Nomuqan,²¹ and another envoy to persuade Qaidu to surrender.²² One may surmise from these actions that Qaidu acted against Nomuqan, or perhaps that Qubilai blamed Qaidu for Hoqu's activities. It is also possible that Qubilai considered that Nomuqan's strengthened coalition was daunting enough to persuade Qaidu to surrender, and that he wanted to confirm the latter's submission before launching his major attack on the Song.

Qubilai's envoy was an Uighur named Shibān (Xibān), who had been the tutor of Qaidu's father. He contended that Qaidu had no chance of withstanding Qubilai's troops, and asked him to cease his military activities, to set up postal stations, and to come to the imperial court. The *Yuan shi* maintains that Qaidu withdrew his army and set up postal stations, although it does not specify where these were established or whither he retreated. He still refused, however, to travel to the court. On learning subsequently that An Tong had inflicted a resounding defeat on Hoqu's army, Qaidu was apprehensive, felt deceived, and refused to surrender. Further missions of Shibān also failed to bear fruit.²³

Qaidu's willingness to accept Qubilai's demands seems merely a tactical step. He certainly benefitted from the weakness of Hoqu, who was likely to have been a major rival to Qaidu's senior position in the house of Ogödei. It is certainly difficult, however, to associate willingness to surrender, even if this was a tactical move, with pretensions to be a rival Qa'an.

Nomuqan's strengthened coalition, with which Shibān tried to frighten Qaidu, indeed constituted a serious threat to the latter. This threat collapsed when the princes accompanying Nomuqan rebelled against him. In the autumn of 1276²⁴ Tugh Temür (Tuohei Tiemuer),

the son of Sögedu (Suigedu), and grandson of Tolui, persuaded Shiregi (Xiliji) the son of Möngke, to rebel against Nomuqan, claiming that Shiregi deserved to be Qa'an and that Qubilai had committed many crimes against their brothers.²⁵ This uprising was also the result of frictions between the princes and An Tong,²⁶ and perhaps it also reflected resentment at Qubilai's sinicization policies.²⁷ The rebel princes subdued Nomuqan, his younger brother Kōkōchū (Kuokuochu) and general An Tong. According to Rashid al-Dīn, the princes sent Nomuqan to the court of Mongke Temür, Khan of the Golden Horde, while An Tong was sent to Qaidu.²⁸ According to the *Yuan shi*'s confused and fragmented version of this episode, both An Tong and Nomuqan were sent to Qaidu,²⁹ and Wassāf may well be correct in his claim that it was Qaidu who sent Nomuqan to the Golden Horde.³⁰ At the same time, the princes sought Qaidu's support in their struggle, but Qaidu clearly rejected their overtures.³¹

Chinese scholarship and Pelliot claim that Qaidu refused to join the coalition against Qubilai because he saw himself as the only legitimate Qa'an, and did not wish to receive powers from another pretender to the throne.³² This assertion is unfounded, and it is easy to offer a practical reason for Qaidu's refusal, namely the threat of Alghu's and Baraq's sons, who in 1276 were laying waste to Bukhara.³³ In order to cooperate with the rebel princes, Qaidu would have had to increase his activity in the east, thus risking his control over the house of Chaghadaï and over Transoxania. Moreover, Qaidu might have calculated that the coalition of princes was an unreliable support, an evaluation that was proved to be correct by the series of internal quarrels that broke out between them.³⁴

Following Qaidu's refusal to join them, the princes migrated north to the Upper Yenisei, the region of their original domains. In 1277 they seized control of Qara Qorum and plundered Mongke's *ordo*. Qubilai's generals rapidly restored the dynasty's control of Qara Qorum, but the battles between the Qa'an's troops and the princes (and among the princes' themselves) continued until 1282. In the course of the battles, Shiregi killed Tugh Temur, but was obliged to give up his title to Sarban (Saliman), Mongke's grandson. Ultimately, Sarban took him captive and obliged him to surrender to the Qa'an. Qubilai exiled Shiregi, but pardoned Sarban. Some of the rebels rejoined the Qa'an after the capitulation of the leaders, and other princes chose to surrender to Qaidu.³⁵

While refusing to participate actively in the princes' revolt, Qaidu did not hesitate to use it for his own ends: he did not refuse to receive

An Tong, and seems to have taken full advantage of the latter's experience.³⁶ During the revolt he also led a raid into Qubilai's territory.³⁷ Beyond these immediate advantages, the princes' rebellion was also of far-reaching importance from Qaidu's viewpoint: this uprising coincided with the successful completion of the invasion of the Southern Song by the Yuan forces (1276-79), and this meant that Qubilai's army was occupied on two different fronts, and could take no action against Qaidu.³⁸ Qaidu was therefore completely free to deal with the Chaghadaïds. The fact that between the years 1277 and 1279 there is no evidence of activity by Qaidu or the Chaghadaïds against China, despite its vulnerability, suggests that the conflict between Qaidu and Alghu's sons and the other Chaghadaïds occurred at this time. This conflict was concluded at the latest in 1283, when Alghu's sons appear in the *Yuan shi* as princes loyal to the Yuan dynasty.³⁹ On the other hand, Baraq's son, Du'a, forged an alliance with Qaidu. In 1282 Qaidu appointed him as Khan of the Chaghadaïds, and from then until Qaidu's death, the Chaghadaïds were his loyal allies.⁴⁰

The rebel princes who chose to surrender to Qaidu added their troops to his army. Among these princes were the sons of Arigh Böke, Melik Temur (Mingli Tiemuer) and *Yomuqur (Yamuhuer); *Shinqan (Shenhan), the son of Melik Temur; Qurbaqa, Arigh Böke's grandson; Ulus Buqa (Wulusi Buhua) and *Qongqor Temur (Huanghuo Tiemuer), the sons of Shiregi.⁴¹ If Rashid al-Dīn's description of Melik Temür's troops is accurate, it is obvious that Qaidu's army grew considerably with the new additions. Along with Melik Temür, eighteen of his commanders (*amirs*) joined Qaidu, among whom are mentioned four chiefs of thousands, a guard commander (*kesig*), a commander of auxiliary troops (*cherig*), the son of a *tümen* commander, as well as holders of various administrative posts.⁴² Even assuming that these commanders did not bring all their troops with them, and that Melik Temür's force was larger than that of most of the princes who joined Qaidu (a probability given by his subsequent senior position in the *ranks*),⁴³ this is still a considerable reinforcement.

Another major positive result for Qaidu of the princes' uprising was his renewed control of Almaliq, whence he had been driven in 1268. The failure of the force that accompanied Nomuqan made Qubilai realize that he could not rely on forces so distant from his capital, and he decided to give up the territory and not to send further forces there.⁴⁴ Qaidu was thus able to return to Almaliq, which the *Yuan shi* includes in his domain,⁴⁵ and to extend his frontier eastward.

Qubilai temporarily abandoned the attempt to defeat Qaidu by military confrontation. He did, however, endeavor to subject Qaidu to an economic siege. After destroying the Song (1279), Qubilai took several steps aimed at reinforcing the Yuan control of Uighuria and the Tarim basin oases, and at preventing Qaidu from obtaining supplies for his troops from these areas.⁴⁶ From 1278 Qubilai stationed a garrison at Besh Baliq, the abandoned Uighur capital, and in 1280 the Chinese general, Qi Gongzhi, took command at the head of this troop. He received a series of reinforcements between the years 1281-86, and in 1281 he was joined by the Chaghadaid prince Ajiqi (Azhiji).⁴⁷

In 1281 twenty-two postal stations were set up between Besh Baliq and the Taihe range in northern Shanxi, in the Datong region.⁴⁸ Military agricultural colonies (*tun tian*) were established in Besh Baliq in 1283 and 1286.⁴⁹

This period also saw a series of steps designed to make Uighuria, which until then had enjoyed autonomy under the local dynasty, an integral part of the Yuan administrative system: In 1278 a regional supervision bureau (*anchasi*) was established south of Besh Baliq in Qara Qocho (Hala huozhou), which had replaced Besh Baliq ca. 1270 as the Uighur capital.⁵⁰ In 1283 this office was replaced by a Pacification Bureau (*xuanweisi*), which was charged with military and civilian rule in Besh Baliq, Qara Qocho, and Uighuria as a whole.⁵¹ This bureau seems to have worked in coordination with the Besh Baliq protectorate (*duhufu*), which was established in 1281.⁵² Through this bureaucratic mechanism the Yuan subordinated the Uighur economy and society to its direct rule; Yuan laws also applied to the Uighurs, and Yuan paper money became the main currency.⁵³

Along with his activities in Uighuria, Qubilai had also stationed a garrison in Khotan in late 1276, which he reinforced several times between 1278 and 1283.⁵⁴ In 1286, a series of postal stations were set up to connect Khotan, Lop, and Cherchen, and thus to reactivate the southern route from Central Asia to China proper.⁵⁵ When famine broke out in Khotan and its environs in 1287, relief came from the center of the empire, and agricultural military colonies were established alongside the postal stations, receiving reinforcements in manpower from Gansu and from Hexi.⁵⁶ In 1288, Qubilai forbade the soldiers in Khotan to deal in trade, so that they would concentrate on military activity,⁵⁷ and in the middle of that year agricultural military colonies were also established in Khotan.⁵⁸

At the same time Qubilai took a series of steps to develop the Gansu corridor, which joins between China proper and Central Asia. His intention was to transform it into an area with resources that could feed large military forces passing through it, thereby eliminating the need to organize long supply lines.⁵⁹ Another step taken by Qubilai in his campaign against Qaidu, was to halt the flow of revenues from the appanages that the latter owned within the areas under Qubilai's suzerainty.⁶⁰

Qubilai's actions did not have the desired effect, since during the same period Qaidu began to stabilize his power, and he or the princes close to him attacked the Yuan positions in all the sectors where the Qa'an had tried to strengthen his power. In 1280 Prince *Tügme (Tuoqumie), the son or grandson of Hoqu son of Güyüg, raided the granaries in Qara Qocho, thereby bringing about the famine that constrained Qubilai to send additional rations to the postal stations in the area and to exempt the area from taxes for three years.⁶¹

In 1281 Qubilai's Chinese general Liu En defeated a force of Qaidu near Khotan, but some time later he was obliged to retreat before a larger force that Qaidu sent there under Baba, a prince from the house of Jochi Qasar.⁶² Since Yuan rule over the city continued subsequently and since Khotan was not plundered, Dardess concluded that Qaidu seized the revenues of the city and withdrew only subsequently; otherwise it is difficult to understand the logic of his actions.⁶³

In 1284 Qubilai sent troops commanded by Prince *Yaqudu (Yahudu) to punish Qaidu. After catching Qaidu's scouts and obtaining information on his position from them, these troops defeated him.⁶⁴ His retreat, however, was only a temporary setback, and from 1285 on he and Du'a began to expand their activities.

Circa 1285, Du'a vanquished the princes heading Qubilai's garrison in Uighuria, the Chaghadaid Ajiki and *Ayachi (Auluchi), Qubilai's son.⁶⁵ It is very possible that this is the battle mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn, according to whom Du'a's troops defeated those of Ajiki and Chūbei (Chubai), the son of Alghu.⁶⁶ Subsequently Du'a and Buzma (Busiba), another son of Baraq's, laid siege to Qara Qocho for six months. Du'a lifted the siege only after the desperate Uighur Iduq qut⁶⁷ lowered his daughter down the city wall and gave her to him. While the sources do not mention further gains for Du'a, the great financial compensation given by Qubilai to the Uighur ruler after lifting the siege suggests that Du'a also exacted certain revenues.⁶⁸

In 1286 Du'a and Qaidu led a large offensive against Besh Baliq, defeated the Yuan forces, took captive the Chinese garrison

commander Qi Gongzhi and thus consolidated their control of the region.⁶⁹ Qubilai was constrained to allocate a generous grant to Uighuria in order to compensate it for these attacks.⁷⁰

Rashld al-Dīn cites another proof, albeit problematic, of Qaidu's attack on Qubilai's revenues: he indicates that Malik Nasīr al-Dīn Kāshgārī, apparently a functionary in Qubilai's administration, was accused of sending over one thousand coins to Qaidu's army every year. When Qubilai learned of this, he had the man executed. These events occurred apparently towards the late 1280s.⁷¹

Qaidu's and Du'a's activities during the 1280s confirm the failure of Qubilai's policy of economic strangulation: not only was Qubilai unable to prevent Qaidu and his allies from appropriating the revenues of Uighuria and the Tarim basin, but he was also obliged to invest extensively in the maintaining of garrisons and to compensate the plundered populace. His investments in developing the Gansu corridor did not bear fruit either, as shown by the many reports of famine in this area during the 1280s, and this also led to more expenses than revenues.⁷² From 1288 on, there are thus several reports of Yuan retreat from Central Asia.

In the winter of 1288, the *Yuan shi* reports that 1050 craftsmen from the colonies in Khotan and Kashgar returned to the interior of the country, to Gansu and Shaanxi.⁷³ In 1289 the Han army returned from the colonies in Khotan and Besh Baliq,⁷⁴ and later that year the Bureau of Pacification in Khotan was closed.⁷⁵

Further confirmation of the Yuan retreat is the fact that there are very few mentions of Khotan, Kashgar and Besh Baliq in the *Yuanshi* in the next few years, indicating their abandonment by the Qa'an troops.⁷⁶

It seems that at this stage the border between Qaidu and the Qa'an passed through Qara Qocho, as related by Rashld al-Dīn.⁷⁷ The invasion of Hami (Hamili), east of Qara Qocho, by Jangqi (Zhangji), one of Melik Temür's commanders who joined Qaidu, also points to the advance of Qaidu's troops.⁷⁸

Qaidu's takeover of Central Asia can be described as "creeping annexation," and he achieved his position of supremacy through a combination of control of the economy with military backing. Qaidu was in no hurry to abrogate Yuan nominal rule in Kashgar, Khotan, and Besh Baliq or to declare them his territories, but his capacity to appropriate the revenues from these cities led the Yuan forces to retreat from the area, without Qaidu having to face them in a full-scale military confrontation.

Another important reason for the Yuan retreat in these years was the fact that after the mid-1280s the dynasty faced two dangerous rebellions in Tibet and in Manchuria, in both of which Qaidu seems to have been involved. These rebellions also enabled Qaidu to extend his activity to the north in the direction of Mongolia, control of which was more important to the Yuan than control of Central Asia.

In 1285 a conflict broke out in Tibet (which was tributary of the Yuan), between two Buddhist sects, the Sa Skya and the 'Bry-Gung. The Sa Skya sect, under Qubilai's close associate Phags Pa, supported the Mongols and its members served as governors in Tibet. The 'Bry-Gung faction, on the other hand, took advantage of the period of instability following Phags Pa's death (1280), and rebelled against the Sa Skya and against Mongol rule in Tibet.⁷⁹ According to Tibetan sources the 'Bry-Gung applied for the help of "the king of sTod Hor (east Turkestan), Hu La," who sent to the assistance of the Tibetans the prince Rin Chen.⁸⁰ Hu La is an abbreviation of the name Hūlegü. Obviously, however, Hiilegii, who died in 1265, could not have supported a Tibetan faction in 1285. Petech, and subsequently Rossabi, identify this Hu La with Du'a, while Wylie maintains that he was in fact Qaidu himself.⁸¹ Qubilai sent a large force commanded by his grandson, Temür Buqa (Tiemuer Buhua) against the rebels in Tibet, and in 1290 his troops together with the Central Tibet militia defeated the 'Bry-Gung faction and the prince Rin Chen, who was taken captive. This action averted further rebellions in Tibet.⁸²

It should be noted that Tibet was first conquered in 1236 by Kotei, son of Ögödei, and until Möngke's rise it was exclusively a sphere of Ögödeid influence. This fact could have justified the involvement of Qaidu's or Du'a's troops there, although the descendants of Kotei were not among Qaidu's supporters.⁸³ Tibetan sources allude to a possible sTod Hor's involvement in Tibet in the early 1270s and to the stationing of a small Chinese garrison to watch the frontier region towards the sTod Hor circa 1281.⁸⁴ Rashld al-Dīn indicates that in the mid-1290s the army of Qutluğ Qocha, Du'a's son stationed in Afghanistan, was the force that was liable to threaten the Qa'an's rule in Tibet.⁸⁵ Even if it is difficult to determine what part, if any, Qaidu and Du'a played in the Tibetan revolt, evidently the opening of the front in Tibet reduced the number of troops that the Yuan could send against the formers.

A still more serious threat menaced Qubilai, when Nayan rebelled in Manchuria in 1287. Nayan (Naiyan), the great-great-grandson of Temüge Odchigin, Chinggis Khan's younger brother, dwelled in

Liaodong. In 1287 he headed a coalition of princes, descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers, against Qubilai. Western and Chinese scholarship propose as a motive for Nayan's rebellion the princes' fear before "Qubilai's growing closeness to the agricultural world and increasing estrangement from his nomadic heritage."⁸⁶ It is interesting to note that these princes all supported Qubilai in his conflict with Arigh Boke, a conflict that according to the same scholars centered on the same subject.⁸⁷ It seems that the immediate cause of the conflict was the administrative changes that Qubilai endeavored to introduce in Manchuria (Liaoyang) in 1286 in order to strengthen the authority of the central government there. The resistance of the princes, which compelled Qubilai to forego these changes,⁸⁸ reinforces the version of Marco Polo, who left a vivid portrayal of Nayan's revolt. According to Polo, Nayan rebelled because he had a great force, and he did not wish to be a vassal of the Qa'an any longer, even aspiring to take some of the latter's territories.⁸⁹ It seems that the descendants of Chinggis Khan's brothers also wished to obtain *de facto* independence from Qubilai, as the Golden Horde, the Ilkhans, and Qaidu had already done. Perhaps this is the real meaning of Rashīd al-Dīn's assertion that Nayan and his followers attempted to join Qaidu and Du'a.⁹⁰

When Nayan planned his rebellion, according to Marco Polo, he sought the support of Qaidu. Qaidu accepted the overture with alacrity and dispatched troops to go up through Mongolia to join Nayan's forces, and thus to attack the Yuan from the north and west simultaneously.⁹¹ This alliance represented a serious danger for Qubilai, and accordingly he immediately set out in person against Nayan. At the same time he sent a force to Qara Qorum to block Qaidu's advance on this front, and another force to southern Manchuria to prevent the forces of Qadan (Hadan), the son of Chinggis's brother Qachi'un, from joining Nayan.⁹²

Qubilai's swift response took Nayan by surprise, and in the decisive battle between the two, waged in mid-July 1287 only a month or two after the beginning of the rebellion, Qubilai scored an overwhelming victory, took Nayan captive and subsequently had him executed.⁹³ Qubilai also dispersed the forces of the rebel princes, so that they could no longer constitute a danger to his regime. He then subordinated them to his grandson, Kammala (Ganmala), who from 1286 commanded the garrison in Mongolia.⁹⁴

In fact, Qaidu's troops did not come to Nayan's assistance, possibly because of the swift suppression of the rebellion, nor to the assistance of the remains of his faction, against which the Yuan troops continued

to fight for several years.⁹⁵ Qaidu did, however, exploit the movement of Yuan troops from Mongolia eastward to Manchuria in order to extend his arena of activity northward to Mongolia.

In 1288 the *Yuan shi* makes mention of a record four incursions by Qaidu and one by Du'a. At least three of the incursions were northward to Mongolia, around the Hirgis Nuur basin (*Yeligan-naoer*), in the northwest of Outer Mongolia.⁹⁶ The increase in Qaidu's power at this time is also demonstrated by the fact that in the same year he also carried out a small-scale incursion into the Ilkhanate's territory, a measure unprecedented in the former decades.⁹⁷

In 1289 Qaidu continued to carry out border raids, together with Arigh Boke's son, *Yomuqur.⁹⁸ Qubilai sent his grandson, Kammala, to subdue Qaidu. The two met at the Qanghai (Hanghai) mountains east of Altai. Qaidu's army occupied the strategic positions, drove Kammala's army back and then surrounded it. The Qipchaqi commander *Tuq Tuqa (Tutuha) managed to free the surrounded army, which then retreated and instructed Qubilai's commissioners in Qara Qorum to flee as well. The commissioner of the Pacification Bureau in Qara Qorum, Kebei (Qiebo), feared that he would not have time to flee, and so surrendered to Qaidu and joined his army in the pursuit of the Qa'an's army. Other commissioners followed the same course, and Qaidu's army took possession of Qara Qorum and undermined Qubilai's entire ruling system in Mongolia.⁹⁹

Fearful of losing Mongolia, Qubilai set out to combat Qaidu in person. When Qubilai reached Qara Qorum, Qaidu retreated, and the two did not join in battle.¹⁰⁰ It should be noted that this is the only time that Qaidu attempted to invade Qara Qorum, and the first time that a direct confrontation seemed likely between Qaidu and Qubilai. Qaidu, however, retreated unimpeded from Qara Qorum.

Qubilai returned to his capital, but left behind his senior commander Bayan (Boyan) who had been stationed in Mongolia even before Nayan's revolt and who had faced Qaidu's incursions in 1288, as head of the garrison in Qara Qorum.¹⁰¹ Although no longer in possession of Qara Qorum, Qaidu still held large areas of Mongolia and to the west of Mongolia: the Qanghai mountains, the Upper Yenisei region, and the Barin region, between the Yenisei and Irtysh. During the years 1290-93, several skirmishes occurred between Qaidu's army and the Qa'an's commissioners.

The first of these was in 1290 when Arigh Boke's sons, Melik Temür and *Yomuqur, attacked the camp of Prince *Yaqudu (Yahudu), who had accompanied Kammala. *Yaqudu was occupied

with an attack on the remnants of Nayan's supporters, and Melik Temiir and *Yomuqur plundered his camp without interruption. The commander of the Yuan troops in the area, *Dorduka (Tuoertuohai), who did not stop them, was summoned to the court by Qubilai. Fearing for his life, he joined the rebels.¹⁰²

In autumn 1292, Qaidu and Melik Temiir invaded the domains of the Yuan. The *Yuan shi* notes explicitly that it was Melik Temur who pushed Qaidu to this action. Qubilai sent Bayan against them. The two armies met at the *Asaqtu (Asahutu) ridge, west of the Qanghai mountains and south of the Jabkan river, and Melik Temiir suffered a resounding defeat.¹⁰³ Taking advantage of the fact that the troops were tied down in the south, *Tuq Tuqa invaded from the north, crossed the Altai mountains and took three thousand of Qaidu's men captive.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, Qaidu did more than suffer losses in this period. This is clear from a malicious rumor that came to the ears of Qubilai in 1292 that Bayan, who had long been stationed on the northern border, had established friendly relations with Qaidu and had thus not taken even a handful of land from his possession. Qubilai decided to replace Bayan with another commander, Us Temur (Yuxi Tiemuer). Even before the new commander arrived at the border, Bayan had to fight off yet another incursion by Qaidu, who was driven back.¹⁰⁵

In 1293 *Tuq Tuqa advanced to the Qirghiz domains (Qilijisi) and in a series of victories succeeded in driving Qaidu's forces from the Yenisei region, which was restored to Yuan control, thus keeping Qaidu away from Mongolia.¹⁰⁶ Military colonies and postal stations were established in the area.¹⁰⁷ While prepared to give up territory in Central Asia, the Yuan dynasty was not prepared to relinquish control of Mongolia, which was important for the defence of the capital Dadu (Beijing); its economic development was, moreover, more successful than the development of Central Asia and thus allowed the maintaining of garrisons. The control of the the Mongols' homeland was also important for maintaining of Qubilai's legitimacy. In 1293 the Yuan dynasty regained its control over the area, that Qaidu had held since 1289.¹⁰⁸

During this period Arigh Böke's sons played a major role in Qaidu's forces. These princes, whose original appanages were in Mongolia and the Yenisei region, were extremely active in inciting Qaidu to act in this area. It should be noted that the incursion in 1289 was Qaidu's only attempt to take control of Qara Qorum. Qaidu's willingness to give up the old Mongol capital so readily serves as further

corroborative evidence that he did not see himself as the Mongol Qa'an.

In 1294 Qaidu took captive the men of Asu (Alans¹⁰⁹) in Mongolia, and compelled the emperor to pay a ransom for them. In other words, even though he no longer held much territory in Mongolia, he could still threaten the Emperor's revenues from there.¹¹⁰

There is no evidence that Qaidu took advantage of Qubilai's death (1294) or the participation of most of the border commanders in the enthronement of Temiir (1295) for a special attack, though a small raid of his troops to Yuan's "Western border" was allegedly checked by a lesser commander in 1295.¹¹¹ The *Yuan shi* ascribed his relative inactivity to *Tuq Tuqa's former successes.¹¹² It is also possible that Qaidu was occupied with a confrontation in the west with Nauruz, who had turned against him, and that he then preferred to take advantage of the instability among the Ilkhans in this period.¹¹³

Temiir (Chengzong, 1294-1307), Qubilai's grandson and successor, took the border threat seriously. In contrast to Qubilai, Temiir desisted from the Yuan's unsuccessful attempts to expand towards Japan and Southeast Asia, and was thus able to send a larger army against Qaidu.¹¹⁴ Rashid al-Din gives a rather detailed description of the situation on the borders and of its commanders:

Between their (i.e. Qaidu and Du'a) frontiers and those of the Qa'an is a forty day journey through the desert. The armies and scouts of both sides are stationed on the frontiers, defending their territories and keeping a lookout; and sometimes there is also fighting. The Qa'an's frontier in that direction extends eastwards for a month's journey and there are armies and scouts in most of the vital places.¹¹⁵

Rashid al-Din mentions seven garrisons under the command of either princes or renowned generals. Five garrisons were stationed in Mongolia: Those are the forces of prince Kammala, Temür's brother and the general commander of Qara Qorum and the northern border up to the Upper Yenisei since 1292;¹¹⁶ west of there was stationed Temiir's brother-in-law, Körgüz Küregen (Kuolijisi); adjoining his district was that of *Chong 'ur (Zhuangwu'er), *Tuq Tuqa's son who succeeded his father in 1297; then the tümen commander Nangiyadai (Nanjiatai); then Kōkōchū, Qubilai's son, who was taken captive during the princes' rebellion. The Hexi-Tangut region was guarded by prince Ananda (Ananda), Qubilai's Muslim grandson. The Chaghadaid princes Ajiki and Chūbei, Alghu's son, were stationed near Qara

Qocho. Qara Qocho, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, was the border between Qaidu's territory and the Qa'ans: its people "are on good terms with them both and render service to both sides." A system of postal stations ensured a link among the armies and between them and the capital, transmitting warnings and enlisting swift assistance when necessary.¹¹⁷

The strengthening of the borders is also shown by the fact that in 1295 Temür sent garrisons to Besh Baliq and to Kucha in the Tarim basin (Quxian talin).¹¹⁸ Already in 1296-97, however, there is evidence of the withdrawal of these troops.¹¹⁹ The "creeping annexation" of Yuan territories by Qaidu and Du'a also continued during Temür's lifetime, and by 1304 Qara Qocho was an integral part of Du'a's domain.¹²⁰

Temür's accession and the strengthening of the borders, as well as Qaidu's losses in Mongolia and a severe famine, led Arigh Böke's son *Yomuqur and Shiregi's son Ulus Buqa, together with the amir *Dorduka, to desert Qaidu in 1296 and to return to the Qa'an's ranks.¹²¹ On their way back they plundered the territories of the Yuan through which they passed, causing great damage to the population.¹²² Notwithstanding, Temür saw their return as a great achievement, and in 1297 he arranged a series of grants from the court, and stationed them on the northern border opposite Qaidu.¹²³

In 1297, Qaidu's and Du'a's forces were obliged to retreat several times before the forces of the border commands, led by *Yomuqur and *Dorduka. The fighting took place in the Barin (Balin) region between the Yenisei and Irtysh, on the border of the territories of the Qa'an and the White Horde, and south of there.¹²⁴

The fighting on the borders of the White Horde probably encouraged Bayan, its leader, to propose to Temür a combined Mongol coalition against Qaidu, composed of the White Horde, the Yuan, the Ilkhanate and the ruler of Badakhshan. Rashīd al-Dīn dates Bayan's suggestion to 1298/9, and says that Temür rejected this proposal on the advice of his mother, who argued that it was better to consolidate his position in China, than to devote a large force to distant Central Asia.¹²⁵ Presumably, Bayan's suggestion came in early 1298, following the series of Yuan victories, when Temür was rather assured of his ability to guard Yuan frontiers and unwilling to undertake costly adventures.

Du'a's reaction changed the situation: in late 1298 he set out to redress the recent setbacks. He attacked in winter, while the Yuan garrisons relaxed after their recent series of victories over Qaidu.¹²⁶

Rashīd al-Dīn describes the commanders feasting and drinking, and when they heard that the enemy army was approaching, most of them were too drunk to mount their horses.¹²⁷

The only alert commander who went to meet Du'a, Temür's brother-in-law Kōrgüz, received no assistance from the drunken commanders and was swiftly defeated. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, Du'a spared his life when he discovered that he was the emperor's brother-in-law; Chinese sources testify that Du'a treated Korgiiz according to "the sons-in-law's etiquette," tried to persuade him to come over to his side, and even offered his own daughter in marriage, all of which Korgiiz proudly declined.¹²⁸

After this successful attack, Du'a withdrew, and was in turn attacked by the Qa'an's garrison troops, in which *Yomuqur and Ulus Boqa again played a major role, apparently under the overall command of *Chong'ur. Du'a's new complacent troops were defeated in *Qorqatu (Huoerhatu), a very mountainous region east of the Altai in the region of modern Qobdo (Kebuduo).¹²⁹ The Yuan troops failed to free Kōrgüz, but according to Rashīd al-Dīn, they did take Du'a's brother-in-law captive. The brother-in-law's capture opened the way for a prisoner exchange. There was initiative for this on both sides, and messengers were exchanged.¹³⁰ According to Rashīd al-Dīn, the Qa'an favored the exchange of prisoners and sent Du'a's brother-in-law with followers of Korgiiz and expensive gifts. However, when they reached Du'a's domains, they found that Temür's brother-in-law was already dead. Du'a's men explained that they had sent him to Qaidu and he died on the way.¹³¹ Chinese sources just say that Korgiiz was almost immediately taken away from the messenger and was eventually put to death because of his recalcitrance.¹³²

Rashīd al-Dīn (followed by Mīrkhwānd), maintains that this attack by Du'a was part of the overall offensive that he planned on the Yuan garrisons,¹³³ but it seems that the battle was on no greater a scale than that of the regular skirmishes between the Qa'an forces and the forces of Qaidu and Du'a, although the killing of an important Yuan commander and the capture of the Emperor's brother-in-law was a serious assault on the Yuan's prestige.

Temür took steps to prevent the repetition of similar incidents. In 1299 he made Qaisha-n (Haishan, who would later succeed Temür) responsible for the border, in place of Kōkōchū who had been negligent in its defence.¹³⁴ Yet Kammala retained his senior position. Shortly afterwards Temür started planning a large-scale attack against Qaidu and Du'a, instructing the princes to combine all their forces

and recruit a large army to fight Qaidu and Du'a.¹³⁵ Temür's decision to mount such a conclusive assault, so different from the usual skirmishes that characterized the confrontation so far, was perhaps influenced by his knowledge that Qaidu was bogged down in conflicts with other Mongol branches, the Jochids and the Ilkhans, as attested by Bayan's proposal. However, Rashīd al-Dīn's assertion that the final Yuan attack against Qaidu was indeed an implementation of such a coalition is not substantiated in Chinese or Muslim sources, according to which only Yuan forces fought against Qaidu.¹³⁶ The *Yuan shi*, Mīrkhwand, Rashīd al-Dīn and Wassaf all make it clear, moreover, that the initiative for the battle came from Temür.¹³⁷ Thus it is difficult to accept the claim in the *Xin Yuan shi* that the battle represented another attempt by Qaidu and Du'a to invade Qara Qorum.¹³⁸

In any case, the Yuan assault began at 1300. Qaishan forces fought against Qaidu at Kuobielie, east of the Altai, causing him to lose at least the head of one of his generals. Qaidu beat a strategic retreat, and Qaishan was able to advance to the Altai only after Kammala supplied his exhausted troops with provisions.¹³⁹ The *Yuan shi* indicates that Qaishan was victorious, but in the same year it also notes that the army in the north was lazy and undisciplined, thereby giving rise to the assumption that the Yuan forces suffered a setback.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile, *Chong 'ur launched another attack, which successfully drove the Ogöeid princes beyond the Altai.¹⁴¹

Aware of the seriousness of Temür's intentions, Qaidu sent for Du'a. Yet Du'a refused to come, claiming that his troops were fatigued and wounded, and his cattle weak. In addition to this practical reason, he also claimed that the descendants of Chinggis Khan were killing each other and it was better to cease the fighting and to make peace. Qaidu was not prepared to receive this answer and commanded Du'a to arrive immediately. He himself set out against the Qa'an's troops.¹⁴² According to Wassaf, Qaidu set out to repel the Qa'an in early 700/late 1300.¹⁴³

The actual battle took place in the autumn of 1301.¹⁴⁴ Qaidu encamped on Mount Tiejiangu, south of the Altai, in the southwest of Mongolia and west of the Jabkan river.¹⁴⁵ Conscious of his numerical inferiority to the Yuan forces, Qaidu preferred to await reinforcements from Du'a. Mīrkhwand notes that the Yuan's army had never been so large in relation to Qaidu's army. Even if the 100:1 ratio given by Mīrkhwand is exaggerated, it is very probable that the mobilization of all the Yuan's garrisons could have placed a far larger force than Qaidu's army at Qaishan's disposal. The large number of Yuan

army commanders mentioned in the *Yuan shi*, all the border commanders and many others, shows that this was an unprecedented mobilization of forces. The *Yuan shi* does not enumerate the troops who participated in the battle. Mīrkhwand estimates that the Yuan army stood at ten or a hundred *tumens*. There is no estimate of Qaidu's forces in the sources, except for Wassaf's reference to the fact that forty-one princes accompanied Qaidu.¹⁴⁶

Recognizing his numerical inferiority, Qaidu waited, and even considered retreating without joining battle. The Yuan forces, perhaps aware that Qaidu was waiting for reinforcements, attacked him on September 3rd, 1301 on Mount Tiejiangu.¹⁴⁷ The sources agree that at this stage the Yuan forces won a resounding victory. The most explicit is Mīrkhwand, who says that in the one to three days of fighting Qaidu was wounded and narrowly escaped capture. The Qa'an's commanders already planned to lead his *ordo* to China. The same night Qaidu commanded all his men to light fires. Seeing the line of flames, Yuan soldiers were afraid that Qaidu had received large reinforcements. Qaidu retreated under cover of night, but Yuan soldiers held back from attacking him out of fear that his retreat was designed to lure them into his territory so that he could ambush them afterwards.¹⁴⁸

Two days later Qaidu assembled all his men, together with Du'a's troops who had arrived in the meantime, and fought against the Qa'an's army at *Qara Qada (Hala hata). This locality cannot be positively identified, although Mīrkhwand claims that the battle was fought on the banks of the Irtysh, namely west of Mount Tiejiangu.¹⁴⁹ This time the imperial army lost, but Qaishan and another general, *Yochicar (Yuechichaer), saved the situation when they penetrated the enemy's ranks, seized part of Qaidu's military supplies, rescued princes who had been taken captive, and attacked from the front and the rear simultaneously.¹⁵⁰ Another front was at Wuertu, also west of Tiejiangu, the exact position of which is also unknown. During the fighting there Du'a was wounded and defeated. However, his subsequent status and military power make it difficult to accept the *Yuan shi*'s assertion that most of his army perished.¹⁵¹ Qaidu's forces, which were also involved in this battle, succeeded in driving the Yuan forces into a corner.¹⁵²

The final battle occurred the following day. Of it the *Yuan shi* says:

On the following day they fought again. The (imperial) army retreated a little. Qaidu took advantage of this. The future-

emperor (Qaishan) fought bravely, penetrated to the enemy's rear and all the (imperial) army then came back.¹⁵³

In the restrained language of the *Yuan shi*, the meaning of this narrative is that the Yuan imperial army was not victorious. Wassaf and Mirkhwand clearly indicate that Qaidu won this battle, and Mirkhwand also adds that the Yuan army escaped to Qara Qorum, burning the grazing lands behind them so that Qaidu's forces could not pursue them. Qaidu's army also turned back rather than advancing to the east.¹⁵⁴

Rashīd al-Dīn, on the other hand, maintains that Qaidu was defeated in the battle.¹⁵⁵ The *Yuan shi* also adopts an equivocal attitude and indicates in another place that Temür distributed gifts to the princes who participated in the battle.¹⁵⁶ The reason for this ambiguity is the fact that Qaidu did not have time to enjoy the fruits of his victory - he died shortly after the battle, and a year or two after his death Du'a made peace with the Qa'an, thus bringing to an end the prolonged confrontation between the princes of Central Asia and the Yuan dynasty.¹⁵⁷



The last battle between the forces of Qaidu and the Qa'an was on a large scale and asymptomatic of the general nature of the conflict between the two sides, a conflict characterized mainly by raids and border skirmishes. This battle made it clear to the Yuan dynasty that even with mobilization of a large part of its army it could not suppress Qaidu's threat by force.

Thus Qaidu succeeded in establishing for himself a kingdom independent of the Qa'an's authority, a state that encompassed Transoxania, Turkestan, Uighuria and at certain periods also parts of Mongolia. Qubilai seems to have surrendered his sovereignty in most of the area under Qaidu's rule, when he allotted to Alghu in 1264 the area between the Altai and the Oxus.¹⁵⁸ His later activities, such as the population census in Bukhara circa 1265;¹⁵⁹ the planned postal stations from Hülegü's domain up to China;¹⁶⁰ the dispatch of Nomuqan to Almaliq, formerly Alghu's base; and the attempt in 1276 to send men to work in Badakhshān (Badashan) bordering on the Ilkhanid territories;¹⁶¹ all show that he had no intention of giving up his supremacy in the regional khanates altogether.

Whatever Qubilai's intentions, Qaidu obliged him to give up control of Central Asia. The fact that Qaidu was a descendant of

Ögodei, and thus had a claim to the Qa'an's throne, as the sources emphasize, certainly increased the menace in Qaidu's insurgence. Aside from the rival claim of blood, Qubilai's failure to impose his authority on two of the Mongol *uluses* was sufficient to impair his prestige, and to cast constant doubt on his legitimacy. Moreover, the location of Qaidu's kingdom in the heart of the Mongol empire made it difficult for Qubilai to assert his power in the other branches of the family.

The *Yuan shi* and Marco Polo indicate that Qaidu received better treatment from the Qa'an than other rebels because he was a descendant of Chinggis Khan.¹⁶² Qaidu's origin certainly contributed to the Qa'an's attempts to appease him initially, but it seems that the emphasis on the special treatment is designed principally to disguise Qubilai's failure to eliminate Qaidu. Indeed other princes who rebelled - the outstanding example is Nayan - were treated without mercy.¹⁶³

Chinese sources and Rashīd al-Dīn stress that the initiative for the confrontation came from Qaidu, who rebelled ceaselessly against the Qa'an.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, Qarshī, Het'um and Wassaf blame Qubilai for the imbroglio, the aim of which was to take Turkestan from Qaidu.¹⁶⁵

The outcome of this confrontation is also controversial. The *Yuan shi* and other Chinese sources indicate that Qaidu lost repeatedly,¹⁶⁶ while Muslim sources stress precisely his ability always to vanquish the Qa'an's army.¹⁶⁷ It is possible that some of the difference in the approaches derives not only from the bias of the *Yuan shi* but also from the fact that the Chinese saw a retreat as a defeat, even if it followed plundering the revenues of a given area, whereas the Muslims saw it as a victory.¹⁶⁸ The military aspects of the confrontation will be reviewed in Chapter IV. Here we will note only that the picture of victory and defeat is slightly more balanced than that presented in the Chinese or the Muslim sources. Although Qaidu was victorious in most of the confrontations with the Yuan, in the 1290s he suffered a series of defeats by the Qa'an's army. A reason for these setbacks can be the fact that in these years Qaidu was also fighting on other fronts, against the Ilkhans and the White Horde, and this reduced the force which he could deploy against the Qa'an.

Chinese and Persian sources explain Qaidu's anger over the demotion of the house of Ögodei from the post of the Qa'an as the main motive for his rebellion.¹⁶⁹ Yet, the course of the confrontation

as described above makes it difficult to accept the argument that Qaidu saw himself as a rival Qa'an to Qubilai and subsequently to Temür: Qaidu did not hurry to impose his authority on new territories, and did not oppose Yuan nominal rule in a given area, as long as he could obtain what he wanted from that area. He did not hesitate to retreat. He never tried to enter China proper (in contrast to Qubilai's attempt to rule in *Almalıq*), nor was it he who escalated the confrontation from the level of a border skirmish to a real engagement. Only once, and possibly not on his own initiative, did Qaidu invade *Qara Qorum*, the symbolic center of the Mongol world, and he readily evacuated this town, unlike Qubilai who felt compelled to defend it. It is easy to see the difference between the struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Böke, a struggle of two rival Qa'ans who fought a few decisive battles, and the confrontation between Qubilai and Qaidu.

What then was Qaidu's goal? Marco Polo maintains that Qaidu demanded from Qubilai the part of his father's conquests that belonged to him by right,¹⁷⁰ and indeed it seems that Qaidu's goal was local and was limited to the restoration of the rights of the *Ögodeid ulus* to its patrimonial estates. In this context it is perhaps significant that two of the main areas of confrontation between Qaidu and the Qa'an, *Besh Baliq* and the *Irtish*, were lands that Möngke allocated to sons of Ögodei whose descendants supported Qaidu,¹⁷¹ while the *Altai* mountains, another important front, were part of the original *Ögodeid* appanage.

It is very probable that the personal enmity between Qaidu and Qubilai, or between the house of Ögodei and the house of Tolui, played a role in Qaidu's activities, but a practical cause for his activities cannot be disregarded: like other nomads on the borders of China throughout history, Qaidu needed to augment his income from the populated areas bordering on his domain, and he also required employment for his troops.¹⁷²

The prolonged confrontation with Qaidu had several consequences for the Yuan dynasty: in addition to harming the Qa'an's prestige, the constant confrontation called for the maintaining of large military forces as a border garrison. This economic burden impaired the dynasty's ability to expand its conquests in other directions, such as Japan.¹⁷³ The large army that stood at the disposal of the princes on the northern border allowed them to mobilize great forces quickly and thus to become leading contenders in the struggle for the next emperor's throne.¹⁷⁴

Another consequence of the struggle was the serious harm to the border areas, such as *Uighuria*, where the frequent passage of armies destroyed the economy, as attested by Rashīd al-Dīn and the *Yuan shi*.¹⁷⁵

The fighting on the route between China and Europe and Western Asia was also detrimental to the trade routes passing through Central Asia, and reduced the volume of China's overland trade. It is difficult to estimate the extent of the damage, and probably a certain amount of trade no doubt continued on these routes even during the heat of the battle, yet the internecine warfare certainly contributed to the shift of much of China's trade to the sea.¹⁷⁶

2. The Ilkhans

Even though Rashīd al-Dīn maintains that Qaidu frequently fought against Qubilai and Abaqa,¹⁷⁷ the first specific information that historian gives as to the relationship between the latter and Qaidu points to their pact of friendship in 1270, when Qaidu informed Abaqa that he was no longer supporting Baraq. Qaidu's position was one of the factors that contributed to Abaqa's victory, and this victory in turn greatly helped to bolster Qaidu's power. This shortlived friendship ended in 1273, however, when Abaqa laid waste to Bukhara. At this time Qaidu was engaged in his struggles with the sons of *Alghu* and Baraq, and was unable to counter Abaqa's invasion.¹⁷⁸

The first mention of a confrontation between Qaidu and the Ilkhans dates from 1288, when envoys from Khurasan informed the Ilkhan Arghun (1284-91) that they had been attacked by three thousand horsemen from Qaidu's army. These horsemen, commanded by the Chaghadaid *Yasa'ur Noyan*, came from Panjab, invaded Balkh, Marv, and *Shabūrghān*, and arrived in the environs of *Nishāpūr*.¹⁷⁹ Arghun did not rebuff this invasion, possibly because immediately afterwards he faced a more serious invasion by the Golden Horde.¹⁸⁰

Qaidu's and Du'a's armies were involved in Khurasan far more extensively in the 1290s, motivated by Nauruz's rebellion: this commander, who is remembered in history principally as the man who intrigued the conversion of the Ilkhan Ghazan to Islam, was the son of Arghun Aqa, head of the regional administration of Khurasan from Ögodei's reign until his own death in 1275. Nauruz inherited his father's position, but in 1289 rebelled against Arghun, who at the same time faced a revolt by his Vizier, Boqa.¹⁸¹ Nauruz tried to

establish himself as an independent ruler in Khurasan, using Prince *Kingshu as a puppet ruler.¹⁸² While contemplating resistance to the Ilkhan army sent against him by Ghazan (then Nauruz's commander as ruler of *Khurāsān*),¹⁸³ or after actually losing to the Ilkhanid army at Herat,¹⁸⁴ Nauruz sought Qaidu's friendship and even performed various services for him. In return he pleaded for an army. Qaidu lent the army in Transoxania, commanded by Yasa'ur, to Nauruz and sent him his son Sarban, with other princes of the house of Ögödei.¹⁸⁵ Sarban, who lived in Badakhshān and Panjab, on the banks of the Oxus, maintained responsibility for the border with the Ilkhans in the following years too.¹⁸⁶ One may assume that Qaidu acceded to Nauruz's request because of the latter's proven capabilities (by virtue of which Ghazan subsequently pardoned him) and his familiarity with *Khurāsān*. Another factor that certainly contributed to Qaidu's willingness to provide an army was the fact that Nauruz then commanded at least part of the *Qara'unas*. This was a group of Mongols based in Ghazna, who ruled over a large part of Afghanistan and endeavored to remain independent of both the Ilkhans and the Chaghadaids.¹⁸⁷

In 1291 Nauruz invaded Khurasan as the vanguard of Qaidu's army, reaching the edges of Mashhad. At the same time the *Qara'unas* invaded Iran. For at least a year Nauruz plundered Khurasan (*Tūs*, *Nlshapur*, *Badghīs*), wreaking wholesale destruction.¹⁸⁸ These invasions coincided with Arghun's death (1291) and the outbreak of a succession struggle among the Ilkhans, and thus Nauruz was able to act relatively freely without having to contend with the Ilkhanid army.¹⁸⁹

It seems that Nauruz did not afterwards abandon his intention of becoming an independent ruler in Khurasan. When he became stronger he attempted to rebel against Qaidu. Nauruz befriended Prince Üruk Temur, the grandson of Ögödei's son Qadan, gave him his daughter in marriage, and apparently also sponsored his conversion to Islam. According to Waṣṣāf, Nauruz and Üruk Temur became allies in order to "purify the Oxus vicinity of Qaidu's impure forces and to spread the Islamic religion."¹⁹⁰ They therefore set out to fight Yasa'ur's army. Informed of the alliance, Qaidu may have reinforced his troops. In any case, Nauruz and Üruk Temur were unable to vanquish Yasa'ur's army and retreated to Herat.

Despite his retreat, Nauruz issued edicts throughout Khurasan, in the name of Üruk Temur, and when he recovered his strength again laid siege to *Nlshapur*. In the meantime, Üruk Temür was persuaded

that Nauruz's aspirations were also endangering him, and rejoined Qaidu with his army. His desertion was one of the main reasons that led Nauruz to surrender to Ghazan (1294).¹⁹¹ As for Üruk Temür, Qaidu had him summoned and executed.¹⁹²

There is no information on Sarban's activities at the time of Nauruz's action, either in seizing control of Khurasan or in suppressing his rebellion. It is possible that he did not take an active part in the events and remained east of the Oxus.

Nauruz's revolt prompted the desertion of another Ilkhanid commander, Uighurtai, to Qaidu's ranks. In about 1291 Uighurtai proclaimed *Jurjān* and eastern Mazandaran subject to Qaidu, but the Ilkhan's commanders drove Uighurtai eastward toward Qaidu's army. Unlike Nauruz, Uighurtai subsequently remained loyal to him.¹⁹³

Uighurtai's familiarity with the roads of Mazandaran allowed Du'a to conduct a large-scale incursion into Khurasan and Mazandaran in early 1295, together with Sarban, Qaidu's son, and with Ebügen, a descendant of Jochi Qasar. Du'a took advantage of the absence of Ghazan and many of his commanders, who were occupied with the war of succession with Baidu (enthroned in March 1295, and killed in October 1295). He took control of the property that Ghazan and his men had left behind, and resided in Mazandaran for eight months.¹⁹⁴ On his way back from Mazandaran to the east in the autumn of 1295 Du'a pillaged many cities in Mazandaran and Khurasan. He also attempted to persuade the governor of Herat to come over to his side and receive part of Khurasan in return. The latter, however, preferred to report to Nauruz, now a vassal of the Ilkhans. In the meantime, Du'a's forces attacked the cities of Kusui and Fushang, south of Herat. Kusui withstood Du'a's siege and inflicted heavy losses on him, but the latter subdued Fushang, slaughtered many of its inhabitants or deported them to Transoxania. From there Du'a turned toward Herat, but refrained from an attack and returned to Transoxania.¹⁹⁵

According to HarawT, Du'a stopped short of attacking Herat since his dreams and omens that he had received led him to believe that such an attack was doomed to failure, just as the attack by his father Baraq had failed. In order to avoid ridicule and to explain his departure, however, he spread a rumor that a large army was heading toward his domains from China.¹⁹⁶ It is very possible that the desertion of some of the princes from Du'a's army to the Qa'an's army (1296), or also the losses to the border commanders of the Yuan (1297), led Qaidu to summon Du'a to the east. Du'a, in any case, returned from Khurasan without encountering any of the Ilkhanid


troops, since some of the troops that had been sent to combat him rebelled against Ghazan, and Nauruz had to fight them first.¹⁹⁷

The next Chaghadaid attack on Ilkhanid lands occurred in the year 1300/1, when Du'a's troops, previously under the command of his son Qutluğ Qocha, invaded Fārs and Kirman, while Ghazan was leading a campaign against the Mamluks.¹⁹⁸ In 1298/9 Du'a had appointed Qutluğ Qocha to be head of the Qara'unas, who thereby became subject to the Chaghadaids. In addition to the Ghaznīn and Sīstān region, the Qara'unas then ruled extensive areas of Khurasan (Balkh, Shabūrghān, Badakhshān, Marv, etc.).¹⁹⁹ Although Qutluğ Qocha himself died shortly after this nomination, on his way back from invading the Delhi sultanate in 1299–1300,²⁰⁰ his forces raided Fārs and Kirman principally in order to obtain cattle. On their return from the raid, the troops lost part of the spoil to the governor of Hormūz.²⁰¹

In Sha'bān 702/March 1303 the news of Qaidu's death must have come as a great relief to Ghazan.²⁰² In 1302 the Ilkhans had suffered another incursion, perhaps planned by Qaidu prior to his death, and carried out by his son Sarban. However, Öljeitu, the Ilkhanid governor of Khurasan and Ghazan's future successor, managed to thwart this invasion, mainly because of the difficult weather conditions that prevented the former forces of Qutluğ Qocha from joining and assisting Sarban's forces.²⁰³

On September 19th, 1304, the Qa'an's emissaries arrived at the court of Öljeitu (1304–16), accompanied by the envoys of Chapar, Qaidu's son and heir, and of Du'a, in order to inform the Ilkhans of the peace accord among the Mongols.²⁰⁴ The announcement was celebrated with great rejoicing, and for good reasons. This peace benefitted the Ilkhans greatly, since it avoided a conflict with the Golden Horde, and the internal struggles of the Central Asian princes in the wake of the "peace" gave Iran a decade-long respite on its eastern border. In the course of this decade Öljeitu regained control of Khurasan and was able to defeat occasional invasion attempts from Central Asia.²⁰⁵

One of the consequences of the struggles in Central Asia was the surrender of some of Qaidu's troops, and principally of Sarban, to Öljeitu in 1306, after appropriation of most of Qaidu's territories by the house of Chaghadaid and the wars between Sarban and Qutluğ Qocha's successor, Esen Buqa. Sarban died after his surrender, but his sons took their places in Öljeitu's army.²⁰⁶



From 1288 onwards Qaidu was in constant confrontation with the Ilkhans, and only the rumors that his daughter Qutulun intended to marry the Ilkhan Ghazan, intentions that came to nought, could suggest a tendency towards conciliation.²⁰⁷ The confrontation was no more than a border fight, consisting mainly of brief invasions and plundering of cattle, captives and property, intended for Transoxania and Turkestan. There is a conspicuous difference between these incursions and the actions of Nauruz, who was quick to send edicts to announce his sovereignty. Nevertheless, in the course of these incursions, the Central Asian troops temporarily seized control of extensive parts of Khurasan, and also raided other provinces such as Māzandarān, Kirman, and Fārs.

The Ilkhans did not respond to these incursions, and in the main there were no military clashes between them and the Central Asian princes. The Ilkhans may have preferred to avoid escalation of the conflict both because they were preoccupied by internal problems and because they feared that escalation could lead to an alliance between Qaidu and the Golden Horde, perhaps even with the participation of the Mamluks.

It is difficult to attribute the motive for the incursions from Central Asia to the rivalry between the houses of Ögodei and Tolui, if only because the Central Asian incursions of the Chaghadaids again plagued Iran from the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century, after the end of the internecine wars in Central Asia.²⁰⁸ It is more probable that internal turmoil, such as Nauruz's revolt, succession struggles, and then the redeployment of most of the Ilkhan army to Syria, contributed to the continuation of and increase in incursions from Central Asia into Iran, and made Khurasan a convenient place to obtain the cattle and captives desired by the nomads. Old enmities may well have been added to these practical motives, and not only the enmity between the houses of Ögodei and Tolui: Du'a, who played a dominant role in the raids into Iran, apparently considered himself entitled to conquer Khurasan in order to avenge the loss of his father Baraq in 1270, and to reclaim the title to the region which Baraq had received at the *quriltai* of 1269.²⁰⁹ It is also possible that Qaidu wished to retaliate for Abaqa's provocative invasion of Bukhara in 1273. Nevertheless, the main reasons for the raids from Central Asia seem to have been the practical need to obtain cattle and revenue and the fact that the internal situation in Iran made Ilkhanid territories vulnerable.

By attacking the Ilkhans in Khurasan and beyond, Qaidu affected Iran in two ways. First he harmed the Ilkhans' relations with China:

Qaidu's control of the trade routes between Iran and China reduced the scale of trade and diplomatic missions between these two countries. Disruption of the relations also continued during the wars among the princes in Central Asia, despite the "peace." The large number of delegations exchanged between the Ilkhans and the Yuan in the time of Abu Sa'īd (1316-35), after termination of the war in Central Asia²¹⁰ attests to the potential of far broader relations than was the case in Qaidu's time. It is possible that the relative isolation of Iran from the Yuan and perhaps also the growth of Qaidu's power at the Qa'an's expense encouraged the Ilkhans to detach themselves, albeit informally, from dependence on the Qa'an.²¹¹

The second effect was the serious impairment of the Ilkhans' expansion in the direction of Syria: the raids from Central Asia obliged the Ilkhan troops to retreat repeatedly from Syria and did not allow them even to enjoy for long their only victory in their long war with the Mamluks. Baraq's invasion in 1270, for example, prevented Abaqa from responding to the advance of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars to Antioch and Rum (1268/9).²¹² A month after they finally vanquished the Mamluks in Wadi Khaznadār (December 1299) and conquered Damascus, the Ilkhans were obliged to retreat home, apparently in order to deal with the incursion of Qutluğ Qocha's forces. Her'um explicitly states that Ghazan's troops retreated because of the advance of Qaidu's army.²¹³ The fact that in 1303 Ghazan did not personally lead the incursion to Syria and even did not pursue the siege of Raḥba, opting instead to return to Iran, may very well be related to Sarban's invasion of Khurasan in this period.²¹⁴ It is not surprising that Öljeitu quickly exploited the peace among the Mongols in order to write to the King of France and to propose a joint coalition against the Mamluks.²¹⁵ However, nothing came of this idea. Nor did Öljeitu take advantage of the internal wars between the Central Asian princes in order to conduct a serious invasion into Mamluk territories.

Brief mention should also be made of the relationship between Qaidu and the Mamluks: these relations commenced apparently in the time of the Mamluk Sultan Baybars (1260-77), on the initiative of Mongke Temur, the Khan of the Golden Horde. In the late 1270s, Mongke Temür proposed that the Mamluks establish relations with Qaidu on the basis of their shared hostility towards the Ilkhans.²¹⁶ Qalawun, Baybars' successor (1279-90), approved of Mongke Temür's idea, and dispatched envoys to Qaidu in the years 1282-84, at the same time that he sent envoys to the Golden Horde.²¹⁷

It is probable that the relations between Qaidu and the Mamluks continued for there is evidence that relations existed in Chapar's time up to the fall of the house of Ögödei.²¹⁸ Yet the meager and blurred information on Qaidu in the Mamluk sources shows that these diplomatic relations were limited in scope. Since the initiative in the Mongol-Mamluk war came mainly from the Ilkhans' side, it is unlikely that there was military or intelligence cooperation between Qaidu's troops and the Mamluks, although they obviously benefitted from each other's activities.

Beyond the diplomatic ties, however, it is possible that there were also commercial links. According to Nuwayrī, Egypt imported Mamluks from Qaidu's territory. (These may well have been taken from the great numbers of captives acquired in Iran.)^{219c} Umarī, on the other hand, indicates that until the time of Tarmashirin (Chaghadaid Khan, 1326-34), Transoxania was not open to traders from Egypt and Syria.²²⁰ This testimony, together with the paucity of information on Qaidu in the Mamluk sources, attests that even if there were such trade relations, they were of limited importance.

3. The Jochids: the Golden Horde and the White Horde

The Golden Horde played a decisive role in Qaidu's rise: it was the khan Berke, after all, who in ca. 1264/5 gave Qaidu an army to fight against their common enemy Alghu, and in fact recognized his right to rule over the Chaghadaid domains. Mongke Temur saved Qaidu from Baraq in 1268, and in the course of the *quriltai* that followed this battle retained a measure of supremacy over Qaidu, the *quriltai* decisions being sent for his approval. A war subsequently broke out between the two leaders, when Qaidu apparently withheld from Mongke Temiir the territory that the *quriltai* had awarded him. Despite this war, and despite Mongke Temiir's later promise to help Qubilai eliminate the rebel,²²¹ the alliance between Qaidu and Mongke Temur seems to have recovered sufficiently by the middle 1270s, and the Golden Horde may well have retained a certain position of supremacy in it.

In 1276/7, when Nomuqan's retainers rebelled against him, they sent An Tong, the most important Chinese general in Nomuqan's retinue, to Qaidu; Nomuqan was sent to Mongke Temür.²²² It is also possible that it was Qaidu who sent Nomuqan to the Golden Horde.²²³ The princes in question also spread false rumors that they had the support of both the descendants of Batu and of Qaidu,

implying an alliance between the two.²²⁴ Toward the end of the 1270s, Mongke Temur suggested that the Mamluk Sultan Baybars should establish ties with Qaidu as a possible ally against Abaqa, although the Golden Horde itself did not join such an alliance, perhaps because of the "peace" then existing between them and the Ilkhans.²²⁵ Finally, the tension between the Golden Horde and Qubilai and the former's unresolved dispute with the Ilkhans made Qaidu and the Golden Horde natural allies.

If the Golden Horde did hold a position of superiority in the relations with Qaidu, it probably did not retain it after the early 1280s; following Mongke Temür's death (1280), a dual rule existed in the Golden Horde, with Prince Noqai in fact serving as a joint ruler with the enthroned Khans.²²⁶ The resulting internal conflict weakened the Golden Horde's power, while Qaidu's strength increased from the beginning of the 1280s. Nonetheless, Rashīd al-Dīn maintains that Qaidu's return of An Tong in 1283/4 was still influenced by the Horde's decision to return Nomuqan.²²⁷

Along with the political connections between the realms, one should note that part of the trade to and within Qaidu's domains (e.g., the trade in Mamluks) passed through the Golden Horde's domain, and the fact that QarshT indicates that the city of Jand, on Qaidu's border with the Golden Horde, served as a trade city with many markets reinforces this suggestion.²²⁸

According to Rashīd al-Dīn and Waṣṣāf, the Golden Horde took advantage of the return of Nomuqan to improve its strained relations with the Yuan court,²²⁹ although the *Yuan shi* indicates that the conciliation with "Batu's descendants" occurred only under the Qa'an Temür.²³⁰ The improved relations between the Yuan and the Golden Horde are described explicitly in the last years of the thirteenth century, the period of the Khan Toqto'a (1291-1312). Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions that Toqto'a supported the Qa'an against Qaidu and subsequently against his son Chapar.²³¹ As long as the Golden Horde was engaged in internal struggles, its Central Asian policy had little significance, but after Toqto'a vanquished Noqai in 1299,²³² his support of the Qa'an became more dangerous for Qaidu and his successors.

At this time, in the late thirteenth century, Qaidu was involved in a dispute with another group of Jochi's sons - the White Horde. These were the descendants of Orda, the eldest son of Jochi, who theoretically were part of the Golden Horde but in fact had an independent *ulus*. The White Horde's territory extended from north of

the right bank of the Jaxartes to the Ulugh Tao mountains, in central Kazakhstan, i.e., it bordered Qaidu's territory on the north.²³³ Qaidu seems to have cooperated at first with this group, since Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that in the mid-1260s Qonichi, the later head of the White Horde, fought on Qaidu's side.²³⁴ The same historian also indicates that refugees of the princes' revolt who surrendered to Qonichi in the late 1270s were subsequently in Qaidu's service.²³⁵

Qonichi, however, participated in 1284 in the Jochids council that decided to return Nomuqan to China, and there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that from then on he strove to improve his relationship with both Qubilai and the Ilkhans. The *Yuan Shi* mentions, for example, that in February 1288 the emperor granted prince Qonichi (Huonizhi) 500 ounces of silver, a string of pearls and a suit of embroidered clothes; and in the next year Qubilai sent relief to Qonichi's forces.²³⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn notes, too, that Qonichi was on friendly terms with the Ilkhans Arghun (1284-91) and Ghazan (1295-1304), "to whom he was constantly sending ambassadors to express his affection and devotion."²³⁷


Qonichi's new policy and the threat of a "grand alliance" of the Mongol *uluses* against them, probably encouraged Qaidu and Du'a to interfere in the internal affairs of the White Horde. Their involvement became apparent in the last years of the thirteenth century, after Qonichi's death, when his son and heir, Bayan, tried to defend his position. Bayan's cousin, Külük,²³⁸ challenged the former's right to rule over the *ulus*, and Qaidu and Du'a chose to support him, perhaps in order to weaken Bayan. With the assistance of their troops, Külük vanquished Bayan. The defeated Bayan sought the help of Toqto'a, the Khan of the Golden Horde. As already noted, Toqto'a was fighting Noqai, and accordingly did not send troops to Bayan's assistance. He used Bayan's appeal to underscore his right to rule over the White Horde, however, and he sent envoys to Qaidu and Du'a, demanding that they extradite Külük, a request that they understandably ignored.²³⁹ Rashīd al-Dīn indicates that up to the early fourteenth century the cousins fought fifteen battles, in the course of which Külük seized some of the domains of Bayan, whose troops were drained by the prolonged fighting.²⁴⁰

In about 1298, probably encouraged by recent Yuan achievements against Qaidu in the Barin region that bordered the White Horde's domain, Bayan asked for the Qa'an's help in his struggle with Külük. Moreover, he attempted to form a joint coalition against Qaidu, that would combine the forces of the Yuan, the Ilkhans, the White Horde

and the ruler of Badakhshān.²⁴¹ Luckily for Qaidu, Temür rejected this proposal.²⁴² Nevertheless, Qaidu took the threat of the "grand alliance" seriously, stationing on Bayan's border a large force under the command of his sons Shah and *Yangichar,²⁴³ and of Melik Temiir, son of Arigh Böke. The mission of these forces was to block attempts at joint action against Qaidu, and to continue the pressure on Bayan.²⁴⁴

In 1302/3 Bayan again proposed a supra-Mongol coalition, this time against Du'a and Chapar, Qaidu's son and successor.²⁴⁵ The danger of such a coalition to the army of the Central Asian princes was now even greater, not only because of Qaidu's death, which greatly weakened their power, but also because Toqto'a no longer had to cope with Noqai and was therefore free to join the coalition against them. One may assume that recognition of this situation was one of the main motives for Du'a's decision to seek reconciliation with the Qa'an.

The peace treaty among the Mongols (1304) seems also to have included the settlement of the dispute in the White Horde,²⁴⁶ and it certainly brought about a temporary reconciliation between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans.²⁴⁷ In wake of the struggles between the Ögöeid and Chaghadaid princes after the "peace accord," Baba (a descendant of Jochi Qasar), and other princes who were subordinate to Qaidu, opted to surrender to the Golden Horde.²⁴⁸ However, in 1313/14 Baba, at the head of these princes, invaded Khwārizm, which belonged to the Golden Horde, and sought to offer their services to the Ilkhan Öljeitu, thus creating renewed tension between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans. Öljeitu chose instead to kill Baba in order to avert a reopening of the conflict with the Golden Horde.²⁴⁹



To summarize, the most important consequence of Qaidu's activities for Jochi's descendants was the final cession of the Golden Horde's rights and control over Transoxania and Central Asia.²⁵⁰ Initially, Qaidu may have held this territory on behalf of or together with the Golden Horde, but it seems that already Möngke Temiir agreed willynilly to renounce his rights to the territory in Transoxania that was set as his part at the *quriltai* of 1269. Qaidu's increased power, together with the internal conflicts within the Golden Horde led to the loss of its influence over Qaidu and over the territories in his possession.



Throughout the decades of interaction with other Mongol chieftains, Qaidu succeeded in establishing in Central Asia a state independent of the authority of the Qa'an, and under the rule of the sons of Chaghadaï - the rivals, allies and successors of Qaidu - this state outlasted the Yuan dynasty and the Ilkhans.

The establishment of this state accelerated and reinforced trends prevailing in the Mongol empire of the mid-to-late thirteenth century: the parceling of the Empire into independent states, and the decreasing power of the Qa'an. The diverting of a great part of the strength of the Mongol army to internal struggles impaired its ability to move on to new conquests, and also damaged the border areas among the different Mongol countries and reduced the volume of overland trade within the empire and between it and the rest of the world.

Chapter III

The Shift into the Chaghadaids: the Collapse of Qaidu's Kingdom after his Death

Qaidu fell ill and died shortly after the battle against the Qa'an in 1301.¹ The sources diverge somewhat on the date of his death. Qarshī sets the date in early 701/late 1301.² According to Qāshānī, Qaidu returned from the battle with the Qa'an in Rajab 702/February–March 1303, and then contracted the illness of which he died.³ Mīrkhwānd, perhaps following Qashanī, also states that Qaidu died in Rajab 702/February–March 1303.⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn notes that the news of Qaidu's death reached Ghazan on the sixth of Sha'bān 702/March 26th, 1303, precisely at the moment when the latter left the fortress of Rahba in Syria.⁵ Elsewhere Rashīd al-Dīn indicates that Qaidu died about a month after the battle with the Qa'an.⁶ The *Yuan shi* notes only that Qaidu died a short time after the battle with the Yuan forces in the autumn of 1301.⁷ I tend to agree with Barthold in accepting Qarshī's dates: it is more probable that the news of Qaidu's death was delayed over a year on its way to Ghazan, than that it reached Syria from Mongolia in less than a month, and there is no reason to suppose the battle with the Qa'an lasted a year. It is also likely that Qarshī would give a precise date for an event that occurred such a short time before his writing. Moreover, a comparison of Qāshānī's dates for the events in Central Asia and China with those appearing in the *Yuan shi* shows that Qashanī is often imprecise (see below).⁸

Qāshānī says that a short time before his death Qaidu appointed Orus (Woluosi), his youngest son by his chief wife who was stationed on the front opposite the Yuan, as his successor.⁹ Wassāf does not explicitly say that Qaidu appointed Orus as his successor, but describes a conversation between Orus and Qaidu on the eve of the latter's death, that could be interpreted as a kind of testament to a successor. In this conversation Qaidu commanded Orus to heed the advice of Du'a, whom he described as the most experienced and

bravest prince who owed many favors to Qaidu's family.¹⁰ Du'a indeed played a major role in the enthronement of Qaidu's successor, but he chose to appoint not Orus, but Chapar (Chabaer), Qaidu's firstborn son, albeit by a concubine. He did so even though Chapar was not present at the time of Qaidu's death, arriving from Talas only after learning of his father's demise.¹¹ According to Qarshi, Chapar's accession to the throne was celebrated in the vicinity of Emil in May or June 1303.¹² According to Wassaf's description, Chapar's rise to the throne was celebrated with a feast and with great pomp, and he even assumed his father's name, calling himself Chapar Qaidu.¹³

Wassaf maintains that Du'a chose Chapar because it was Chapar who advised Qaidu to appoint Du'a to be head of the Chaghadaid *ulus* in 1282, despite Du'a's youth at that time.¹⁴ Qāshānī, however, contends that Du'a appointed Chapar as head of the *ulus* because Chapar was weak and foolish, and Du'a felt that he would be able to seize control of Qaidu's lands more easily through him.¹⁵ Such an assertion is further supported by Rashīd al-Dīn's description of Chapar as "extremely lean and ill-favored,"¹⁶ as well as by the fact that during Qaidu's life nothing is heard of Chapar, in contrast to Qaidu's other sons who were active on different fronts.¹⁷ Further evidence is provided by Du'a's contemptuous treatment of Chapar after his enthronement, and by Chapar's own conduct.

In setting Chapar on the throne in opposition to Qaidu's wishes, Du'a also succeeded in creating a division in Qaidu's camp. Rashīd al-Dīn notes that several princes contested Chapar's enthronement; including Orus, Qaidu's daughter Qutulun, and Tügme, the son or grandson of Hoqu son of Güyüg, who may also have had pretensions to the throne.¹⁸ Qashanl alleges that Chapar's enthronement alienated his brothers, but the historian tells of only the opposition of Qutulun, who wished to set Orus on the throne. After Du'a and Chapar dismissed her claims and sent her back to the "scissors and needle," she withdrew from the succession struggles and become the custodian of her father's tomb.¹⁹ It was probably the dissension among Qaidu's sons that delayed Chapar's enthronement until a year and a half after his father's death.²⁰ In describing the rule of Du'a and Chapar in the early fourteenth century, Qarshi makes it clear that Chapar owed his throne to Du'a, "the mainstay" of Chapar's power and "his benevolent elder brother" (*al-akh al-shafiq al-akbar*).²¹ From the course of the events, however, it is clear that in 1304/5 at the latest Orus and Qaidu's other sons, as well as Tiigme, accepted Chapar's leadership.²² This was because they had a shared interest in

combatting Du'a, who very shortly after Chapar's enthronement sought to make peace with the Yuan forces.

Chinese and Persian sources stress the fact that the peace initiative came from Du'a and not from Chapar.²³ Du'a established contact with one of the border commanders, either with Ananda, according to Qāshānī,²⁴ or with *Yochicar, who was related to Du'a by marriage, according to Chinese sources. Whoever he was, this commander quickly agreed to the proposal and only then informed Temür.²⁵ It is difficult to determine at what stage of the agreement Chapar learned of these machinations: Qashanl asserts that Chapar did not know of Du'a's appeal to the Qa'an, and Du'a informed him of this only after receiving from Temur the right to rule in Turkestan. Then Du'a demanded that "in the name of friendship and justice" Chapar evacuate Turkestan and Khurasan, which Qaidu had annexed, and suggested that Chapar set out to conquer his ancestral domain - Qara Qorum.²⁶ According to Waṣṣāf, after Chapar ascended to the throne Du'a informed him that he intended to make peace, and Chapar replied that he could not depart from Du'a's wishes.²⁷ The *Yuan shi* indicates that in the autumn of 1303 Du'a, Chapar and Melik Temur (the son of Arigh Böke) sent an emissary to seek an end to the fighting. The emperor rejoiced at the proposal, but also instructed his army to take precautionary measures.²⁸ In late 1304 Chapar and Du'a sent another emissary, who announced their surrender.²⁹ Elsewhere the *Yuan shi* describes a council held by Du'a, Chapar and Melik Temur dated erroneously 1305, in which the three decided to make peace.³⁰ All of this suggests that Chapar participated in the preparations for peace from a relatively early stage.

Only the Muslim sources document the signing of the global peace treaty among the Mongol states following the surrender of the Central Asian princes: emissaries who announced the signing of the peace accord arrived in Oljeitu's court on September 19th, 1304 according to Qāshānī.³¹ Wassaf also attests to the arrival of the emissaries and to the global range of the peace accord.³² The *Yuan shi* makes no mention whatsoever of a global peace agreement. The most renowned reference to it, however, is the one given in a letter of 1305 sent by the Ilkhan Oljeitu to the King of France, Philippe IV, in which he proposes taking advantage of the peace among the Mongols for a combined attack on the Mamluks, saying:

Now, however, heaven has inspired us with the thought that We, Temur Khāqān, Toqto'a, Chapar and Togha (Du'a), and We (i.e.

Öljeitu) other descendants of Chinggis Khāqān should put an end to the vituperation which had been going on for forty-five years up to now, and now, thanks to heaven, all of Us brothers get on well together and, moreover, from the land of the Chinese where the sun rises, to the Tala Sea, We have joined Our mail lines together in order to connect the states. We have given each other Our word, that if anyone among Us should become disloyal We would all stand together against him.³³

Despite this impressive display of unity, in Central Asia the peace agreement merely marked the beginning of a series of battles between the Ögodeids and the Chaghadaids, since the former were unwilling to agree to the proposed settlement. More interesting is Du'a's willingness to modify the disposition of forces between Central Asia and China: from his enthronement as head of the Chaghadaid *ulus* in 1282, Du'a served as Qaidu's right-hand man, as the frequency with which their names appear together in the various sources³⁴ and Qaidu's instructions prior to his death show.³⁵ Du'a and the Chaghadaids played a major role in the incursions into the territories of the Ilkhans and even more so in prevailing over the Qara'unas and in the forays into India which commenced in the last decade of the thirteenth century.³⁶ Already at the end of Qaidu's life, Du'a disagreed with his policy towards the Qa'an. Du'a, however, obeyed Qaidu's order and came to fight in 1301.³⁷

The decisive reason given in the Persian and Chinese sources for Du'a's appeal to the Qa'an was the need for unity in Chinggis Khan's family.³⁸ Since this reason did not deter Du'a from harassing the various Mongol *uluses* when he acted together with Qaidu, it seems likely that more practical concerns dominated his thinking. Du'a stated he wished to continue to expand the borders of the Mongol empire, an expansion which had been halted because of the internal wars. He proposed that the Chaghadaids and the Ögodeids invade India.³⁹ Until then, Du'a had in the main been unsuccessful in his incursions into India, but he was aware of this country's wealth, which he must have felt easier to obtain than that of China and Persia. Another reason set forward by Du'a for peace was the need to revive the caravan trade within the borders of the empire;⁴⁰ Wassāf emphasizes this aspect of the peace agreement also in the description of the emissaries who reported to Oljeitu on the peace accord.⁴¹ Another stimulus, finally, was the wish to relieve his army and the population of the empire in general.⁴²

In addition to these motives, which the sources mention explicitly, further reasons might be adduced. As already noted, in the early fourteenth century Du'a faced the danger of a coalition of all the Mongol *uluses* against him.⁴³ Qaidu in his lifetime had feared such a coalition, and certainly without Qaidu and after the damages inflicted on them in the battle of 1301, the Central Asian princes would have been hard put to withstand such a coalition.⁴⁴ It is perhaps also for this reason that Du'a so greatly stressed the need for an empire-wide peace that would also resolve conflicts among other branches of the Mongol family (the Ilkhans and the Golden Horde, the White Horde and the Golden Horde).⁴⁵ Moreover, Qaidu's death and Du'a's senior position as *aqā* in Central Asia, provided Du'a with an ideal opportunity to free himself from the control of the house of Ögödei. Notwithstanding his prestige, the course of events would prove that in order to overcome Qaidu's army he required the assistance of the Yuan troops,⁴⁶ and this alone was a good reason for peace. Du'a assumed that he could obtain legitimacy for his rule in Central Asia from the Yuan, since most of the area of Qaidu's state was made up of territory that had been allocated to the house of Chaghadaid by Chinggis Khan (from the borders of Uighuria to the Oxus) or by Qubilai (from the Altai to the Oxus, as promised to Alghu in 1263).⁴⁷ For this reason, the peace proposal of Du'a stressed the rights of the sons of Chinggis Khan to the domains their father had distributed to them, and it described the proposed peace as a situation in which "everyone will be content with what he has," namely that each prince would keep the territories allocated to him in Chinggis Khan's time.⁴⁸ In his surrender to the Yuan, Du'a would seem at first to have been exchanging one master for another, but here he built on his and Qaidu's achievements. In the early fourteenth century the position of the Qa'an in Central Asia and also in other areas of the empire was very different from Qubilai's status when he rose to power. Du'a correctly calculated that recognizing the Qa'an's nominal supremacy would still allow him to maintain his autonomy.⁴⁹

While Du'a's peace agreement is full of references to unity and to Mongol tradition, it may be possible to identify in it also a typical example of relations between Central Asia and China, with the nomad neighbors discovering the advantages of recognizing the nominal supremacy of the Chinese ruler and thus enjoying his gifts, free access to Chinese trade, and military assistance if required.⁵⁰ The string of gifts received by Du'a's emissaries in the years after his surrender fits into this pattern.⁵¹

Temür thus found it convenient to accept Du'a's peace proposal. In addition to the economic and military damage to the Yuan caused by the confrontation, the battle of 1301 proved to the dynasty that even by coordinated effort it could not vanquish the Central Asian forces, and it is doubtful whether it wished to enter into further conflict, even under improved conditions.⁵² The Chaghadaids posed no threat to the Qa'an's legitimacy, and by recognizing Du'a's right to Turkestan, an area over which the Yuan had long since ceded control, Temur hoped to ensure the rule of the Yuan over Mongolia and peace on the northwest border. Temür, therefore, confirmed Du'a's right to Turkestan but not to other regions.⁵³ From the *Yuan shi* it is clear that the northeast part of Qaidu's territory (part of Mongolia, the Altai, the Irtysh; the part that can be roughly described as belonging to the original Ogodeid appanage) passed to the Yuan dynasty, though only after Chapar's surrender to Du'a.⁵⁴ The Yuan map of 1330 shows the advance of the Chaghadaids to the south and their withdrawal in the north.⁵⁵

For the Ögödeids, the peace agreement both changed their relations with the Yuan and subjected most of their domain to the Chaghadaids, and thus it is not surprising that they showed little enthusiasm for the proposed agreement. The tension in Central Asia commenced, according to Qāshānī, when Chapar refused to attend the *quriltai* that Du'a planned to hold in order to celebrate the peace accord with the Yuan.⁵⁶ Chapar opposed more to the holding of the *quriltai* under the auspices of Du'a than to the proposed peace, and he suggested that he rather than Du'a should hold the *quriltai*.⁵⁷ It seems that ultimately the *quriltai* was not held at all. At the same time, in 1305/6 local fighting broke out between the Chaghadaid troops and those of Chapar, apparently as a result of the former's attempts to supplant the latter in various regions, following the agreement with Temür. The fighting was waged on several fronts simultaneously: in the Oxus region Qaidu's son Sarban fought against princes appointed by Du'a to replace Qutluğ Qocha, Du'a's son who ruled over parts of Khurasan (until his death in 1299). Sarban succeeded in vanquishing his rivals, to some extent because he received the support of part of Qutluğ Qocha's army and his queens. Subsequently, Sarban suffered a defeat, partly due to poor weather conditions. When he reached a stalemate with the Chaghadaid troops, probably simultaneously with Chapar's surrender to Du'a, he preferred not to tire his army any longer. In 1306/7 he surrendered to Oljeitu in the company of princes, commanders, and a *tümen* of the Qara'unas.⁵⁸

Other Ogodeid princes took advantage of the outbreak of the fighting in order to plunder Samarkand and Bukhara, and then sought to go over to Du'a's side. Baba, of the house of Jochi Qasar and a follower of Qaidu, opposed this plan. Fighting broke out between him and Jangqi, a commander who supported Du'a, and the Chaghadaid Yasa'ur. The latter fought between Samarkand and Khojand, triumphed over Baba, but was defeated after Baba received reinforcements from Shah, another of Qaidu's sons, based in Talas.⁵⁹ At this stage Du'a decided to intervene and to make peace with Chapar. He blamed the wars on the youthful errors of the young commanders and suggested appointing experienced commanders to mete out punishment to the offenders. Chapar agreed to the suggestion, and it was decided that the princes would meet about a month later in Shash to carry out the punishments. Shah, who believed in the peace, returned most of his army and left Baba in Shash with a thousand men. Baba soon noticed a large part of Du'a's army approaching the region. He sent a messenger to inform Shah, but Shah refused to send an army without receiving orders from Chapar. Baba was defeated, and Du'a's troops, under the command of Yasa'ur and Jangqi, continued in the direction of Talas. They laid waste to Talas and the neighboring cities, and with reinforcements from Du'a's army vanquished Shah. Later, after Chapar's surrender to Du'a, Shah received a post in the Chaghadaid army.⁶⁰

The most important front in the struggle was on the border with the Yuan. On the eve of the planned *quriltai* Chapar instructed Orus to defend the border with the Yuan, fearing a possible incursion from there. The Qa'an's border commanders had been led since 1299 by Qaishan, a descendant of Qubilai and the heir apparent of Temur who was stationed beyond the Altai.⁶¹ According to Qāshānī, Orus relied on his friendship with Qaishan in order to prevent a confrontation, and so he invited him to a feast.⁶² Du'a persuaded Qaishan that the aim of the feast was to give Orus an opportunity to capture him. Fired with anger, Qaishan did not trouble to ascertain the truth of the allegations, but decided to forestall Orus' attack.⁶³ In June 1306, Qaishan crossed the Altai, and attacked suddenly in the night, killing and taking captive many of Orus' men. Much of Orus' army preferred to abandon him and join the Qa'an's army.⁶⁴ Wassāf also indicates that Qaishan acted in coordination with Du'a and behind Chapar's back.⁶⁵ In this way the Yuan began to actively support the house of Chaghadaid.

Orus's defeat and Yuan support of the Chaghadaids persuaded many princes that Chapar had no chance of victory in the

confrontation with Du'a. When Orus told Chapar of his defeat, the latter did indeed set out to fight Du'a, but he was not followed by all his supporters. Melik Temiir, hitherto a loyal follower of Chapar, asked to guard the rear and to join the fighting force later. Chapar agreed to this request, despite warnings from the princes. Melik Temiir informed Du'a that Chapar was mobilizing troops against him, and he himself elected to go over to the Qa'an's side, accompanied by several Ögodeid princes.⁶⁶ On his way Melik Temiir passed through the empty camps of Chapar and his men, and plundered their herds, wealth and families.⁶⁷ About a month after subduing Orus, Qaishan received his surrender in the Irtysh regions.⁶⁸ On hearing that their camps had been plundered, Chapar's men abandoned him and rode out to try to recover their property. At this stage many of them went over to the Qa'an's side.⁶⁹ Du'a, meanwhile, was alarmed by the news that Chapar was mobilizing troops. According to QashanI, Du'a appealed to Temiir, claiming that Chapar was attacking him because of his submission to the Yuan. Temiir sent supposedly ten *tümens* to his aid, headed by Alghu's grandson and other commanders, apparently from the army accompanying Qaishan. They surrounded Chapar and left him no choice but to surrender to Du'a with the three hundred horsemen he had left.⁷⁰

QashanI, Wassāf and the *yuan shi* confirm that already with Chapar's surrender to Du'a (1306/7) most of Chapar's army joined the Qa'an's service, where it was divided among the different units.⁷¹ A large part of Chapar's property came into the hands of the Yuan as a result of the activities of Melik Temiir and Qaishan. Qaishan, who returned from the border in order to become Qa'an after Temür's death (early 1307), gave much of this property as recompense to the commanders who assisted him in his rise to power.⁷² The surrender of Chapar's and Melik Temiir's army also led to the transfer of many residents from the Altai and Irtysh regions to the domains of the Yuan. In late 1307, the province of Lingbei was organized for these residents, whose number the *Yuan shi* sets at 86,000.⁷³ Lingbei replaced the Bureau of Pacification in Qara Qorum as the administrative unit of Mongolia.⁷⁴ The borders of Lingbei approximately coincide with those of Outer Mongolia and include the region of the Altai and the Irtysh, areas previously held by Qaidu and Chapar.⁷⁵

Du'a allocated a domain and a stipend to Chapar, and at the same time sought to capture the heads of Qaidu's camp. His followers killed Qutulun, and captured the chiefs of the house of Qaidu and his

followers: Shah, Orus, *Yangichar, Tügme son of Hoqu and Baba of the house of Jochi Qasar. In 1307, when all were assembled, Du'a held a *quriltai* in Quyās near Almalīq.⁷⁶ There he deposed Chapar as head of the *ulus* and appointed in his place *Yangichar, the only son of Qaidu who had not been involved in the fighting with the Chaghadaid forces.⁷⁷ At the same time, in order to divide even further the supporters of the house of Ogodei, Du'a allocated to Tiigme, son of Hoqu, Güyüg's appanage in the Emil region.⁷⁸ Despite the apparently desperate straits of the house of Ogodei at this stage, until the *quriltai* of 1307/8 and perhaps also after it, the Chaghadaids were still constrained to fight princes loyal to Qaidu who dwelt near Samarkand.⁷⁹

Du'a's death in 1307⁸⁰ precipitated a period of instability in the house of Chaghadaid. After ruling for one year (1308) Du'a's son Konchek died. Būri's grandson Talīqu then seized power. Talīqu's Islamization policies and the fact that he was not descended from Du'a aroused resistance against him in the house of Chaghadaid. The opponents rallied around Du'a's youngest son Kebek, and they fought and defeated Talīqu in 1308/9.⁸¹

The succession struggles in the house of Chaghadaid gave Qaidu's sons an opportunity to reassert their power. In about 1309 *Yangichar, Orus, Chapar and Tiigme attacked Kebek, who had just concluded his war against Talīqu.⁸² The battle took place near Almalīq. The Ögodeid forces achieved an initial victory, but were defeated when reinforcements of Talīqu's supporters, also joined by Shah, arrived. Following the defeat, Chapar opted to surrender to the Qa'an.⁸³ On the way Chapar plundered Tügme's domain; Tiigme fled before him, but was captured by Kebek's men and executed.⁸⁴

The office of Qa'an was occupied from 1308 on by Qaishan. (Wuzong, 1308–11). He and his men were concerned by the continued fighting in Central Asia and feared a renewal of the confrontation.⁸⁵ In late 1308, Qaishan sent emissaries to Chapar and Konchek (Kuanshe).⁸⁶ According to Qāshānī, Qaishan offered to appoint Chapar over his brothers, a position that he had recently lost to *Yangichar, and sent him gifts and marks of respect.⁸⁷ Subsequently, however, Qaishan's counsellors advised him to establish ties with Du'a's sons since they had been the first to sue for peace.⁸⁸ He therefore confirmed the enthronement of Kebek over the Chaghadaids and his right to slay Tügme.⁸⁹ Accordingly, the importance of his mission to Chapar should not be exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is probable that the mission contributed to Chapar's decision to

surrender to the Qa'an after it became clear to him that he would not be punished as a rebel. According to Qāshānī, *Yangichar accompanied Chapar on his way to the Qa'an, but was poisoned on reaching Dadu.⁹⁰ *Yangichar does not appear at all in the *Yuan shi*, which sees only Chapar as Qaidu's successor; this omission may be an echo of the agreement between Qaishan and Chapar.


Chapar surrendered to the Yuan in early 1310, and six months later he came to the imperial court,⁹¹ bringing with him a large number of postal horses.⁹² Chapar's arrival at the court, a journey that Qaidu refused to make from 1264 onwards, symbolized for the Yuan the end of the conflict with the house of Ogodei, and Qaishan celebrated this with a feast and a sacrifice at the temple of the ancestors.⁹³

After Chapar came to the Yuan court he received from Qaishan the revenues of Qaidu's possessions in China which had been frozen at the time of his revolt.⁹⁴ He received an honorable status in the court and in 1315, was appointed prince of Runing in Henan, far from Central Asia.⁹⁵ This title passed down to his son Oljei Temür (Wanzhu Tiemuer) and in 1324 to Chapar's grandson, Quladai (Huladai).⁹⁶ Quladai, however, supported the losing side in the struggle for the Yuan throne in 1328, and was executed by the victor, Tugh Temür (Wenzong, 1328-32). With this, the passing down of the title to Qaidu's descendants came to an end.⁹⁷

Qaidu's son Orus, meanwhile, apparently remained at the Yuan court, with an inferior status to that of Chapar, and only in 1320 did the emperor give him a grant and send him back to his appanage.⁹⁸ While the *Yuan shi* states that Orus returned to his domain, it seems that he did not return to Central Asia. In 1321 the *Yuan shi* indicates that there was a famine in Orus' domains, and the emperor sent him food from Jingzhou.⁹⁹ Since this city is in the south of present-day Inner Mongolia and closer to Dadu than to Turkestan, it may be assumed that even a decade after the surrender the Yuan did not wish to take the risk of returning Qaidu's sons to the steppes.¹⁰⁰ There is no later information in the sources on Orus or his descendants.

Princes of the house of Ögödei continued to serve in the Chaghadaid army in the following decades. From time to time they also tried to reemerge in the historical arena. For instance, several descendants of the house of Ogodei were puppet rulers under Temiir Lang,¹⁰¹ and in 1360 one of Ögödei's descendants tried to seize the throne of the Yuan emperor - and failed.¹⁰² However, the Ögödeids

never again established an autonomous political entity, as had Qaidu.



Among the immediate reasons for the rapid collapse of the Ögodeid power were Du'a's actions to divide it up: the enthronement of the weak and unpopular Chapar; the spreading of rumors and suppositions on his replacement; his removal; the capture of the leaders of the house of Ögodei and the division of their *ulus* into two, the *ulus* of Ögödei-Qaidu and that of Güyüg. The coalition that Du'a formed with the Qa'an completely altered the balance of power in Central Asia, and resulted not only in the overwhelming defeat of Orus by Qaishan, but also in the surrender of princes who had supported Qaidu to the Qa'an (Melik Temur and his partners) or to Oljeitu (Sarban and those accompanying him).

Less immediately, the reason for the rapid collapse of the Ögodeid kingdom lies in the status of Chaghadaid's sons in Qaidu's kingdom. It was the weakness of Chaghadaid's sons after Abaqa defeated Barak at Herat (1270) that enabled Qaidu to take control over them in 1271, a control for which he was obliged to fight until 1282, when he installed Du'a as head of the *ulus*. Neither in 1271, nor in 1282, nor later, did Qaidu try to dismantle the Chaghadaid *ulus* or its military units, in contrast to Temür's treatment of Chapar's army after this latter's surrender, to Qubilai's treatment of the *uluses* of Chinggis Khan's brothers after Nayan's revolt, or to Abaqa's treatment of Tegüder's army after the latter's surrender.¹⁰³ Qaidu apparently did not feel himself strong enough to act similarly. It is clear, in any case, that a separation was maintained between Du'a's and Qaidu's armies,¹⁰⁴ and the Chaghadaid army, even though subordinate to Qaidu, continued to serve as a power base for Du'a, a base which he used after Qaidu's death.

Upon Qaidu's death, Du'a took advantage of his position as an *aqa* to manipulate the former's sons and to take back the Chaghadaid domains. Unlike Qaidu, Du'a posed no threat to the Qa'an's legitimation, and, moreover, the Chaghadaids' historical right to rule Central Asia was recognized by the Yuan. It was, therefore, easier for him to make peace with the Yuan and legitimize his new acquisitions through the Qa'an's approval. Nevertheless, Du'a could surrender to the Qa'an and still retain his independence only due to Qaidu's activities: Qaidu's long and successful struggle against the Qa'an during the last decades of the thirteenth century wiped out Yuan

pretensions to rule Central Asia and made the Qa'an's authority in the other Mongol khanates a nominal one.

The creation of a strong independent state *ex nihilo* in Central Asia, on the back of the Chaghadaids and against the Qa'an, called for leadership and ability such as Qaidu possessed. His sons lacked their father's stature, and let the Chaghadaids enjoy his toil. Yet Qaidu's achievement, the creating of an independent state in Central Asia, survived him, and under the Chaghadaids this state outlived both the Yuan and the Ilkhanate.

Chapter IV

The Mongol State of Central Asia: Internal Administration under Qaidu

1. The Army

Qaidu's army is famous principally for the quality of its soldiers. Many of the sources sing its praises, with emphasis on the courage of the soldiers, their strict discipline, high level of training and ability to report as one man when summoned.¹ In this section, I shall study the composition and size of the army, the weapons at its disposal, the tactics it employed and the counter-tactics employed against it, mainly from China.

Qaidu's initial army consisted of men whom he assembled "from every corner" according to Rashīd al-Dīn.² Rashīd al-Dīn, perhaps trying to undermine his legitimacy, stresses in another place that the troops Qaidu had gathered together were for the most part not the troops originally bequeathed to Ögödei by Chinggis Khan.³ Yet Rashīd al-Dīn himself, as well as other sources, attest that before 1269 Qaidu had at his disposal several units previously connected with the Ögöeid army. Their commanders were Dānīshmand, son of Ögödei's Jalayirid commander who served as Qaidu's messenger to Abaq;⁴ the *amir* of the Arulad who held a high position under Ögödei;⁵ and the Ögöeid princes, such as Qipchaq and Chabat, who chose to join Qaidu.⁶ Other recognizable components in Qaidu's initial army were the members of the Bekrin, Qaidu's mother's tribe, who according to Abu Ghāzī numbered two thousand households by the time of Chinggis Khan,⁷ and troops placed at Qaidu's disposal by the Golden Horde in Berke's time.⁸

After Qaidu's victory over Baraq and following the *quriltai* of Talas, Qaidu shared with Baraq and Möngke Temür the army stationed in the cities of Transoxania; it is known that the army residing in Bukhara circa 1265 consisted originally of fifteen *hizārabs*

(units of 1,000 men), of which ten remained after Hülegü slaughtered Berke's men in 1263.⁹ In 1271, after Baraq's death and with the enthronement of Qaidu as Khan of the house of Ögodei, or shortly afterwards, further troops of the house of Ögodei enrolled in his army, such as the troops of Hoqu son of Güyüg,¹⁰ as well as a sizeable part of the Chaghadaid army. Although the Chaghadaid forces joined Qaidu after having been crushed by Abaqa, Rashīd al-Dīn still estimates Baraq's army after the defeat at about 30,000 men, though not all of them supported Qaidu at this stage.¹¹ One may assume that at this time Qaidu also commanded all the troops stationed in the cities of Transoxania. The complete surrender of the Chaghadaid army occurred in 1282, with the appointment of Du'a as Chaghadaid Khan.¹² Within a year, princes from the house of Jochi Qasar also joined Qaidu; some of them perhaps had accompanied the Chaghadaid army in the past.¹³ At about the same time, in the wake of the failed princes' rebellion against Qubilai other princes, in particular from the house of Tolui, also joined Qaidu's army. The impressive size of the forces of Melik Temür, son of Arigh Böke and the most senior of the new recruits from this side, has already been mentioned.¹⁴ The arrival of commanders such as Nauruz or *Dorduka and *Yomuqur¹⁵ suggests that princes continued to join Qaidu's ranks throughout the last decades of the thirteenth century, though most of his troops were already consolidated in the early 1280s. In the last years of the thirteenth century the Qara'unas were also incorporated into Qaidu's and Du'a's forces.¹⁶

While many troops joined Qaidu's army, there were also desertions from his camp to the ranks of the Qa'an or the Ilkhans. Those suspected of attempting to desert were executed: such was the fate, for example, of Buzma, son of Baraq, who wished to go over to the Qa'an's army; and of Ürük Temür of the house of Ögodei, who joined Nauruz's revolt against Qaidu.¹⁷ Other deserters, like *Durdoka and *Yomuqur, were more successful, however.¹⁸

In order to transform these disparate forces into an exemplary army, Qaidu had to reorganize them perhaps along the same lines as Chinggis Khan's army of the various Mongolian tribes.¹⁹ The sources provide no testimony to this effect, but there is an indirect evidence to a certain reallocation of the joining troops. Thus Melik Temiir was sent by Qaidu to the border of the White Horde, and after Qaidu's death he worked in coordination with Chapar, until betraying him and surrendering to the Qa'an.²⁰ Likewise, Melik Temür's son *Shinqan operated further west, and he accompanied Sarban to the

banks of the Oxus in his attack in 1302 and in his surrender to Öljeitu in 1306/7.²¹ Jangqi Küregen, one of the commanders from Melik Temiir's *Ordo* who joined Qaidu together with the former, worked alongside Du'a in the Farghāna region and remained faithful to the house of Chaghadaid even after Melik Temiir's surrender to the Yuan.²² These facts substantiate the supposition that Qaidu reorganized some of the troops that joined him, or at least endeavored to disperse the military force of the joining princes in order to avoid a concentration of a large force in the hands of one prince.

On the other hand, the sources make it clear that a separation was maintained between the Chaghadaid army and Qaidu's, contrary to the usual custom when one Mongol prince surrendered to another. The Chaghadaid army was not redistributed among other units but maintained its integrity even though it was subordinate to Qaidu; thus Qāshāni was able to refer to Du'a's *hizārah* as opposed to the *hizārah* of Chapar, son of Qaidu.²³ Wassāf calls Qaidu's army *Lashkar Khassa* (private army?), to differentiate it from Du'a's army, and according to his description, it consisted of princes of the house of Ögodei and of the house of Jochi Qasar.²⁴ "*Khassa*" may denote an army that Qaidu assembled from his initial supporters or one directly subject to him as opposed to the Chaghadaid army. In view of the large size ascribed to this army – three *tumens* – it could in no way have been a mere *retinue*.²⁵ Incidentally, however, the term *Khassa* is also mentioned in relation to the army that Qaidu sent in 1270 to succor Baraq's army. At least according to Rashid al-Dīn it seems that this was a *Khassa* of Chabat, Güyüg's grandson and one of the princes sent to Baraq, and not Qaidu's *Khāssa*; moreover, the numbers mentioned are far lower – between one to four thousand men.²⁶

In addition to the Mongol princes, commanders who were probably not from Chinggis Khan's family played a role in Qaidu's army. Very little mention is made of these commanders in the sources and for the most part it is impossible to identify them.²⁷ For the same reason it is also impossible to present a full picture of the tribal structure of Qaidu's army. Among his men members of the following tribes can be identified: the Bekrin²⁸, the Arulad²⁹, the Qorulat/s,³⁰ the Olqunu'ud,³¹ the Jalayir,³² the Süldüs,³³ the Qongqotan,³⁴ the Merkid,³⁵ the Besüd,³⁶ the Qatagin,³⁷ and the Naiman.³⁸

Apart from the Mongolian and Turkish tribes Qaidu might have used some auxiliary forces from the regions over which he ruled. Yet evidence for the existence of such forces is sketchy, especially as compared with the important role of Chinese units in the Yuan army

and the frequent mentions of auxiliaries (Armenian, Georgian, etc.) fighting in the Ilkhanid forces and even in those of the Golden Horde.³⁹ If not a result of the scarcity of the sources, the scant references to auxiliary forces can be explained by the fact that the troops of the Central Asian rulers before the Mongols and the local troops there were incorporated into the Mongol army prior to Qaidu's time, and not all of them remained in Central Asia.⁴⁰ Another explanation may lie in the fact that the auxiliary forces in the service of the Yuan (and the Ilkhans) were frequently infantry troops, while clearly most of Qaidu's army was cavalry.

Isolated and equivocal examples of the presence of such auxiliary forces in Qaidu's ranks occur in the reference to *Balm wanhu*, whom Pelliot tentatively identifies as the commander of the *tümen* of the Barin region;⁴¹ in the mentioning of the commander of the *cherig* (auxiliary troops) and Tajik and Qara-Khitān commanders among the *amirs* of Melik Temür, though it is unclear who belonged to their armies;⁴² and in the hundred "naphtha throwers" (*andāz-inaft*) who accompanied Du'a in the sieges of Kusui and of Fushang.⁴³ The frequent use of the military title *amir* (commander) in relation to several Persian and Turkish Transoxanian landowners in the 1299 *waqf* document from Bukhara as well as to Mas'ūd Beg's sons;⁴⁴ the attribution of the title "people of the pen and the sword" (*ahl al-qalam w'al-sayf*) to the founder of the above-mentioned *waqf* document and to Mas'ūd Beg, and the latter's accompanying Baraq to the battle of Herat⁴⁵ - all these indicate that part of the Transoxanian population also served in Qaidu's ranks, a phenomenon not uncommon in Central Asia in earlier periods.⁴⁶ Among those auxiliary troops, the Barin army was unquestionably a mounted army,⁴⁷ while the Berkin, a mountainous people, might have supplied infantry, and the naphtha throwers could be either mounted or infantry. Although Marco Polo might have implied the presence of infantry among Qaidu's troops that had been sent to help Nayan,⁴⁸ clearly mounted riders were the dominant force in Qaidu's army as a whole.

Qaidu and Du'a retained the decimal structure, typical of the Mongol armies and the Central Asian armies in general. The basic units were units of a 100 (*gha'un/ṣadah/baihu*); units of 1,000 (*mingghan/hizārah/qianhu*) and *tümen/wan hu*.⁴⁹ There is no data regarding the number of men constituting a *tümen*, but presumably it was less than ten thousand men, just as in the other Mongol armies.⁵⁰ As for military titles, Baba Oghūl is described as an *amir qul*

(commander of the main wing of the army, namely one of the most senior commanders);⁵¹ Taraghai is defined as the *amir-i ordo* (commander of the camp) of Du'a's son, Qutluḡ Qocha;⁵² and the description of Melik Temür's *amirs* reflects a certain differentiation in the division of responsibilities among the commanders.⁵³ Yet it is difficult to determine on the basis of such isolated references whether there existed a coherent system of ranks in Qaidu's army.

Several estimates appear in the sources as to the size of the armies of Qaidu and, later, of Chapar. Het'um indicates that Chapar could field 400,000 superb horsemen,⁵⁴ while Marco Polo speaks of 100,000 horsemen in Qaidu's army.⁵⁵ The *yuan shi* sets Chapar's forces just prior to his surrender at over 100,000 men,⁵⁶ and this is also the estimate in later Chinese sources as regards Qaidu's army.⁵⁷ Wassaf attributes ten *tumens* to Chapar on the eve his surrender to Du'a,⁵⁸ and according to QashanT ten, twenty, or thirty *tumens* accompanied Chapar on the eve of his surrender to Du'a and the Qa'an.⁵⁹ Of course, the varying estimates of Chapar's troops on the eve of his surrender (in the *Yuan shi*, Wassaf and QashanT) do not include the Chaghadaid army, which constituted a large part of Qaidu's forces. (The *Yuan Shi* estimates Du'a's army at the time of the siege of Qara Qocho in 1285 at 120,000 men,⁶⁰ and Harawī indicates that at the siege of Kusui and Fushang in 1295, Du'a led 100,000 horsemen.⁶¹ Yet, at least in the case of Kusui and Fushang Ogödeid troops were also incorporated in Du'a's army).⁶² Qarshī stresses the great size of the army led by Qaidu and his successors as one of the factors in the victory over the Qa'an.⁶³

These numbers can not be taken literally.⁶⁴ More significant is the fact that the numbers that the sources attribute to other armies in the Mongol empire are far greater: Het'um set the Golden Horde army at 600,000 men, or 1.5 times as many as the number of soldiers he attributed to Chapar.⁶⁵ Marco Polo estimated the army of Qubilai that fought Nayan at 360,000 horsemen and about 100,000 foot soldiers; to the army of the Ilkhans and the Golden Horde he attributed 300,000 men each.⁶⁶ Umarī maintained that the Golden Horde army was greater than the armies of the Central Asian princes, and also attributed twelve Mongol *tumens*, twenty *tumens* of horsemen and a large Chinese army to the Qa'an.⁶⁷ Chinese and Muslim sources emphasize Qaidu's numerical inferiority in relation to the Yuan, where the ratio suggested between the armies is 1:100.⁶⁸ Even if this is an exaggeration it gives some indication of contemporary understandings of the relative power of the Mongol states. All these sources,

however, note the quality of Qaidu's army (in 'Umarī's case the Transoxanian army) in contrast to the other armies, despite its numerical inferiority.⁶⁹

Rashīd al-Dīn set at 150,000 the force of Prince Ananda, Yuan garrison commander on the border with Qaidu, who dwelled in the land of the Tanguts in Temür's time.⁷⁰ Du'a boasted at the time of the siege of Qara Qocho that he vanquished 300,000 Han soldiers, who were under the command of two of the border commanders in Uighuria.⁷¹ Yet it is difficult to conceive that each border commander had 150,000 men at his disposal, if only because Rashīd al-Dīn counts eight such commanders,⁷² which would mean that a force of about 1,200,000 men was maintained on the border. Further corroborating evidence that these numbers are exaggerated is the fact that in two documented cases, a Baraq or Qaidu force estimated at 30,000 was able to frighten the garrison commanders of the Yuan into avoiding battle.⁷³ The chapter in the *Yuanshi* dealing with the garrison troops mentions the dispatch of a few thousand men at the most to serve as a garrison.⁷⁴ More credible, therefore, may be the estimate of a Yuan scholar Yao Sui (1238-1313), that in 1281 there were over a 100,000 Yuan soldiers in the "North West," a name that denotes Turkestan and the Yenisei region in Mongolia.⁷⁵ It is hard, however, in the final analysis, to reach an unequivocal estimate.

Among the weapons used by Qaidu, in addition to bows and arrows,⁷⁶ swords,⁷⁷ and lances⁷⁸ also appear as arms that were no less vital to Qaidu's army. There are less frequent mentions of shields (apparently of leather),⁷⁹ knives,⁸⁰ cudgels with a metal knob at the end,⁸¹ short spears,⁸² and javelins.⁸³ Du'a's army also had at least a dozen catapults for breaking sieges, and Greek fire (naphtha), which was also used in times of siege.⁸⁴ Armor and helmets are also mentioned,⁸⁵ but it seems that they were not allocated to the whole army. The main difference between the composition of weapons in Qaidu's army and in the Mongol army in the time of Chinggis, Ögödei, and Güyüg (as described by Piano Carpini and in the *Secret History*) was the more extensive use of swords and lances by the former.⁸⁶

The importance attributed by Qaidu to arms was expressed at the *quriltai* of Talas, when he demanded a share in the workshops in Samarkand and Bukhara.⁸⁷ Baraq, who even earlier "made the artisans work day and night preparing weaponry,"⁸⁸ attributed at least the same importance to the acquisition of weapons, going so far as to plunder arms as part of his invasion.⁸⁹ Het'um indicates that Chapar's

army suffered from a shortage of arms (and horses).⁹⁰ This shortage was probably due to wars of the princes after Qaidu's death. In any case, Su Tianjue emphasizes the inferiority of Qaidu's army in weapons compared with the Yuan army.⁹¹ Such a disadvantage is plausible, given the superior resources and organization that stood at the Yuan's disposal. The names of the units overseeing the manufacture of arms in China attest to the fact that the principal battle equipment of the Yuan consisted of bows and arrows and armor.⁹² The *Yuan shi* rarely mentions weapons used in the course of the fighting with Qaidu. The *Wenji*, however, mention swords, shields, spears and armor, as well as using bare hands for cutting heads.⁹³ It seems that the extensive use of armor was one of the main qualitative advantages of the Yuan army over Qaidu's.

From descriptions of the battle of Herat - the only frontal clash between the Chaghadaid army and the Ilkhans in the period discussed here - it can be concluded that the Ilkhans had an advantage in arms over the Chaghadaid army, although not such a dramatic advantage as maintained, for example, by Martinez. There is no evidence there of the use of armor by Abaqa's troops.⁹⁴

Qaidu's ability to surmount his inferiority in arms and in numbers derived from the nomadic nature of his troops, as clearly demonstrated by the tactics that he used. In the years of his conflict with the Yuan, as also with the Ilkhans, Qaidu engaged principally in raids for plundering territories. He did not impose his rule over the territories that he invaded, and for the most part had no need to defend his own territories. Qaidu exploited the mobility of his troops to create tactical numerical superiority over the opposing force, a superiority which led to their defeat or withdrawal. Thus, for example, when Baba was sent in 1283 to attack the Qa'an's forces in Khotan, Qubilai's garrison commanders, on seeing the size of his army, preferred to retreat without joining battle.⁹⁵ Baraq also used the same tactics at Khotan in circa 1266.⁹⁶ The large size of Qaidu's army at the critical point is also cited as a reason for his victory at Besh Baliq in 1286.⁹⁷ Su Tianjue notes Qaidu's ability to coordinate forces as one body as a major reason for his success against the Yuan.⁹⁸ The important role played in Qaidu's success by his ability to coordinate forces also explains why he was weakened in the 1290s when he was obliged to maintain three fronts simultaneously. He was thus unable to concentrate his forces at a single point and had to engage in a kind of border defense (see Chapter II).

Qaidu himself also did not hesitate to withdraw if he realized that the opposing army was superior to his, as attested by Marco Polo.⁹⁹

At times the retreat served only as a tactical step, designed to lure the enemy into pursuit and ambush. After the initial victory scored by the Yuan troops in the last battle with Qaidu, they thus elected not to pursue him, fearing that he was retreating in order to draw them into an ambush.¹⁰⁰ Another typical Mongol tactic that Qaidu favored was to send a small force forward to lure the enemy into an easy fight, only attacking with all troops once their men the enemy deployed for battle.¹⁰¹ Although Qaidu's army was clearly an equestrian unit, Harawl explicitly indicates that the Central Asian troops did not hesitate to engage in face-to-face fighting, in contrast to Carpini's description of the Mongol army.¹⁰²

Particularly noteworthy is the importance that Qaidu attached to knowing the lie of the terrain over which he intended to attack as a major factor for the success of the invasion. Accordingly, he was in the habit of sending people who were well acquainted with the region he wished to invade at the head of raiding forces: Uighurtai's familiarity with the territories of Mazandaran constituted a basis for the invasion of this area by Du'a's army;¹⁰³ Nauruz led the invasion of Khurasan in which Qaidu's army also participated;¹⁰⁴ and Arigh Böke's sons led the incursions into the Yenisei area and Mongolia, where their original appanages were situated.¹⁰⁵ After *Yomuqur surrendered, the Qa'an also utilized his familiarity with the lie of the terrain in sending him to fight Qaidu in that same region.¹⁰⁶

The *Yuan shi* on several occasions refers to victories won by Qaidu after he gained control of strategic points.¹⁰⁷ Mention is also made of the fact that Qaidu's and Du'a's forces encamped on mountains or used mountains for defense purposes,¹⁰⁸ and this, in addition to the terrain, may also illustrate a clever use of the mountainous Bekrin tribe in the army.¹⁰⁹

Another way to obtain accurate information on the lie of the land and on the enemy troops was the use of scouts. Rashid al-Din mentions that scouts were stationed on the Qa'an borders with Qaidu on both sides.¹¹⁰ According to the *Yuan shi*, in the late 1260s Qaidu sent scouts to examine the preparedness of Batu's (i.e., Möngke Temür's) troops and whether they intended to attack him;¹¹¹ in 1284 *Yaqudu, one of Qubilai's commanders, caught a scout sent by Qaidu and used the information that the scout gave him in order to attack Qaidu's army;¹¹² and in about 1292 Bayan caught one of Melik Temiir's scouts.¹¹³ There are no clear confirmations of the use of scouts on the Ilkhanid front, but the successful timing of Qaidu's and Du'a's incursions into Iran reinforces the supposition that Qaidu also

succeeded in obtaining information on what was happening on this front.¹¹⁴ On the eve of the battle of Herat, similarly, Baraq sent Mas'ud Beg to obtain information on Abaqa's position. Subsequently, he also sent scouts to Abaqa's camp, thus attesting to the use of these means in the Chaghadaid army also.¹¹⁵

Another tactic employed by Qaidu's and Du'a's army, designed also to disguise its numerical inferiority, was the use of psychological warfare. In the last battle with the Qa'an, for example, after being defeated by the Yuan army, Qaidu commanded his men to light fires in order to create the impression that he had received large reinforcements.¹¹⁶ Du'a's description of the immense army that he would bring against Kusui and Fushang seems also to have aimed at the same purpose. Certainly Du'a's descriptions during the siege of the bodies of the townspeople being left to the birds and the jackals were also an expression of psychological warfare; in this case it was unsuccessful.¹¹⁷ There is, however, no evidence of the use of deliberate destruction as a psychological weapon designed to arouse the fear of the residents, a tactic employed by Chinggis Khan's troops.¹¹⁸

Most of the incursions of Qaidu's army occurred in autumn, the usual season for nomad invasions into China.¹¹⁹ There is also a reference to several incursions in winter, the object being to exploit the element of surprise of an invasion in this season.¹²⁰ In at least one case the difficult weather foiled the invasion.¹²¹

In battle, as opposed to invasion, exchange of ambassadors and beating of drums preceded the fighting; a practice also customary in battles among other Mongols.¹²² It seems that battle, or warfare in general, was usually waged in the daytime and halted in the evening;¹²³ this explains why the night attacks of Nauruz or Qaishan gained an advantage.¹²⁴ During fighting, the army was divided into wings (left, right, center), which was a standard in other Mongol armies as well.¹²⁵ Several times a rain of arrows is mentioned as the opening gambit used by Qaidu's army in battle or in raid.¹²⁶

The sources twice mention's use of a siege tactic by the Central Asian army, in both cases by Du'a.¹²⁷ Complete details do not exist on Du'a's siege of Qara Qocho in 1285, but Harawl gives a detailed account of the siege of Kusui: Du'a first ascertained whether the city wall was built of stone or mud, and was pleased to hear that it was of mud. He sent against the city a force estimated at 12,000 horsemen with a dozen catapults and a hundred naphtha throwers. Du'a's soldiers lit a great fire on four sides of the citadel. The Mongols simultaneously attacked the fortress with arrows, with the attacking

force being changed daily, but to no avail. Du'a then sent a reinforcement of 10,000 men, and they fired arrows and struck with catapults from all directions, but without success. As a last step, after already deliberating on whether to abandon the siege, Du'a commanded his men to build a tower of wood and earth, higher than the citadel of Kusui, planning to attack Kusui from there. The townspeople frustrated his plan by setting the tower alight, and Du'a decided to withdraw.¹²⁸ In neither case attributed to Du'a's army, did the siege lead to breaching of the city walls. Qara Qocho surrendered, but Du'a was obliged to retreat from Kusui, even though he succeeded in breaching Fushang subsequently.¹²⁹ In addition to those episodes it is worth citing the experience of Taraghai, a Chaghadaid commander who in 1303 laid siege to Delhi for two months, and also felt constrained to lift the siege without obtaining the city's surrender.¹³⁰ Such testimonies would seem to indicate that the Chaghadaid army was relatively unskilled in siege tactics.

Most of the documentation on the tactics employed by the Mongols against Qaidu involves the front with the Yuan, since in the west Qaidu was able for the most part to avoid direct contact with the Ilkhanid army, and there are no details in the sources on the nature of the fighting with the White Horde.

In the Yuan battles against Qaidu two strategies are evident; the sedentary approach and the nomadic approach. The former favored fortifications as an effective method of defence against Qaidu. This recommendation, made by the emissary sent to evaluate Qaidu's force in the late 1260s,¹³¹ was adopted by the governor of Qara Qorum in 1289.¹³² It is also recommended by the lesser pacification commissioner in Qara Qorum in 1302, who claimed that building walls and making fortifications was the best way to defend Mongolia.¹³³ The same strategy motivated the building of a fortress after the princes' revolt some 130 km south of Qara Qorum, which the Yuan designed to defend the city and the postal stations in its vicinity.¹³⁴ The fortifications were part of a strategy of permanent border defence that demanded the posting of garrisons throughout the border regions, and some supporting activities such as the establishment of military-agricultural colonies (*tun tian*) and organization of grain supply routes - actions that placed a heavy financial and logistical burden on the Yuan.¹³⁵ While this strategy was of a defensive nature, there are several mentions in the *Yuan shi* of attacks initiated by the garrisons.¹³⁶

The second approach in the confrontation with Qaidu was based on the use of nomadic tactics like those of Qaidu. A strong proponent

of this approach was Qubilai's Qipchaq commander *Tuq Tuqa (Tutuha), who argued that mobility is vital in fighting Qaidu.¹³⁷ *Tuq Tuqa, and his son after him, headed the nomad armies of the Qipchaqs, the Qarluqs, and the Qangli after the mid-1280s.¹³⁸ They did not hesitate to pursue Qaidu deep into his territory, to set ambushes for his troops, to exploit the terrain to their advantage and to also use psychological warfare, such as blowing copper horns, in order to create the impression that large reinforcements were arriving. It was thus their nomadic tactics, not much different than Qaidu's, that enabled them to defeat him in the 1290s.¹³⁹

The success of Bayan, Qubilai's famous general, who defeated Melik Temür's army in 1292, also come from the use of a clearly nomadic tactic, the setting of an ambush.¹⁴⁰ The case which best illustrates the clash between the nomadic and sedentary approaches is also connected with Bayan's name. In 1292 rumors circulated to the effect that because Bayan had been posted on the border for a long time he had developed a friendship with Qaidu and it was for this reason that he had not obtained even a clod of earth from him. This calumny led the emperor to relieve Bayan of his post. However, before the replacement arrived, Qaidu's forces invaded. Bayan fought against them for a week, attacking and retreating alternately. The commanders in his army attributed his approach to cowardice and angrily exclaimed: "If you are afraid to fight, let's wait for a replacement." Bayan explained that his aim was to draw Qaidu deep into the hostile territory in order to catch him before he retreated to his own territory. The commanders accepted his view and apparently defeated Qaidu, although he did escape to his realm.¹⁴¹ This episode illustrates to what extent the Yuan army's garrison commanders disregarded and misunderstood the nomadic methods of warfare, and this certainly played a part in their failure to subdue Qaidu.

In addition to the disdainful attitude towards the nomadic methods of warfare, and the economic burden of keeping large garrisons in the border areas, the main practical reason that prevented the Yuan from subduing Qaidu by virtue of its superiority in arms was the shortage of horses. This problem haunted China in its wars with Central Asia throughout history, and the Yuan Mongols also had to contend with it after they established their center in China and lost a large part of Central Asia to Qaidu.¹⁴² The many horses sent to Nomuqan in Almaliq,¹⁴³ and the claim of the Chinese commander Li Ting that in order to fight Qaidu they must collect 110,000 horses,¹⁴⁴ are evidence of the Yuan's awareness of the importance of horses in fighting Qaidu.

The collection of edicts dealing with the Yuan horse policy, studied by Jagchid and Bawden, together with the information from the *Yuan shi*, make it clear that in addition to a regular collection of horses as part of taxation, and to special areas allocated for horse breeding in Qubilai's time, emergency collections of additional horses were sometimes necessary. Under Qubilai at least five such special collections were made - in 1260, 1275, 1287, 1289 and 1293. The edict of 1293 cites the "activity of the rebel princes" as the explicit reason for this collection. Evidence of a serious increase in the prices of horses between 1260 and 1289, collection of horses also from members of the priesthood, attempts to mobilize horses even from southern China which was poor in horses, acceptance of defective horses for use; and the fact that the collection of 70,000 horses fell 30,000 short of its goal - all these facts attest to the gravity of the horse shortage in Qubilai's time.¹⁴⁵

Qaidu thus had a distinct advantage over the Yuan in obtaining horses, since he ruled in the steppes, but the large quantities of animals collected by Qaidu's and Du'a's forces in their incursions in the west,¹⁴⁶ as well as the testimony of Het'um and of the *Yuan shi* on the shortage of horses in Chapar's troops, prove that in Central Asia too it was not easy to obtain the large number of horses the Mongol army required.¹⁴⁷

As in many battles between the Central Asian tribes and China throughout history, Qaidu was able to exploit an advantage in the supply of horses and the mobility that these allowed in order to vanquish the Yuan forces in most of his confrontations with them, despite his numerical and technological inferiority. The quality of Qaidu's soldiers and his leadership led to his victory in his final battle against the Yuan, the only frontal clash between the two armies. However, the high price paid in this battle in men and horses, and the difficulty with which the victory was achieved, explain why Qaidu preferred to adopt a policy of raids as the style of warfare best suited for his conflict with the Yuan and with the other Mongol forces.

2. Religion

Most of the Mongols in Central Asia, including Qaidu, continued to practice their native religion until the late thirteenth century, although some did embrace other religions. Mirkhwānd bears witness to Qaidu's faith, relating that he bowed down to the sun several times.¹⁴⁸ Qaidu's religious proclivities are further evidenced by the fact that he

was buried in a high place between rivers, "as is the usage of the nomads."¹⁴⁹ A further expression of Mongol native religion can be seen in the "tested incantations" that Prince *Ebügen used in order to affect the weather when he accompanied Du'a to Kusūi and Fushang.¹⁵⁰

Both HarawT and Amīr Khusraw Dihlawī describe the Central Asian Mongols in the late thirteenth century as infidels, thereby attesting to the fact that most of them were not Muslims.¹⁵¹ More concrete evidence of this is found in Wassāf's narration of the period after Qaidu's death: in 1307/8 Taliqu son of Būri became the Chaghadaid Khan in place of Könchek son of Du'a. Taliqu was a Muslim, and he tried to convert some of the Mongols to Islam. His confidante, 'Alī Oghul, whom he appointed as ruler of Khotan and Turkestan, was also a Muslim (as his name shows). Taliqu's conversion activities angered some of the commanders of Du'a's army, who shortened his rule.¹⁵² These testimonies correspond to 'Umārī's affirmation that the Mongol customs, including sun worship, survived in Central Asia at least until the time of the Chaghadaid Khan Tarmashirin (1327-35), when most of the Central Asian Mongols converted to Islam.¹⁵³

However, a few Central Asian princes began to embrace Islam before and during Qaidu's time. From the house of Ogödei only Urük Temür, the son-in-law of Nauruz who converted in his wake, is explicitly identified as a Muslim.¹⁵⁴ Rashīd al-Dīn indicates that Urük Temür's son Küresbe was also suspected of following in his father's path. Other sons of Urük Temür were called Muhammad and 'Alī, thus they were also Muslims.¹⁵⁵ By their names several other Muslims can be identified among Ogödei's sons, including, for example, 'Alī Qocha and Mubarak Shah, the grandsons of Ogödei's son Qadan, or 'Umar Qocha, one of the lesser known sons of Qaidu.¹⁵⁶ All the aforesaid princes were marginal figures in thirteenth-century politics, and it is doubtful whether their religious faith had any effect on Qaidu's policy.

Among the Chaghadaids there were more Muslim princes, including some who served in important posts: apart from Taliqu, mentioned above, Orghina, the queen of Qara Hülegü who subsequently married Alghu, and who headed the Chaghadaid ulus from 1251 to 1260, was a Muslim, as was her son, Mubarak Shah.¹⁵⁷ Baraq, who deposed Mubarak Shah, converted to Islam only towards the end of his life, after his defeat by Abaqa.¹⁵⁸ From the names of the Chaghadaids that appear in the contemporary sources, other princes

who converted to Islam can be identified.¹⁵⁹ These were minor princes, however, and there is no evidence of their having had any influence over Qaidu or Du'a.

There is no information on the religion of other princes who accompanied Qaidu, apart from Melik Temür, whom Qāshānī states was a Christian.¹⁶⁰ It is also known that the Bekrin tribe, from which Qaidu's mother came and which was subject to him, was partly Christian.¹⁶¹

The population in the territory under Qaidu's control, in Transoxania and Turkestan, was for the most part Muslim, as Marco Polo, Qarshi and Brother Benedict attest.¹⁶² A large Nestorian Christian minority existed at least in Samarkand, Kashgar, Qayaliq, Uighuria and Yarkand.¹⁶³ According to Polo there were also Jacobites in Yarkand.¹⁶⁴ In Qayaliq and Hami, and probably also in other places in eastern Turkestan, there were also Buddhists, called pagans by the Christian travellers.¹⁶⁵

Most of the information that we have on Qaidu's religious policy again relates to his attitude toward Islam. Both Qarshi and Mīrkhwānd praise his tolerance. Mīrkhwānd notes that he preferred the Muslims over the other religions, and that friendly discussions were held with *'ulamā'* (Muslim scholars) and *'hukamā'* (learned men).¹⁶⁶ Qarshī, who described Qaidu as a benefactor ruler for the Muslim, was twice summoned to his court, probably as part of those meetings described by Mīrkhwānd.¹⁶⁷ The sympathetic attitude towards Islam continued under Chapar as well.¹⁶⁸

Several indirect indications testify to the continuation of Muslim religious life under Qaidu including the reconstruction of Mas'ūd Beg's *madrassa* in Bukhara;¹⁶⁹ the building of mosques in Bukhara in 1299, with special attention to the income of their *imams* (leaders of prayer) and *mu'adhdhins* (criers for prayers) and extra devotion to the pilgrims' needs;¹⁷⁰ the existence of the office of supervisor of the *awqāf* in Transoxania, who was also a *qādī*, and the multitude of Islamic titles mentioned in the 1299 *waqf* in general;¹⁷¹ Qarshī's descriptions of the Islamic scholarship, with frequent mentions of judges (*qādīs*), *imams*, preachers and scribes as well as the importance of the civil-religious leaders called *sadrs* in several towns under Qaidu's control.¹⁷² All this demonstrates Qaidu's tolerant attitude towards the Muslims.

One should note, however, that a great many of Qarshī's descriptions relate to the fourth and fifth decade of the seventh century A.H., namely to the 1240s and 1250s.¹⁷³ From this it may be

concluded that Central Asians practiced and studied Islam freely under the rule of the Muslim Orghina and even before her. Qaidu's tolerant attitude was thus not a complete innovation.¹⁷⁴

The sympathetic policy towards Islam was likely to have offered political advantage to Qaidu, particularly in the years 1279/80-1287 when Qubilai adopted an anti-Islamic policy, expressed chiefly in the banning of Muslim ritual slaughter.¹⁷⁵ There is, however, no evidence of a change in Qaidu's treatment of the Muslims after the conversion to Islam of Ürük Temiir, who fought Qaidu because he saw him as an infidel, or after the conversion of the Mongols in Persia to Islam in Ghazan's time.¹⁷⁶ Qaidu's attitude towards Islam, or to religion in general, seems to have derived primarily from the religious tolerance customary among the Mongols¹⁷⁷ rather than from any immediate political goal.

This view finds support in Rubruck's description of the active Buddhist temples in Qayaliq under Qaidu and the fact that Christians worshipped freely there as well.¹⁷⁸ Further evidence of Qaidu's sympathetic treatment of the Christians is his patronage of the mission of Rabban Sauma, who visited him in Talas circa 1274/5,¹⁷⁹ or the letter that Pope Nicholas IV saw fit to send to Qaidu in 1289 in which he appealed to him to embrace Christianity and to help to free the Holy Land from the Muslims.¹⁸⁰ The fact that the Bekrin tribe was half Christian, and that a sizeable Christian population lived in Qaidu's territory certainly contributed to his positive attitude. Yet, it seems that in this case, too, tolerance rather than mere political considerations were at the root of the sympathetic attitude.

3. Economy and Administration

Qaidu's basic policy, as manifested in the *quriltai* of Talas, advocated separation between the nomads and the sedentary population.¹⁸¹ Each group shall be discussed separately.

The nomads in Qaidu's kingdom were practically all soldiers organized into units on a decimal basis. The army commanders, princes and others, were the group with whom Qaidu consulted in most of his important policy decisions, such as whether to make peace with Baraq in 1269, whether to assist Baraq after his defeat, or who to appoint as his successor.¹⁸² According to the *Yuan shi* Qaidu also consulted with "specialists" outside the circle of his followers, such as the Uighur Shi Tianlin, whom Möngke sent to him in 1256 and who remained in captivity with him for over twenty years; or An Tong,

Qubilai's general whom the rebel princes took captive and sent to Qaidu in 1276–77.¹⁸³ An Tong was also accused of having received the title of minister from Qaidu,¹⁸⁴ but it is difficult to determine whether Qaidu accorded titles to his advisers or whether this testimony is merely an attempt by the *Yuan shi* to make events in Central Asia correspond with the Chinese reality. Decision-making by consultation was part of the Mongol political culture as expressed, for example, in the institution of the *quriltai*, and certainly it was not unique to Qaidu.¹⁸⁵

Appanages and pasture lands were distributed among the princes and their forces in the mountains and the deserts, sometimes near cities,¹⁸⁶ but in such a way that they would not adversely affect the life of the city.¹⁸⁷ Interestingly, Qāshānī records that after the surrender of Qaidu's son Chapar to Du'a, Du'a fixed Chapar's daily salary at four heads of sheeps, and also allocated a monthly salary to him.¹⁸⁸ It seems that this allocation was a unique case, perhaps designed to make clear that Chapar was subject to Du'a, since it is difficult to imagine that large numbers of the Central Asian nomadic army received salaries.¹⁸⁹

Umarī indicates that Chinggis Khan's *Jasagh* (the *Yasa* of the Muslim writers) continued to be maintained in Central Asia until the time of Tarmashirin and the conversion of the Mongols to Islam.¹⁹⁰ In the material dealing with Qaidu there are several mentions of Chinggis Khan's *Jasagh*, but most are connected with general directives and not with specific laws.¹⁹¹ Qaidu argued that Chinggis Khan's *Jasagh* stipulated that as long as one of the descendants of Ogodei lived he would be a deserving successor to the throne of the Qa'an.¹⁹² On the other hand, Rashīd al-Dīn portrays Qaidu as breaching the *Jasagh*, since he refused to obey the Qa'an.¹⁹³ In Du'a's appeal to surrender to the Yuan he makes frequent mention of the *Jasagh*, while stressing Chinggis's orders to maintain unity in the Mongol ranks (a command that Qaidu's revolt had violated) and the allocation of appanages by Chinggis to his sons.¹⁹⁴ After Qaidu's death, Du'a mentions "Qaidu's *Jasagh*", with due respect,¹⁹⁵ but here too it is difficult to give concrete content to his words. It may be assumed that the life of the Mongols in Central Asia followed the Mongol customs, different of course from the *Shari'a*, but as aforesaid there is no evidence of tension between the Mongols and the sedentary population as regards the differences between their legal systems.

The center of Qaidu's rule seems to have been in Talas, at least at the beginning of his career: the *quriltai* of 1269 was held there as was

Qaidu's enthronement as Khan in 1271, and Rabban Sauma's interview with him in circa 1274/5.¹⁹⁶ When the Chaghadaid princes entered Talas after Qaidu's death, they also plundered the *sira ordo* there.¹⁹⁷ This term, literally the golden *ordo*, was the name of one of the residences of Ogodei, and in Güyüg's time designated the court or main tent in which Güyüg resided, a kind of mobile palace.¹⁹⁸ The mention of the *sira ordo* is, therefore, a further proof of the centrality of Talas in Qaidu's kingdom.

Nevertheless, Qaidu was buried in "the place of his throne"¹⁹⁹ between the Ili river and the Chu river,²⁰⁰ both east of Talas, in the south of modern Kazakhstan, and thus he probably had another residence there. Qaidu's son Chapar was enthroned in Emil, southeast of the Ili and the Chu, which was the base of Ögödei's domain and subsequently of the domain of Güyüg and his family.²⁰¹ This was probably on the initiative of Du'a, who certainly did not wish to crown Chapar in a territory that originally belonged to Chaghadaid.²⁰² From all the facts cited above, it appears doubtful whether Central Asia had a permanent capital during Qaidu's reign, and the existence of a mobile court seems more plausible. There is, incidentally, also no evidence of the place or places in which Du'a dwelled.²⁰³ Even if it is difficult to determine where Qaidu held court, its members included at least a physician, an astronomer, a Muslim poet and Muslim clergy, who sometimes engaged in religious debates. This retinue thus differed little from those of earlier Central Asian Muslim courts.²⁰⁴

Next, regarding the sedentary population, the sources stress Qaidu's fear of placing his lands, and principally Transoxania, "under the hooves of the horses." They indicate his awareness of the damage that could be caused to the sedentary population in wake of the many wars and his attempts at rehabilitation.²⁰⁵ Qaidu's concern for the welfare of this population probably derived from the lessons that he learned from the rebellions of Arigh Boke and Alghu, when the latter's control of Transoxania and Turkestan enabled him to establish his kingdom and obliged Arigh Boke to surrender to Qubilai.²⁰⁶

Qaidu entrusted administration of the affairs of the sedentary population in Central Asia to Mas'ūd Beg, who entered his service after Baraq's death in 1271. Mas'ūd Beg had extensive experience in administration of Mongol territories: in 1241 he had replaced his father, Mahmūd Yalavāch, as head of the regional administration of Central Asia from Uighuria to Bukhara. Mas'ūd was obliged to leave this position after Ögödei's death during Töregene's regency, but returned to his office under Güyüg and maintained his position also

under Möngke. After Möngke's death, he made an alliance with Alghu and served as his governor; subsequently he came into Baraq's service. Mas'ūd Beg served Qaidu from 1271 until his own death in 1289,²⁰⁷ and his three sons continued in the post after him: Abu Bakr, Mas'ūd II, from 1290 to his death in 1297; *Satilmish Beg, Mas'ūd III, until his death in 1302; and *Sevinch, Mas'ūd IV, whose appointment met the approval of Chapar. He commenced in the post in 1302 when he was dwelling in Kashgar.²⁰⁸ It is not clear what became of him after the Chaghadaids took control of Qaidu's kingdom.

The testimonies to stability and economic growth under Qaidu (see below) as well as Qarshī's praises,²⁰⁹ indicate that Mas'ūd Beg and his sons performed their functions successfully. It is more difficult to determine how they did this: no evidence exists for population censuses in Qaidu's territories, although the fluctuations in the size of the population, at least in Transoxania, during his reign certainly made such a step more important. There are also no records of the appointing of regular tax collectors, and there is no evidence of the use of the institution of *darughachi* or *shahna*, the Mongol commissioner in the occupied urban areas, so vital for the administration in the other parts of the empire. Nor is there evidence that Mas'ūd ever wore this title.²¹⁰

There is a little more information on Baraq's short-lived rule of Bukhara (1268) and of Herat (ca. early 1270): in Bukhara Baraq sought to carry out a population census and to impose taxes. Thus he ordered the townspeople to leave the town so that his forces could plunder their property, their arms and their cattle. It seems that the town rulers, one of whom bore the Chinese title *daifu*, (Wassaf also calls him *shahna*), preferred to meet his demands without allowing him to plunder the town: the rulers brought him tribute in gold ingots (*bālīsh*) and gave him control of the city's *hizārabs*, (units of thousand) and workshops.²¹¹ As part of his preparations for the battle with Abaqa, Baraq obtained the (provisional) surrender of Shams al-Dīn Kart, ruler of Herat. Baraq appropriated from Herat money (*māl*), arms and cattle. When Shams al-Dīn Kart was sent back to Herat at his request, Baraq gave him a *khil'a*, a cloak signalling authority. Baraq's supporters, however, including Mas'ūd Beg's brother, were appointed to be his "companions". When Shams al-Dīn's escorts reached Herat, they ordered the inhabitants to pray for the welfare and victory of Baraq, the new ruler, and set tax collectors (*ummāl*) and inspectors over trade and artisanship (*umanā'*) on the

mints, and on the markets or at the gates (*darvāzah*).²¹² Since in the Talas *quriltai* Qaidu explicitly introduced major administrative changes, it is not clear how instructive the fragmentary descriptions of Baraq's activities can be.

The Mongol rule in Central Asia does not seem to have harmed local dynasties, which survived in Qaidu's territory. Historical texts, inscriptions and coins mention rulers in Utrār, Shash, Khojand, Farghana, Talas, Khotan and Almaliq.²¹³ However, their role in Qaidu's kingdom and other details concerning them are practically unknown from the sources at our disposal. Wassaf stresses the full subjection of the local rulers ("the masters of this area" - Transoxania) to Qaidu,²¹⁴ but does not clarify what this subjection entailed, or who those rulers were, especially in cities where no local dynasty is attested.

Barthold maintained that in Kashgar, for example, the population was headed by a *sadr*.²¹⁵ and indeed *sadrs* might have played a certain role in the administration of Central Asia just as they had done before the Mongols. In eleventh and twelfth century Transoxania the term *şadr*, literally chest, hence eminent person; denoted religious leaders, mostly Hanafis, who also held political and administrative power *vis-a-vis* the rulers of the region (Qarakhanids and Qara Khitan). The most notable example was the Burhān family, whose members held the *sadr*ate of Bukhara from the beginning of the twelfth century to at least 1238, and among their responsibilities were the collection of taxes for the rulers and the daily management of the city's affairs.²¹⁶ *sadrs* in Bukhara in Qaidu's time appear in the 1299 *waqf* document, where they hold posts in the religious establishment, as well as in other literary sources.²¹⁷ Qarshī mentions *sadrs* in Bukhara, Samarkand, Khojand, Üzgand, Farghana, Shash and Almaliq, sometimes in places where he also attests the presence of local rulers.²¹⁸ In the case of Almaliq Qarshī notes that the nomination of the *sadr* was subject to approval by the Qa'an (before Qaidu's time).²¹⁹ This implies a high level of importance attaching to the position of *sadr*, but it is hard to formulate specific definition of the office's role under the Mongols.

The *Waqf* document of 1299 mentions division of the territory around Bukhara into *tümens*.²²⁰ A *tumen* as an administrative-territorial unit is attested in Central Asia from the time of the Chaghadaid Khan Kebek (1318-26), and still existed in Temür Lang's time.²²¹ Morgan suggested that every such *tümen* was designed to provide the needs of a *tumen* of Mongol soldiers.²²² Since the term *tiimen* is mentioned only in the Persian translation of the *waqf*

document, completed sometimes before 1661 (the original Arabic 16x1 used the term *amāl*, district),²²³ the mention of the *tumen* 100x be an anachronism, and it is impossible to determine with certainty whether such a division already existed in Qaidu's domains.

Collection of taxes SEM naturally one of the main aims of the Mongol administration. As early as 1269 Qaidu promised 40 AEO1D collecting extortionate taxes,²²⁴ and it seems that he kept his promise, since Wassaf and Qarshi emphasize the justness of his rule.²²⁵ The only 4EX mentioned in the sources SE SE 4EX collected by Qaidu is thermal.²²⁶ *Mal* here should not be confused with the previously mentioned money. It constitutes at times an alternative to the Mongol term *qalan*, which is usually interpreted SE the traditional, pre-Mongol taxation of the sedentary population 4b4E can include both agricultural taxes 401S on trade 4UE and manufacturing.²²⁷ Yet it is not certain that in the said passage *mal* serves SE a technical term clearly related to taxes, or that the linkage to *qalan* helps to explain the nature of this tax. Some of 4b4 taxes in Qaidu's realm were collected in currency, SE testified by Rashid al-Din, according to whom Malik Nasir al-Din Kashgari paid a thousand *tenge* or silver to Qaidu yearly.²²⁸ It may be assumed 4b4E another part of the taxes SEM collected in kind, probably principally in cattle as befitting the needs of the nomads.²²⁹ The division of taxes between taxes in money and taxes in kind SEM also customary in other areas of 4b4 Mongol empire.²³⁰

Qaidu's 4EX collectors show up in the sources only when they came 40 Bukhara in 1269–70. The text describes them SE emissaries (*ilchiyan*), which attests 40 the fact that they did not dwell in the city but came only 40 collect the taxes, apparently on fixed dates.²³¹ It seems that this method, which Khazanov calls "tribute", was in use at least in parts of Qaidu's territories. Under this practice, 4b6 occupied areas must meet financial obligations towards the ruler, but 4b6 ruler does not interfere in their political or social structure.²³² The use of this method can explain the fact 4b4E the town of Qara Qocho was able 40 maintain good relations with both Qaidu 4UE and the Qa'an,²³³ just SE Kashgar and Khotan were nominally subject to the Qa'an in the late 1280s while some of their revenue went 40 4UE and 4b4E.

Numismatic evidence apprises one of the practices introduced by Qaidu's regime, for which Mas'ud Beg was responsible: reform of the Central Asian currency. The main part of the reform consisted of minting coins with a high percentage of silver, like those minted in Almaliq in Möngke's time. Such coins appeared for the first time in

Utrar (1270–71) and immediately afterwards (1271–72) in Talas, Kanjak and Khojand.²³⁵ All this occurred simultaneously with the enthronement of Qaidu (1271) and the appointment of Mas'ud Beg. From 1281–82, silver coins of this kind also appeared in Samarkand and a year later in Bukhara.²³⁶ It was during this period that Qaidu sent Mas'ud Beg 40 restore the city. In the last two decades or the thirteenth century the great number of coins minted and the many minting sites are conspicuous (in addition to the cities already mentioned, coins were also minted in Andijan, Awsh, Palad, Shash, Kashgar, (the unidentified) Darkhan, Marghinan, and in Almaliq). The greatest quantity of coins originated in Talas, Kanjak and Utrar.²³⁷ These coins bore the names of the local rulers or only the name of 4b4 city in which they were minted.²³⁸ No coins have been found bearing the names of Qaidu, Du'a, or other princes.

The Central Asian coins from this period are not uniform in iconography, but their identical weight, purity 4UE basic design, all testify clearly 40 a central authority that initiated and supervised the minting.²³⁹ The standardization or coinage in Central Asia is attributed generally to the Chaghadaid Khan Kebek (1318–26).²⁴⁰ Yet, Mas'ud's reform 4E3E4X provided the state with a silver currency and gave vital guarantees (weight, percentage of metal, the major external details) for distribution of the coins throughout the state without reference 40 the place or issue.²⁴¹ The willingness of the people 40 exchange the silver in their possession for coins, and the substantial growth in the number of coins and the places of their minting, attest to the relative stability and the revival of trade and urban life in Central Asia under Qaidu.

Alongside the numismatic evidence, literary sources also indicate economic growth in Transoxania and Semirechye in Qaidu's time.²⁴² Such growth would seem incompatible with the frequent warfare in Qaidu's territories, thus one must distinguish between the descriptions of destruction in the border areas, such SE Uighuria 4UE and Khurasan,²⁴³ and the growth in the center or Qaidu's kingdom. The revival from within 4b4 allowed Qaidu 40 wage on the border 4UE also encouraged him 40 40 so. Indeed, in order to allow this economic revival Qaidu 4b4 turn his troops outward, so that they could obtain cattle, revenue 4UE manpower 404 from the territories under his control but 40 those under the control of his rivals. Bukhara, on which there is a little more information, is illustrative of the fate of the territories under Qaidu, and the transition from "confrontation territory" 40 "restored area": Alghu and later Baraq

both plundered Bukhara.²⁴⁴ It was partly out of fear of the destruction of the city and with it all of Transoxania, that Qaidu made peace with Baraq.²⁴⁵ At the *quriltai* of 1269 the princes entrusted the restoration of the settled territories to Mas'ūd Beg.²⁴⁶ The initial achievements of this restoration disappeared after Baraq oppressed the residents prior to his incursion into Iran, but Mas'ūd Beg persuaded him not to plunder Bukhara in order to leave himself a rear should he lose the war.²⁴⁷ After his defeat, Baraq indeed returned to Bukhara, and upon his death it seems to have passed to Qaidu's control. At that time Bukhara was a border territory, and Qaidu could not guarantee mastery of it. Indeed, Bukhara fell in 1273 to Abaqa's troops, and several times afterwards to the sons of Alghu who rebelled against Qaidu. Their great invasion in 1275/6 devastated the town for seven years.²⁴⁸ In 1282, with the enthronement of Du'a and the stabilization of Qaidu's rule, Qaidu sent Mas'ūd Beg to restore Bukhara,²⁴⁹ and he promptly introduced the minting of silver coins he had earlier introduced into Turkestan and Semircheye. Wassaf describes Transoxania at the end of Qaidu's time as a rich, fertile region, safe for its inhabitants,²⁵⁰ and the quantities of coins found there seem to back his claims.

A *ivaqf* document of 1299, found in Bukhara, allows a closer look at life in that time: the founder of the *waqf*, 'Abd al-Rahīm Muhammad son of 'Abdallah al-Isfijābi, purchased an entire village named Khamana in the *tūmen* of Sāmjan in Bukhara, about thirty kilometers to the northwest of modern Bukhara, with its surrounding well-irrigated lands and irrigation canals. The village was situated on a high hill, at the foot of which the founder of the *waqf* built a smaller village (*dihcha*) at his own expense. In this new village he constructed a magnificent house with a garden and terrace for himself, two mosques for summer and winter, good (*ṣāliḥa*) houses for the local workers (*kārandah*), stables, granaries, a flour mill and at least three weaving workshops (*maḥākāt*). The village of Khamana had extensive agricultural lands, including vineyards, trees and water reservoirs. In parts of the lands barley and wheat were sown, but in other parts nothing had yet been planted, and they were ready for cultivation or for building on. All this property was endowed as *waqf* in 1299. The descriptions of the private plots, not included in the *waqf*, and transmission of the names of the owners of the plots bordering on the *waqf* testify to the fact that members of the military elite (*amīrs*) and of the clergy (*shaykh*, *qāḍī*) owned private lands. It seems that they did not actually farm; perhaps the building of the houses by the

purchaser of the *ivaqf* indicates that the peasants were tenant farmers.²⁵¹ The transaction and its details create a picture of a certain abundance, of economic security that allowed such a purchase and investment, of sophisticated agriculture and of development of crafts, probably also for purposes of local trade.

The wars of the princes after Qaidu's death also harmed Bukhara, which was plundered by Ogöeid princes.²⁵² Wassaf describes the destructive effects of these rebellions on Qaidu's territories,²⁵³ and it seems that the destruction in Transoxania appearing in 'Umari's account occurred in this period.²⁵⁴

Qarshi's descriptions tell of a developed agriculture also in other areas of Turkestan, such as Khotan and Khojand, though he depicts Kashgar as waste land; this is strange, since Mas'ūd Beg's son dwelt there.²⁵⁵ However, Marco Polo's accounts, which are correct for the 1270s, describe Kashgar as a trade and artisan center, and employment in artisanship is also prominent in his accounts of the other cities of the Tarim Basin, Khotan and Yarkand.²⁵⁶

One of the difficult subjects to resolve is the question of trade in Qaidu's territories. On the one hand, the wars of Qaidu's time affected the scope of trade in Central Asia. This is clear from the fact that one of the main elements of Du'a's peace overtures to the Qa'an was renewal of the caravan trade throughout the empire.²⁵⁷ The letters of John of Monte Carvino also attest to the lack of safety on the routes of Central Asia in the late thirteenth century.²⁵⁸ It is also possible that the many edicts relating to maritime trade appearing in the laws of the Yuan, particularly after 1282, testify to the shifting of a large part of the Yuan's trade to the sea, perhaps at the expense of the caravan trade.²⁵⁹ On the other hand, it is doubtful whether Qaidu could bring prosperity to the areas under his rule, if trade in Central Asia had ceased almost completely. The sympathetic attitude of the Mongols towards trade,²⁶⁰ and evidence for the continuance of trade even in time of war in other Mongol states,²⁶¹ also reinforce the conclusion that the borders remained open. The quantities of coins found in Central Asia from Qaidu's time attest to a relatively large monetary cycle for the beginning of Mongol rule in the area, and this would require at least flourishing local trade;²⁶² such trade is implied also by the weaving workshops mentioned in the *waqf* document of 1299.²⁶³ Wassaf maintains that as a result of the princes' war after Qaidu's death (1305/6) trade in Central Asia ceased, but even this claim testifies to the existence of such trade previously, and probably not only in the wake of the peace agreement.²⁶⁴ Qarshī mentions

markets in Khotan, for mainly woven material including (Chinese?) silk; in Farghāna and especially in Jand.²⁶⁵

An exchange of goods must also involve people. There is substantial evidence of the presence of Central Asians in China, but it is difficult to determine whether they came to China in Qaidu's time, after his death or before his rise.²⁶⁶ Chinese doctors treated Qaidu before his death,²⁶⁷ but it is possible that they came to his court as captives. From the 1290s the struggle between Qubilai and Qaidu concentrated mainly in Mongolia, thereby opening up the southern silk road - from Badakhshān to Khotan and from there via Lop and Cherchen to China²⁶⁸. From the 1290s onwards trade was also possible on the route described by 'Umarī, from Samarkand to Talas, and from there to Almaliq, Qara Qocho and then on to Dadu and all of China.²⁶⁹ Naturally, it is difficult to determine the volume of trade that passed along these routes, and Qarshī's surprising affirmation of the devastation in Kashgar points to the improbability of large-scale trade, at least along the southern silk road.

It is possible that a great part of the Central Asian trade passed via the Golden Horde and from there to the Mediterranean and Europe. Unequivocal evidence does not exist to this effect, but such a supposition gains support from Qarshī's report on Jand, on the border between the Golden Horde and Qaidu's lands, as a thriving trade city; by the existence of Central Asian products among the goods exported by the Golden Horde;²⁷⁰ and perhaps also by the evidence of trade in Mamluks between Qaidu's territories and Egypt, a trade which was probably a branch of the extensive trade of the Golden Horde with Egypt;²⁷¹ as well as by Qaidu's political standing. If this was so, Du'a's application for renewal of trade may also have been a response to the relatively fresh tension between Central Asia and the Golden Horde over the fate of the White Horde.²⁷² Certainly the other disputes among the Mongols, which Du'a also sought to resolve in the peace agreement, likewise harmed the caravan trade, which was vital to landlocked Central Asia.

Another action that shows the importance of trade for Qaidu and Du'a, and certainly a sympathetic attitude towards the sedentary population, is the building of the city of Andijan in the 1280s.²⁷³ Unlike other cities built by the Mongols (Qara Qorum, Dadu, Sulṭāniyya), Andijan did not serve as a capital and seems to have been built exclusively for the needs of the sedentary population. The continued prosperity of the city throughout the next century, when it became the capital of Farghāna, shows that its location was fortunate,

in other words Qaidu and Du'a were certainly conscious of the interests of the sedentary population.²⁷⁴ From the location of Andijan, between Jand and Kashgar and between Samarkand and Talas, it may be possible to learn about the customary trade routes in Central Asia of that time. Systematic research based on numismatic and archeological evidence, which could not be carried out in the framework of this study, may in the future give a more complete picture of the economy and trade in Qaidu's time.



Dardess maintains that the policy of separation between the nomads and the sedentary population created a *spontaneous* revival in Central Asia under Qaidu, which was oriented by Mas'ūd Beg and local governors.²⁷⁵ Although it is impossible to reconstruct an overall picture of Qaidu's internal policy, there seems to be sufficient proof that a great part of the responsibility for the prosperity of Central Asia belonged to him, and not only to the "spontaneous forces" or to Mas'ūd. The sources emphasize that it was Qaidu who sent Mas'ūd to restore life in Central Asia, and highlight the stability the former introduced in the territories subject to him; the coins show clearly orientation from above, and the precise coordination between the dates of their minting and the different stages in Qaidu's consolidation attest to an even closer relation between the ruler and the situation of his subjects. Certainly the construction of the city of Andijan was not a "spontaneous" action. The devastation in Central Asia prior to Qaidu's rise and after his death also attest to his role in guaranteeing the stability and affluence of his kingdom. The relative prosperity in Central Asia under Qaidu may be appreciated especially against the evidence of the difficult conditions of life of the population in Iran prior to Ghazan's reforms²⁷⁶ and the heavy burden of the tax that Qubilai imposed on the Chinese.²⁷⁷ One should appreciate these steps precisely because Qaidu did not relinquish the Mongol nomadic way of life and religion to achieve them.

It should be noted that from new studies of the Yuan in China one can identify several points of similarity between Qaidu's and Qubilai's rule, e.g., the style of consultation, the decentralization,²⁷⁸ or even the staffing of the court with physicians, astronomers and clerics, and the holding of religious debates.²⁷⁹ The two rulers differed, however, in their attitudes towards the nomadic way of life. Qaidu, moreover, did not administer a complicated machine like the Chinese bureaucracy, and there were of course other major differences between the two

rulers. Before explaining these differences at the ideological level, however, one ^{should} indicate several practical, obvious reasons for the differences between the two types of rule. The first reason is the nature of the territory. Central Asia was characterized by separate settlements of nomads and a sedentary population in different ecological areas, and with a relatively high proportion of nomads.²⁸⁰ The geographic conditions suited the nomadic life, and mobility allowed the Central Asian soldiers to clash successfully with larger and better equipped armies of their neighbors. In other words, in the area ruled by Qaidu the nomads had far fewer reasons to settle down than in China or in Persia.

The ecological and geographical conditions, of course, affected the ruling tradition in the entire area. The ruling tradition of Central Asia differed from that of China or Persia, and was characterized by a symbiosis of the nomads and the sedentary population, under the supremacy of the former. Another characteristic is decentralized rule, sometimes with physical separation between the nomads and the sedentary population.²⁸¹ One can thus say that Qaidu up to a point drew on the local ruling tradition, just like Qubilai and the Ilkhans did in their realms, and the difference in the result derives also from the difference in the system constituting a basis for the regime.

Since the sources are meager, it is difficult to indicate the measure of influence of the local customs in Central Asia on Qaidu's rule. Such a measure is hard to define also because the differences between Mongol customs and Chinese customs, for example, were greater than the differences between the Mongol and Turkish customs in Central Asia. One should, however, note that the Chaghadaid Khan ^{Kebek} is considered by Barthold as having taken "a decisive step towards adoption of the traditional Islamic culture and politics,"²⁸² that is, he was greatly influenced by the sedentary population in his territories. Numismatic and literary evidence give rise to the supposition that some of the reforms ascribed to Kebek, such as unification of the currency or the administrative division into *tümens*, might have commenced already in Qaidu's time.

Conclusion

The events and circumstances [in the life of] a single grandson of Ögödei called Qaidu, **who by conquest, subjugation and trickery has acquired a certain part of the Ögödei's ulus**, are in brief as has been stated.

Rashīd al-Dīn¹

Qaidu was a realist, a superb soldier and a skilled politician rather than an ideological warrior. One should view his activities and struggle against the background of the ongoing disintegration of the Mongol empire in his time, and in light of the status of the house of Ögödei, which received a severe blow in 1251 with the rise of Möngke and the transfer of the position of the Qa'an from the house of Ögödei to the house of Tolui. The struggle between Qubilai and Arigh Boke (1260-64) prompted Qaidu to action. Qubilai's victory over the latter was achieved only at the price of further division of the Empire into areas of influence of the principal heads of the troops there at that time: Berke, the Khan of the Golden Horde; Hülegü, Qubilai's brother, who received Iran and Western Asia; and Alghu of the house of Chaghadaid who received Central Asia. There were three main consequences of this struggle from Qaidu's point of view: first, this division of the empire allocated nothing to the house of Ögödei, whose appanage was swallowed up by that of Alghu; second, the example of Alghu, who through the maximum exploitation of the rivalry between Qubilai and Arigh Boke and the seizure of territories by force was able to carve out for himself a dominion in which he subsequently legitimized his rule. These actions placed Alghu on the same level as the heads of the other great *uluses*, and recouped the position which the Chaghadaids had lost since Möngke's rise. The third consequence was the transfer of the Qa'an's capital from Qara Qorum to China, which left Central Asia less directly under the control of the Qa'an.

These conditions together provoked Qaidu to act. His first enemies were the Chaghadaids: under the patronage of the Golden Horde he attacked Alghu, and then Alghu's successor Baraq. The decisive event in Qaidu's rise was not the *quriltai* of 1269, the decisions of which, as in many peace accords between the Mongols, were not respected, and in the course of which the Golden Horde retained its senior position *vis-à-vis* Qaidu. Rather, it was Baraq's defeat at the battle of Herat (1270), to the outcome of which Qaidu contributed considerably, albeit indirectly. Qaidu took advantage of the confusion that befell the Chaghadaids following Baraq's death to subject them to his rule, and only then was he enthroned as Khan (1271), an event that marks the creation of his state.

One should remember, too, that Qaidu was enthroned as Khan and not as Qa'an, as noted in the testimony of the sympathizing Qarshi. Indeed, Qaidu's activities during and after his rise demonstrate that his ambitions were mainly local, i.e., to obtain a state for the house of Ogodei. He did not aspire to serve as Qa'an, a position that he knew early on to be already of restricted importance in the Mongol world. In the course of his rise, Qaidu did not hesitate to accept the Golden Horde as a senior partner, and to establish friendly ties with Ilkhan Abaqa, Qubilai's nephew. Even after he consolidated his state, his confrontation with the Qa'an consisted mostly of border warfare, in complete contrast to the battles that he fought against the Chaghadaids prior to this. During the confrontation with the Yuan, Qaidu showed no inclination to impose his authority on new territories, did not oppose nominal rule of the Yuan in a given area as long as he could obtain what he wanted from it, and retreated without delay when necessary. Qaidu never tried to penetrate into China proper, and only once, possibly not on his own initiative, did he strike at Qara Qorum, the previous residence of the Qa'ans. Unlike Qubilai, who was called to defend Qara Qorum, Qaidu evacuated this town without hesitation.

The challenge which confronted Qaidu when he came to establish a state for the Ogodeids was greater than that which faced Alghu, since the house of Ogodei had been more severely weakened than the Chaghadaids by Mongke's acts. Physically, the Ogodeids lost most of their seniors as well as their troops, and did not even retain their *ulus* framework. The high position of non-Ogodeids in Qaidu ranks (Chaghadaids, Tuloids, descendants of Jochi Qasar) attests to the difficulties of building his state exclusively (or mostly) on the Ogodeids. Territorially, it is doubtful whether Ogodei's original

appanage, which lacked a sound sedentary basis, could support a strong state without the domains and rights that Ogodei had held *ex officio* as Qa'an. Certainly, the few widely-spaced cities left for the Ogodeids in Mongke's time could not provide a strong territorial base, and even those cities were absorbed into the Chaghadaid realm by Qubilai's time. In order to confirm the right of the Ogodeid *ulus* to an appanage and to a status commensurate with these of the other branches of the Mongol family, Qaidu had to stress the days of glory of the house under Ogodei and Güyüg. Emphasizing the legacy of the Ogodeid Qa'ans implies a threat to Yuan legitimation, but, more important, through this legacy Qaidu could also legitimize his rule over the Chaghadaids and their territories. Even though Qaidu presented himself as the successor of the Ogodeid Qa'ans in his search for legitimization, it is clear from his activities that what he desired was his own state and not mastery of the entire Mongol empire.

The status of the Chaghadaids in Qaidu's kingdom was a source of weakness from the outset. Some of the Chaghadaids continued to resist Qaidu up to 1282, when he made an alliance with Baraq's son, Du'a, whom he appointed as head of the Chaghadaid *ulus*. During this period Qaidu's power also grew when some princes and part of the army of the house of Tolui joined him, after the failure of their revolt against Qubilai. Qaidu's power in the early 1280s was sufficient to convince Du'a of the advisability of mutual cooperation, but not sufficient to deprive Du'a of his independent power base or to dismantle the Chaghadaid army. Qaidu's successes in the 1280s and 1290s were also Du'a's successes, and Du'a's influence in Qaidu's state grew increasingly stronger.

The Chaghadaids' status as a "state within a state" in Qaidu's territories is the main factor which explains the collapse of Qaidu's kingdom after his death. Du'a, who outlived Qaidu, encouraged the succession struggles among the latter's sons, but he required an alliance with the Yuan in order to liquidate the house of Ogodei. Here Du'a exploited his great advantage over Qaidu: the fact that the Yuan dynasty and the other Mongol states recognized the historical right of the house of Chaghadaid to rule in Central Asia. Moreover, it was only due to Qaidu's activities that Du'a was able to make peace with the Yuan Qa'an and still retain his independence: after more than thirty years of fighting with Qaidu the areas of influence which Qubilai had distributed in 1264 became independent regional khanates in every sense of the phrase, while the Qa'an's authority had waned. It was Du'a and his Chaghadaid successors who built on

Qaidu's attainments, while the princes of the house of Ogodei were dispersed among the various khanates and lost the political power that Qaidu had worked so hard to win for them.

Even if the state that he founded passed to the Chaghadaids, there can be no denying of Qaidu's achievement in creating a Mongol state independent of the Qa'an's authority in Central Asia. At first glance, it would appear that Qubilai gave Central Asia as an appanage to Alghu. However, Qubilai demonstrated by his activities in the mid-1260s (such as the population census in Bukhara, the attempt to establish postal stations between China and Persia, and above all by sending Nomuqan to Almaliq), that he still saw himself as the supreme ruler of the region. It was Qaidu's actions that constrained Qubilai to relinquish any involvement in the rule of Central Asia. Furthermore, the location of Qaidu's kingdom in the heart of the Mongol empire also undercut the Qa'an's authority with the edges of the empire, and helped to speed up its dismemberment. Another consequence of Qaidu's revolt was to prevent the expansion of the Mongols to new territories, since many of their troops were involved in internal wars. At the same time, the border areas between the various khanates suffered greatly and the volume of overland trade within and outside the Empire was reduced.

The confrontation between Qaidu and Qubilai, and between Qaidu and the Ilkhans, took the form of random incursions and slow and gradual seizing of territories, rather than large battles or conquests. Qaidu used the mobility of his forces and their skill in nomadic tactics to counter his inferiority to the Yuan army in terms of arms and numbers. The nature of the warfare was very similar to incursions of other nomads into China and Persia throughout history, and may indicate another major motive for Qaidu's actions: the need to supplement his state's revenues with plunder from the sedentary territories on its borders and to provide employment and revenues for his fighting troops, so as to maintain his own authority especially among the Chaghadaids (and Toluids). Since the sedentary states on Qaidu's borders were for the most part the other Mongol khanates, Qaidu directed most of his raids at them. One may assume that the hostility between the houses of Ogodei and Tolui or between the house of Chaghadaid and the Ilkhans affected the orientation of these invasions, but they were mostly motivated by the requirements of the Central Asian state for maintaining its economic and political stability.

One must make a distinction between this practical motive for the confrontation, on the one hand, and a reconstruction of the

confrontation as an ideological conflict focusing on the desire to maintain the old Mongol values as opposed to identification with the sedentary population, on the other. It is very doubtful whether the only explicit mention in the sources of Mongol resistance to Qubilai's settlement activities can be related with certainty to Qaidu. It is important to remember that it was as a result of Qubilai's settlement activities, and principally the transferral of the capital to China and the large scale use of infantry with its characteristic tactics, that allowed Qaidu to obtain his independence and to vanquish the Qa'an's army. It would thus seem doubtful whether he wished to oppose these activities.

The limitations of the sources make it difficult to ascertain to what extent Qaidu was influenced by the non-Mongol population in his kingdom. To be sure, a certain continuity of the Central Asian ruling tradition characterized his rule, just as a certain continuity of the Chinese ruling tradition can be seen in Qubilai's rule, or a certain continuation of Muslim rule in Ghazan's activities. Qaidu was apparently conscious of the needs of the sedentary population in his kingdom, perhaps no less than Qubilai or the Ilkhans were of the needs of theirs. The administration that he established succeeded in guaranteeing the relative prosperity of most of the inhabitants of his state despite the many wars, in introducing a new currency system in Central Asia, and also in building cities for the sedentary population. Qaidu himself conserved the nomadic way of life, but this did not necessarily derive from ideology; rather from the fact that in Central Asia he had less practical reasons to relinquish the nomadic way of life than Qubilai had in China.

It is possible that because Qaidu maintained the nomadic lifestyle he was able to attract to his side some of the Mongol princes who opposed changes in their way of life and close contact with the sedentary population. It is doubtful, however, whether portraying the confrontation between Qaidu and the Yuan and the Ilkhans as a conflict between the conservative, traditional Mongols and the "progressive," sedentary Mongols helps to explain Qaidu's actions.


The connection, obvious in modern research literature, between Qaidu's revolt and that of Arigh Boke deserves attention. Qaidu's revolt can be seen as a continuation of Arigh Böke's revolt in the process of dismemberment of the Mongol empire. On the other hand, it is not clear whether the two rebellions shared common goals and ideology. First, Qaidu seems to have supported Arigh Boke only at a late stage, and not without reservation as some scholars claim.

Second, some of Qaidu's main supporters, such as Hoqu son of Güyüg or Qadan son of Ögodei, whose sons later played important roles in Qaidu's state, and some of the men presented in modern studies as allies of Qaidu, such as Nayan, in fact supported Qubilai during the latter's confrontation with Arigh Böke. A study of the motives for Arigh Böke's rebellion does not come within the scope of this work, but it is difficult to reconcile the claim that the two rebellions had an identical ideological basis with the fact that so many key figures changed sides within a period of less than a decade. The dissimilarity in the nature of the confrontation, the series of large battles and the rapid surrender in Arigh Böke's case, as opposed to a slow, continued border war in Qaidu's case may also indicate that different goals motivated the two rebels.

The main motives for Qaidu's actions, then, were his wish to establish for the house of Ögodei a state commensurate with the other Mongol states, and the necessity of guaranteeing the political and economic stability of this state. The special status of the Chaghadaids in Qaidu's state was its main weak point, and this weakness contributed to Qaidu's inability to make peace with the Qa'an. Qaidu's political and military abilities enabled him to establish and stabilize his state at the expense of the Chaghadaids and against the Qa'an, but were not sufficient to guarantee the continued independent existence of the Ögödeid state after his death. Qaidu's successors lacked their father's stature, and thus within ten years of his death they lost most of their political power and left the independent Mongol state in Central Asia to be known in history as the Chaghadaid khanate.


Maps

Map 1: The Mongol Empire after the Death of Möngke (1259)




After R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks* (Cambridge, 1995), 236.

Map 2: Qaidu and the Yuan




After Tan Qixiang, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji* (Shanghai, 1982), VII, 3 4.

Map 3: The Yuan Dynasty and the Chaghadaid Khanate, 1330.




After Tan Qixiang, *Zhongguo lishi ditu ft* (Shanghai, 1982), VII, 5-6.

Map 4: Greater Iran in the Thirteenth Century



Map 5: Turkestan under the Mongols



Genealogical Tables




Figure 1: The Great Khans




Figure 2: The House of Ögödei




Figure 3: The Chaghadaids (1227–1338)




Figure 4: Yuan Emperors




Figure 5: Ilkhans of Persia




Figure 6: Khans of the Golden Horde

Glossary of Chinese Characters

AH Buge 阿里不哥

Alimali 阿力麻里

Ananda 阿難答

Asahutu 阿撒忽圖

Azhiji 阿只吉

Anchasi 按察司

An Tong 安童

Aoluchi 奧魯赤

Baba AA

Badashan 八答山

Bala (Balahe) 八剌, 八剌合

Balin 八鄰

Balin wanhu 八鄰萬戶

Baihu fi^

Beiping wang 北平王

Beiting 北庭

Bieerge 別兒哥

Bieshi bali 別失八里

Bodaer 伯答兒

Boyan 伯顏

Busiba (Buzaoma) 卜思巴 (不早麻)

Caizhou 蔡州

Chabaer 察八兒

Chengzong 成宗

Chubai, Chuban 出佰, 出班

Dadu 大都

Datong 大同

Daifu 大夫

Duhufu 都護府

Duwa (Tuhe) flggr > 都哇 (禿呵)

Dunhuang 敦煌

Fan chen 反臣

Elinqin 額林沁

Ganmala 甘麻刺

Gansu 甘肅

Gaochang 高昌

Gao Zhiyao 高智耀

Hadan 哈丹

Hala hata 哈刺哈塔

Hala huozhou 哈刺火州

Hamili 哈米里

Haidu (Handu) 海都 (罕都)

Haishan 海山

Haiyali 海押立

Hanghai 沆海

Hedan 合丹

Helin 和林

Henan 河南

Heshi 合失

Heshiher 合失合兒

Hexi 河西

Hubilie 忽必列

Huladai 忽刺怠

Huanghuo Tiemuer 晃火帖木兒

Huoerhatu 火兒哈禿

Huohu f Huohe, Hehu) 火忽, 霍忽 (火和, 和忽)

Huonichi 火你赤

Jin shan 金山

Jingzhou 京州

Kaifeng 開封

Kebuduo 科布多

Kuanshe 寬闊

Kuobielie (Kubuli) 闊別列 (庫布哩)

Kuolijisi 闊里吉思

Kuokuochu 闊闊出

Liaodong 遼東

Liaoyang 遼陽

Lingbei 嶺北

Liu En 劉恩

Luobu 羅不

Menggedu 蒙哥都

Midi 蔑里

Mingli Tiemuer 明里帖木兒

Mobei 漠北

Naiyan 乃顏

Nanjiatai Nangjiatai 南家台, 囊家台

Nanjing 南京

Nanmugan (Namuhan) 南木干 (那木罕)

Nianhao 年號

Niegubai 聶古伯

Qianhu 千戶

Qiebo 怯伯

Qilijisi 乞里吉思

Querzhi 曲兒只

Quxian talin 曲先塔林

Runing 汝寧

Saliman 撒里蠻

Sange 桑哥

Shazhou 沙州

Shangdu 上都

Shangshu sheng 尚書省

Shenhan 申罕

Shi Tianlin 石天麟

Suigedu 歲哥都

Taihe 太和

Taizi 太子

Tiemuer te/^兒

Tiemuer buhua 帖木兒不化

Tuqumie 秃曲滅
Tutuha 土土哈
Tuoertuohai 脫兒脫海
Tuohei tiemuer 脫黑帖木兒
Tuntian 屯田
Tuotuo 脫脫

Wanhu 萬戶
Wanzhe tiemuer 完者帖木兒
Wenzong 文宗
Wuertu 兀兒秃
Wulusi buhua 兀魯思不化
Wusihu 五絲戶
Wuzong 武宗

Xiban 昔班
Xibei 西北
Xiliji 昔里吉
Xingsheng 行省
Xuanweisi 宣慰司

Yahudu 牙忽都
Yan Fu 閻復
Yaomuhuer (Yaobuhuer) 要木忽兒 (要不忽兒)
Yao Sui 姚燧
Yeligannaoer 葉里干腦兒
Yelu Chucai 耶律楚材
Yemili 也米里
Yeerdeshi 也兒的石
Yilihun chahaner 亦里渾察罕兒
Yuxi Tiemuer 玉昔帖木兒
Yuechichaer 月赤察兒

Zhabugan 扎不干
Zhangji 章吉
Zhi yuan 至元
Zhuangwuer 狀兀兒

Notes

Introduction

1. Qa'an was the title assumed by Ögödei upon his accession to the throne to clarify the subjugation of his brothers, entitled khans, to his supreme authority. Qa'an is the Mongolian form of the Uighur Turkic title Khaqan, khan of the khans. (I. de Rachewiltz, "Qan, Qa'an and the seal of Güyüg," in K. Sagaster and M. Weiers (eds.), *Documenta Barbarorum: Festschrift für Walter Heissig zum 70. Geburtstag* (Wiesbaden, 1983), 273; F. Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1963-1975), III, 141-79.) Throughout the work the term Great Khan is completely synonymous with the term Qa'an.
2. Rashīd al-Dīn. *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, tr. J.A. Boyle (New York and London, 1971) 27, n.74 (hereafter Rashīd/Boyle); V.V. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th ed. London, 1977), 491.
3. Mīrkhwand, *Ta'rikh-i rawdat al-ṣafā* (Tehran, 1961), V, 218.
4. On Qutulun, whom Marco Polo called Aijaruc, see e.g. Marco Polo, *The Book of Sir Marco Polo*, tr. H. Yule (London, 1903), II, 393-96. [hereafter *Polo*. Throughout the work I refer to Yule's translation. I cite Moule and Pelliot's version only when it is significantly different from Yule's]; Rashīd/Boyle, *loc. cit.*; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Shu'āb-i panjāna*, MS Topkapı Sarayı Ahmet III, no. 2937, f. 127a; Anon. *Mu'izz al-ansāb* MS Bibliothèque Nationale A. F. Pers 67, f. 44b; Mīrkhwand, V, 218; P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo* (Paris, 1959-73), I, 15. Qutulun's case was dealt in details by Rossabi (M. Rossabi, "Khubilai Khan and the Women in his Family," in W. Bauer (ed.), *Studia Sino-Mongolica: Festschrift für Herbert Franke* (Wiesbaden, 1979), 174-75; idem, *Khubilai Khan* (Berkeley, 1988), 104-5) and is therefore only generally referred to here. On Qutulun see also Chapter II, section 2; Chapter III.
5. Mīrkhwand, V, 219. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, however, after falling in love with the slave girl, the son-in-law planned to go over to the Qa'an with her. When Qaidu learned about it, he executed him.

- (Rashid/Boyle, 27, n.74; *Shu'ab-ipanigāna*, f. 127a; See also *Mu'izz al-ansāb*, f.44b.)
6. For Rossabi's interpretation see the references in note 4 above.
 7. On the importance of revenge among the Mongols, see e.g., P. Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan* (Oxford, 1991), 152; L.V. Clark, "The Theme of Revenge in the *Secret History of the Mongols*," in idem and P.A. Draghi, eds., *Aspects of Altaic Civilization - II* (Bloomington, 1978), 33-57; For the position of Women under the Mongols, see e.g. Rossabi, "Women," *passim*; H. Franke, "Women under the Dynasties of Conquest," in L. Lanciotti, ed., *La donna nella Cina imperiale e nella Cina Repubblicana* (Florence, 1980), 23-43, esp. 36ff. (Rpt. in idem, *China under Mongol Rule* (London, 1994), art. VI.).
 8. L. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia* (Berkeley, 1960), 357.
 9. See e.g. H.H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1876), I, 180; R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes* (New Brunswick, 1970), 336; Zhu Feng and Wang Lu, "Hubilie de dingxin gegu," in Lu Minghui (ed.), *Menggu zu lishi renwu luji* (Beijing, 1981), 59; L. de Rachewiltz, "Turks in China under the Mongols," in M. Rossabi (ed.), *China Among Equals* (Berkeley, 1983), 293-94; J.F. Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 94; Zhou Liangxiao, *Hubilie* (Jilin, 1986), 151 ff.; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 104-11; idem, "The Reign of Khubilai Khan," in D. Twitchett and H. Franke (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6* (Cambridge, 1994), 442-43.
 10. The term West, when the East refers to China, refers here principally to the Muslim World of West Asia.
 11. The term Central Asia in this work refers to the area encompassing Transoxania and Turkestan, from the Oxus to the Altai mountains, and the eastern fringes of modern Xinjiang.
 12. On Jamāl Qarshl and his book see V.V. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion* (4th ed., London, 1977), 51-52; P. Jackson, "Djamāl Qarshl," *EI2*, Supp. III-IV (1981), 240. On Jawharī and his dictionary see C. C. Berg, "Djawharī," *EI2*, II (1965), 495-97 and the references there.
 13. *Polo*, II, 457-67 and *passim*. On European sources for Mongol History, see e.g. Morgan, *The Mongols* (Oxford, 1986), 23-27 and the references there; On Mamluk sources in general see D.P. Little, *An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography* (Wiesbaden, 1970), *passim*.
 14. On Chinggis's *jasagh* (*Yasa*), a body of Chinggisid law and customs, see chapter IV, part 3, and the references there.
 15. For the vast literature on Rashid al-Dīn see D.O. Morgan, "Rashid al-Dīn Tabīb," *EI2*, VIII (1995), 458-59 and the many references there. On *Shu'ab-i panigāna*, the genealogical appendix of *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, see A. Zeki Validi Togan, "The Composition of the History of the Mongols by Rashid al-Dīn," *CAJ*, 7 (1962), 68-71. On Persian sources for Mongol history in general see E.G.A. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia* (Cambridge, 1951-53), HI, 1-104.
 16. On Juwaynī, one of the most important sources for early Mongol history see, e.g., Boyle's introduction to his translation of Juwaynī's work: Juwaynī, *History of World Conqueror*, tr. J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), I, xv-xxxv; also Morgan, *The Mongols*, 12-15.
 17. Indeed, when Wassaf read part of his book to the Ilkhan Öljeitu the latter was unable to make heads or tails of it, an experience that many subsequent readers have shared. On Wassaf see Browne, III, 67-68; Morgan, *Mongols*, 15-16.
 18. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 58. On Mirkhwand (1433/4-98) see A. Beveridge-B. F. Manz, "Mirkhwand," *EI2*, VII (1990), 126-27; Browne, III, 431-33.
 19. On the *Yuan shi* and its composition see e.g. Cang Xiuliang (ed.), *Zhongguo shixue mingzhu pinglie* (Jinan, 1990), II, 223-45; Wang Shenrong, *Yuanshi tan yuan* (Changchun, 1991), 1-336; F.W. Mote, "A Note on Traditional Sources for Yuan History," in D. Twitchett and H. Franke (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol.6* (Cambridge, 1994), 689-83; on the structure of the official histories and the method of their composition, see e.g. Yang Lien-sheng, "The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography," in E.G. Pulleyblank and W.G. Beasley (eds.), *Historians of China and Japan* (London, 1961), 44-59.
 20. On the concept and characteristics of Chinese biographies see e.g. D.S. Nivison, "Aspects of Traditional Chinese Biography," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 21 (1961-62), 457-63; D. Twitchett, "Problems of Chinese Biography," in A.F. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford, 1969), 24-42.
 21. On this work see Mote, 696.
 22. On these works see Wang Shenrong, 362-70, 408-21, 422-27; Mote, 696-97. On the *Secret History of the Mongols*, the Mongols' most important record of their own early history up to the reign of Ogodei (1229-41), see Mote, 693-94 and the many references there.
 23. The reference to the dates and to the sources of these writers in itself raises the problem of distinguishing between primary and secondary sources- My distinction is based on that of Rossabi in his *Khubilai Khan*.
 24. D'Ohsson's pioneering work drew heavily on Muslim sources for Mongol history. See: C. M. d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz Khan jusqu'a Timour Bey* (The Hague, 1834-35), 4 vols.
 25. On Hong see Wang Shenrong, 427-34; A.W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing* (Washington DC, 1943-44), I, 360-61.
 26. On Tu Ji see Wang Shenrong, 434-44; Cang, III, 377-98.
 27. On the *Xin Yuan shi* see Wang Shenrong, 445-53; Cang, III, 399-426.
 28. Barthold, *Turkestan*; idem, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (Rpt. London, 1956-62); idem, *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens* (Berlin, 1935).
 29. See Bibliography.
 30. *Ulus* was the name for the subjects of a Mongol prince, or his descendants. It can also denote the compound of people and territories, i.e. a state or empire. In the following pages *ulus* refers to the territory and men under the descendants of Chinggis, mainly under his four main sons, Jochi, Chaghadaï, Ogodei and Tolui. For a detailed discussion on the term see Doerfer, I, 175-78.

31. For discussion of the bias of the sources see P. Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *CAJ*, 22 (1978), 188-91.
32. Jackson, "Dissolution," 191-92; P.D. Buell, "Tribe, Qan and *ulus* in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yuan History," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1977), 34-40, 125 ff.
33. Jackson, "Dissolution," 192-93.
34. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 479; Jackson, "Dissolution," 193-95; Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3-4 (1979-80), 239-40. As Fletcher noted, Juwayni's assertion about the right of the youngest to succeed was only meant to legitimize the later Toluid accession. (Juwayni, *Ta'rikh-i jahān-gushā*, ed. M. Qazwīnī (Leiden, 1912), III, 3 (hereafter, Juwayni/Qazwīnī) / Juwayni, *History of World Conqueror*, trans. by J.A. Boyle (Manchester, 1958), II, 549 (hereafter, Juwayni/Boyle); the same claim is maintained by Rashid al-Dīn, see Rashid al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, ed. Blocher (Leiden, 1912), 16 (hereafter Rashid/Blocher) / Rashid/Boyle, 30-31.
35. Jackson, "Dissolution," 193-95; see also R.P. Lindner, "What Was a Nomadic Tribe," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 24 (1982), 689-711.
36. Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian," 239.
37. On the *quriltai* institution see e.g. Fletcher, "Turco-Mongolian," 239 and more comprehensively, E. Endicott-West, "Imperial Governance in Yuan Times," *HJAS*, 46 (1986), 525-40.
38. Th.T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism* (Berkeley, 1987), 218 n.4.
39. Juwayni/Qazwīnī, I, 142 / Juwayni/Boyle, I, 180; *Secret History*, par. 255 and see de Rachewiltz's notes in "The Secret History of the Mongols Chapter 11," *POFEH*, 30 (1984), 138-39. On the attempted putsch of Chinggis's brother Temuge Odchigin see below.
40. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 462; Xiao Gongqin, "Lun Da Menggu guo de hanwei jicheng weiji," *Yuan shi ji beifangminzu shi yanjiu jikan*, 5 (1981), 53; Th. T. Allsen, "The Rise of the Mongolian Empire and Mongol Rule in North China", in H. Franke and D. Twitchett (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6* (Cambridge, 1994), 366.
41. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 463; Jackson, "Dissolution," 196; Allsen, "Rise," 366.
42. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 464. On Chinggis's *jasagh* (*Yasa*) see note 14 above.
43. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 464-65; Allsen, "Rise," 366.
44. Rashid/Blocher, 214 / Rashid/Boyle, 164.
45. *Secret History*, par. 255.
46. See e.g. *Secret History*, par. 254, 255, 269; Juwayni/Qazwīnī, I, 141-48 / Juwayni/Boyle, I, 179-87; Rashid al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, ed. B. Karimi (Tehran, 1959), I, 385; Rashid/Blocher, 2-3, 15-16 / Rashid/Boyle, 17-18, 30-31; *YS*, 2/29.
47. de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols Chapter 11," *POFEH*, 24 (1984), 140, and see, e.g., Barthold, *Turkestan*, 462; Jackson, "Dissolution," 197; Allsen, "Rise," 366. However, Krawulsky recently offered a different interpretation: based on the various versions of the nomination story and of the division of Chinggis's armies (about

- which see below), as well as on the reports of the chaos in the interregnum between Chinggis and Ogodei, she suggested that in fact Chinggis died without nominating a successor. The succession agreement was concluded among Ogodei and Tolui, the only two sons who accompanied their father to his last campaign in China. According to this agreement, Ogodei got the supreme rulership while Tolui maintained most of the army under his immediate control. The two years of interregnum were the time required for the brothers to enforce the depriving agreement on their elder brother, Chaghadaï. (D. Krawulsky, "Das Testament von Chinggis Khan: Eine quellenkritische Studie zum Thema Legitimation und Herrschaft," in idem, *Mongolen und Ilkhane - Ideologie und Geschichte* (Beirut, 1989), 65-85.) Provocative as it is, this explanation lacks any hint in the sources and is therefore hard to accept, especially *vis-a-vis* the unquestionable position of Ogodei's nomination even during the future legitimization struggles between the Ogödeids and the Toluids.
48. Juwayni/Qazwīnī, I, 31 / Juwayni/Boyle, I, 42.
 49. Juwayni/Qazwīnī, I, 31-32 / Juwayni/Boyle, I, 42-43; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 392-93; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 45; idem, "Rise," 366-67.
 50. Jackson, "Dissolution," 210-11; Allsen, "Rise," 366; see also Buell, "Tribe," 34-36, though the division of lands that he gives seems a little too schematic; Juwayni mentioned that in addition to the sons, Chinggis's younger brother, Temuge Odchigin, received a territory "in the region of Khitai" (Juwayni/Qazwīnī/Boyle, *loc.cit.*).
 51. Allsen, "Rise," 367, based on the partition given by Rashid al-Dīn (Rashid/Karimi, I, 399-417). The *Secret History*, however, describes a very different, much more equal, partition, according to which Chinggis's mother and his younger brother, Temuge Odchigin, received 10,000 men; Jochi 9,000; Chaghadaï 8,000; Tolui and Ogodei 5,000 each and Chinggis's other brothers got lesser numbers. (p. 242, de Rachewiltz, "The Secret History of the Mongols, chapter 10," *POFEH*, 26 (1982), 46-47, 72). Though the difference is quite considerable, the mentioning of Odchigin together with his mother gives credibility to the practice of inheritance of the younger son of most of his parents property, thus explaining the allocation of most of the army to Tolui after Chinggis's death. Cf. Krawulsky, 75-77. Moreover, the army that was allocated was only the Mongolian army. Apart from it each of the princes has at his command auxiliary troops; their real forces were, therefore, bigger than the numbers I have cited imply. (Allsen, "Rise," 367, n.60).
 52. Xiao, 56-57; Allsen, "Rise," 367.
 53. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 462-63; Jackson, "Dissolution," 197; *YS*, 115/2885; 146/3457, where Tolui is convinced by Chinggis's Khitan advisor, Yelu Chucai, to enthrone Ogodei in accordance to Chinggis's order; cf. Rashid/Blocher, 219 / Rashid/Boyle, 166 and Juwayni/Qazwīnī, III, 3 / Juwayni/Boyle, II, 549 according to them Tolui acted to ensure Ogodei's election. (Jackson, *loc.cit.*). Tolui's regency may have been a later interpolation, and see below.

54. Rashīd/Bloch, 16 / Rashīd/Boyle, 29-30; YS, 2/29; see also Allsen, "Rise," 367; cf. Krawulsky, *loc.cit.*
55. Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 144-51 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 183-89; *Secret History*, par. 269; Allsen, "Rise," 368.
56. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 44; Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 210; Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 255.
57. The branch secretariat (*xing sheng*) was an administrative institution the Mongols adopted from the Jin dynasty that ruled North China before them (1125-1234). This body, a branch of the central secretariat (*shangshu sheng*), was established in newly conquered territories and its official-in-charge enjoyed wide military and civil authority. The Mongols established a branch secretariat in North China in 1214 under Chinggis's general, Muqali. Ögödei's new administrative bodies retained the same name. (Allsen, "Rise," 361). On Mongol administration under Chinggis see, e.g., Ratchnevsky, 175-86.
58. Buell, "Sino-Khitani Administration in Mongol Bukhara," *Journal of Asian History*, 13 (1979), 141-43; Allsen, "Rise," 374.
59. Buell, "Sino-Khitani," 143-47; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 45-46; idem, "Rise," 374. See Buell, "Sino-Khitani," *loc.cit.* for a detailed description of the Bukhara incident with Chaghadaï in 1238. For a general description of Ögödei's administration and reforms, many of them ascribed to his Khitan advisor Yelu Chuchai, see Buell, "Tribe," 82-101; Allsen, "Rise," 372-81.
60. Allsen, "Rise," 379. In theory the Qa'an had the right to receive a certain amount of the appanages' revenues and to govern over their tax collection and military recruitment, yet practically the princes could usually do whatever they liked.
61. On Ögödei's campaigns see e.g. Morgan, *The Mongols*, 114, 136-41; Allsen, "Rise," 368-72.
62. See e.g. *Secret History*, par. 270, 278; Rashīd/Bloch, 18-19, 41, 42 / Rashīd/Boyle, 33, 54, 55.
63. The existence of such units is attested by Wassaf (*Ta'rikh-i Wassaf* (Bombay, 1859-60), 50-51), who narrates the 1260s. He is cited in Barthold, *Turkestan*, 515-16 and subsequently in Buell, "Tribe," 249, n. 128. See also Chapter I below.
64. Rashīd/Bloch, 222 / Rashīd/Boyle, 169; Xiao, 57; Krawulsky, 77; Köten's later alliance with the Toluids in the succession struggles that continued well into the time of Qaidu can be explained against the background of his Toluid army. (Xiao, *loc. cit.*)
65. Rossabi, "Women," 160.
66. Rossabi, "Women," 159; Qara Qorum was built there by Ögödei because Chinggis had chosen this place to be his capital (Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 165-69). Its location is probably connected to the sacred position of the Mongolian steppes among the Mongols and the Turks.
67. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 462; Jackson, "Dissolution," 197.
68. Rashīd/Bloch, 4, 134, 240, 276 / Rashīd/Boyle, 19, 120, 180, 201; Rashīd al-Dīn, *Jāmi' al-tawārikh*, ed. A. A. 'Alizādāh (Moscow, 1953), I, 140-41; YS, 3/44, 124/3055; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 24.

69. Shiremün's nomination is stressed mainly in relation to the Ögödeids' abrogation of their father's will: see the last three references above. Juwaynī only said that a party favored him, and he does not mention at all Shiremün's claims to the throne before Möngke's enthronement. (Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 206 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 251; Jackson, "Dissolution," 198, and see there also for the problems of Shiremün's genealogy). Furthermore, from Chaghadaï's statement that "Töregene is the mother of the princes who had the right to the Khanate" (Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 196 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 240), it seems as if by the time of Ögödei's death the successor was not yet determined. According to the material of the *Yuan shi*, Xiao concluded that Ögödei left the decision about his successor to the *quriltai*. (YS 124/3055; Xiao, 52-53). The *Yuan shi* ascribes to Ögödei only a general statement saying that Shiremün was talented enough to rule all-under-heaven, and the Qa'an offered the same description to Möngke in the same place. In the genealogical tables of the *Yuan shi*, Shiremün is described as *taizi*, a title usually reserved for the heir apparent, yet this title is also given to Kotei, Ögödei's second son. According to Juwaynī, Kotei was chosen by Chinggis to succeed Ögödei, and his election failed only due to his ill health. (Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 206 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 251; YS, 107/1716-7; L. Hambis, *Le chapitre CVI du Yuan Che* (Leiden, 1945), 76; Jackson, "Dissolution," 197.) In 1235 the Chinese messenger of the Song heard that Ögödei chose Qaidu's father, his fifth son Qashī, to be his heir, yet the latter died before his father. (Peng Daya and Xu Ting, *Heida shilue* in Wang Yunwu, ed. *Congshu jicheng* (Changsha, 1937), 1, and see Chapter I.) Qashī's assertion, according to which Ögödei wanted Qaidu to succeed him, is probably of later origin (Jamāl Qarshī, *Mulhaqāt al-surāh*, in V.V. Barthold, *Turkestan v epokhu 'mongol'skogo nashestiya* (St. Petersburg, 1900), I, 138, and see Chapter I).
70. Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 206 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 251.
71. Jackson, "Dissolution," 201; Allsen, "Rise," 384-85.
72. C. Dawson (ed.), *The Mongol Mission* (New York, 1955), 25; Xiao, 54; Jackson, "Dissolution," 198; Allsen, "Rise," 385.
73. Rashīd/Bloch, 244-45 / Rashīd/Boyle, 181-82.
74. Allsen, "Rise," 382, 387.
75. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 480.
76. Jackson, "Dissolution," 201. Those praises can of course be a later interpolation.
77. Jackson, "Dissolution," 200-1; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 22-23; idem, "Rise," 386-89.
78. Jackson, "Dissolution," 201; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 22-24; idem, "Rise," *loc.cit.*
79. D. Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan - a Reexamination," pt B, *Studia Islamica*, 34 (1971), 162; Jackson, "Dissolution," 203-4.
80. Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, III, 17, 19-20 / Juwaynī/Boyle, II, 558, 560.
81. Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, III, 18 / Juwaynī/Boyle, II, 559; Jackson, "Dissolution," 207. Jackson explains Batu's refusal to accept the throne as having originated from the old Jochid legitimacy question.

82. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 23-25; *idem*, "Rise," 391; On Sorghoghtani and her actions to promote Mongke see Rossabi, "Women," 158-66.
83. Allsen, "Rise," 390.
84. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 25; *idem*, "Rise," 392. According to Rashīd al-Dīn and the *Yuan Shi*, the Ogodeids stressed Shiremūn's candidacy, basing it on Ogodei's nomination. Their claim was dismissed by the Toluids, who maintained that the Ogodeids themselves abrogated the Qa'an's decree by enthroning Güyüg. On the problems concerning Shiremūn's nomination see note 69.
85. Jackson, "Dissolution," 204; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 25-26. The Ogodeids that attended the second *quriltai* were Melik and Qadan, both sons of Ogodei by a concubine and therefore ineligible to high position in the *ulus*, and the son of Köten, whose Toluid army probably encouraged him to back Mongke. Among the Chaghadaids there were Mochi, Chaghadaï's son by a concubine, and Qara Hülegü, who was deposed by Güyüg in favor of Yesü Mongke. Qoja, Naqu, Shiremun and the reigning Chaghadaid Khan, Yesü Mongke, did not attend.
86. *Secret History*, par. 254, 255. In those paragraphs, Ogodei, while first nominated by Chinggis, expresses his concern that his descendants after him would prove to be unworthy for the Qa'anate. Chinggis answers that in that case, some capable candidate of another line will be nominated for the post, thereby conveniently enough asserting the Toluid claim. The external textual evidence that implies the fabrication of this claim is the version of the *Secret History*, written in the Uighur script, that was preserved only in a later Mongol chronicle, the seventeenth-century *Altan Tobchi*, and includes only the part dealing with Chinggis's reign (paragraphs 1-268). This version curiously lacks any specific statement of Chinggis in favor of the Toluids. Paragraph 255 and the parts dealing with the subject in paragraph 254 are missing completely, just like other references to the same issue. For a further discussion of those paragraphs and their significance for the dating of the *Secret History* see de Rachewiltz, "Chapter 10," pp. 93-96, 130-41; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 39-42, and the references in both.
87. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 44. Tolui's adherence of the *jasagh* was stressed as a contrast to the Ogodeids abrogation of it, which unfitted them for the Qa'anate. Apart from being condemned for breaching Ogodei's order regarding Shiremun, they were blamed for executing without trial Chinggis's favorite daughter, a crime otherwise unattested, and for not accepting the decisions of the rightful *quriltai* regarding Mb'ngke's election. Xiao, 54; Allsen, "Rise," 396.
88. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 27-28, 34-44; *idem*, "Rise," 396. For adjusted Toluid biographies see, e.g., Rashīd/Bloch, 198-226 / Rashīd/Boyle, 157-72; YS, 115/2885-87.
89. Jackson, "Dissolution," 205-6 and see especially his reservations about the authenticity of this episode; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 30-31; *idem*, "Rise," 393.
90. Jackson, "Dissolution," 205-6; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 30-34; *idem*, "Rise," 393-95. William of Rubruck, the Franciscan missionary,

spoke about 300 grandees that were put to death, while the *Yuan shi* and Rashīd al-Dm claimed that 77 officials and ministers were tried and executed in Mongolia alone. William of Rubruck also mentions that Oghul had ruined her whole family, and Kirakos and Juzjāni, contemporary Armenian and Persian historians respectively, testify that the Chaghadaids were almost completely eliminated.

91. Rashīd/Bloch, 8 / Rashīd/Boyle, 23.
92. Jackson, "Dissolution," 206; Allsen, "Rise," 395.
93. Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, III, 58-59 / Juwaynī/Boyle, II, 587-88.
94. Jackson, "Dissolution," 221. On Tegüder, see p. 30 and p. 146 n. 101.
95. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 483-85; Jackson, "Dissolution," 207.
96. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 103-4, 54-59.
97. Allsen, "Rise," 394. On the exact meaning of Mongke's nomination see, e.g., Jackson, "Dissolution," 221 ff.; R. Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks* (Cambridge, 1995), 12-14.
98. Allsen, "Rise," 394.
99. For more details about the conquests in Mongke's time see e.g. Allsen, "Rise," 403-7.
100. On the administration of Mongke's empire see especially Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, *passim*, especially chapters 4-7.
101. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 99-107, especially 105.
102. On the background for the Hülegü-Berke dispute in Iran, that led to a long bloody confrontation between the Ilkhans, Hülegü's successors, and the Golden Horde, see e.g., Jackson, "Dissolution," 221 ff.; Allsen, "Rise," 412; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols*, 86-91. See Chapter I and the references there.

Chapter I: The Rise of Qaidu

1. Qarshī, 138; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 124. According to Howorth (I, 137, 142) and subsequently others (e.g. Han Rulin, *Yuan chao shi* (Beijing, 1986), I, 157), Qaidu participated in the Mongol invasion of Hungary in 1240-41. Pelliot proved this claim to be erroneous (Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 125).
2. Rashīd/Alizādah I, 343; Rashīd/Boyle, 22, note 47. This tribe's name is sometimes rendered as Berkin.
3. Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 125-26, and see there for discussion of the different possible dates; cf. Tu Ji, *Mengwu'er shi ji* (Rpt. Taipei, 1962), 37/1a; Ke Shaomin, *Xin Yuan shi* (Rpt. Beijing, 1979), 110/511 (hereafter XYS); Rashīd/Bloch, 7; Rashīd/Boyle, 22. Hexi literally means west of the (yellow) river. Its domain included parts of modern Shanxi, Ningxia and Gansu provinces of the PRC. On Chinggis campaigns against the Tanguts see e.g. R. Dunnel, "The Hsi Hsia," in D. Twitchett and H. Franke (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol.6* (Cambridge, 1994), 205-14, esp. 207.
4. *Heida shi lue*, 1. This source also notes that Qashi read and wrote Chinese; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 125-26; Hambis, CVII, 72.
5. Qarshī, 136; Rashīd/Bloch, 7 / Rashīd/Boyle, 22.

6. *Ordo* is the camp of a Mongol prince, directed by one of his wives. (Rashid/Boyle, 341). For a comprehensive discussion of this term see Doerfer, II, 32-39.
7. Qarshī, 136; Rashid al-Dīn indicates that Qaidu grew up in the *Ordo* of Chinggis Khan, but probably means the *Ordo* of Ogodei. (Rashid/Bloch, 7 / Rashid/Boyle, 22).
8. Rashid/Bloch, 7 / Rashid/Boyle, 22.
9. On Mongke's purges see introduction, pp. 15-16.
10. YS, 3/45. The localities referred to in the passage can be found on the maps.
11. Between the lines dealing with Qaidu and with Totaq, the *Yuan shi* notes that Bieerge received Querzhi. Pelliot, and subsequently Allsen, identifies this prince as Berke, Khan of the Golden Horde (1257-67), and the area that he received as Georgia, given in Chinese transliteration of its Persian name *Kurj*. (P. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or* (Paris, 1950), 51; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 59; *idem*, "Rise", 412). It is not clear why Berke was inserted in a passage dealing with distribution of appanages to the sons of Ogodei (perhaps as compensation for the allocation to Qaidu of Qayaliq, which Wassaf, e.g., claims belonged to the Golden Horde? (Wassaf, 50; Ayāti, *Tahrir-i ta'rikh-i Wassaf* (Tehran, 1944), 27). In YS 3/44 the same Bieerge is mentioned only as one of the western princes who participated in the enthronement of Möngke. In the genealogy of the house of Jochi cited in the YS (chapter 107) Berke is not mentioned at all. I have been unable to identify a prince with a similar name in the house of Ogodei.
12. The Emil river is given in other sources as the appanage of Hoqu, the son of Güyüg. See e.g. XYS, 111/513; P. Jackson (tr. and ed.) and D. Morgan (ed.), *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck* (London, 1990), 169-70.
13. Rashid/Bloch, 5-6 / Rashid/Boyle, 20.
14. L. Petech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols* (Rome, 1990), 13. This appanage was abolished by Qubilai in 1260.
15. Juwayni/Taqizwini, III, 69-70 / Juwayni/Boyle, IT, 595; Rashid/Bloch, 307 / Rashid/Boyle, 217.
16. Anon. *Shajaratal-atrak*, MS Harvard University Pers 6F, f. 74a; on the Arulad tribe, see P. Pelliot and L. Hambis (trs. and eds), *Histoire des Campagnes de Genghis Khan* (Leiden, 1951), 344-60; cf. Rashid al-Dīn's insistence that Qaidu's army was for the most part not the troops originally bequeathed to Ogodei by Chinggis Khan, though he admits that certain Ogodeid troops joined him. (Rashid/Karīmī, I, 410-11). See also Chapter IV, section 1.
17. On the fate of the Ogodeid forces after Mongke's rise to power, see introduction, pp. 15-17.
18. Zeng lian, *Yuan Shu* (Shandong university's copy, undated), 42/3B.
19. *Rubruck*, 148.
20. Yan Fu, *Jingxuanji*, rpt. in Wang Deyi (comp.), *Yuan ren wen ji zhen ben cong gan* (Taipei, 1985), II, 17b/550. On Yan Fu see his biography in the *Yuan Shi* (160/3772-74), and Wang Deyi et al., *Yuan ren zhuanjiziliao suoyin* (Taipei, 1979-82), III, 1995-96 and the references there.
21. YS, 153/3619; Xiao shi, *Qinzhaiji* (Si qu quan shu ed.), 3/14a-b. In his biography in the *Yuan shi* and in his epitaph, both cited above, Shi is described as a scholar versed in many languages, who was a member of the Ogodeid guard, worked under Yelu Chucai as a judge and administrator in Central Asia and subsequently entered Mongke's service. During the "imprisonment" he developed close ties with Qaidu and his followers. See also Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 128; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 53; *idem*, "Rise", 412.
22. YS, 3/50, 126/3088, 155/3660, 158/3713; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 34-35; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 51.
23. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 53; *idem*, "Rise", 412.
24. On the struggle between Arigh Boke and Qubilai see, e.g., Jackson, "Dissolution," 227-30; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 53-62; Zhou, 46-65.
25. Rashid/Bloch, 7, 398, 433 / Rashid/Boyle, 24, 255, 266; Mirkhwand, V, 200 (see there on Qaidu's abandoning of Arigh Boke). Also see e.g. d'Ohsson, III, 360; Howorth, I, 174; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 125-26; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 433; Tu Ji, 74/7B; XYS, 110/512; Zhou, 152. The Chinese sources give this information only based on Western sources (d'Ohsson).
26. YS, 4/68. Qaidu's revenues were frozen after his "revolt" against Qubilai but were given again to his son, Chapar, after the latter surrendered to the Yuan. See Chapter III.
27. Seventeen princes are mentioned in the passage. Twelve of them are definitely identified (according to the genealogy of the mongols in Gao wende et al., *Menggu shi xi* (Beijing, 1979)), and ten are known from the *Yuan shi* to have supported Qubilai. None of them is identified as a supporter of Arigh Boke.
28. For example, he gave an allowance to Baraq in 1268, and see below.
29. On Alghu see Rashid/Bloch, 403-20 / Rashid/Boyle, 150, 257-61; Wassaf, 12-16 / Ayāti, 2-5; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 488-92; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 123-24; Zhou, 55-56; Liu Yingsheng, "Ali Buge zhi luan yu Chahatai hanguo de fazhan", *Xinjiang daxue xuebao*, 1987, 30-34 (hereafter, Liu, "rebellion").
30. Rashid/Bloch, 410 / Rashid/Boyle, 259.
31. Rashid/Bloch, 398 / Rashid/Boyle, 255. Boyle's punctuation may lead one to conclude that those battles were fought between Qaidu and Hülegü, Qubilai's and Arigh Böke's brother and the founder of the Ilkhanate. I follow Dr. Peter Jackson's reading of the Persian text, according to it Alghu is the one who fought with Qaidu. (Personal communication, January 1995). In any case, those battles were certainly fought only after Alghu (and Hülegü) turned to Qubilai's side.
32. Mirkhwand, V, 201; B. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde* (Wiesbaden, 1965), 41. Berke's pretension to nominate another *ulus'* leader attests to the fluid position of the Qa'an at this stage.
33. Mirkhwand, *loc.cit.*; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 123-24.
34. Rashid/Bloch, 434 / Rashid/Boyle, 266.
35. On Qubilai's transferral of the capital and its consequences, see e.g., Jackson, "Dissolution," 228-29. Shangdu is the famous Xanadu of Coleridge's poem.

36. YS, 6/107, 95/2416; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 127 (He dates it to 1265). Other Ogodeids also got revenues from this province together with Qaidu.
37. Rashid/Bloch, 398 / Rashid/Boyle, 255-56; MTrkhwand, V, 196.
38. Rashid al-Din, *Jāmi' al-Tawārikh* vol. III (ed. 'Alizadah, Baku, 1957), 109 (hereafter: Rashid/'Alizadah); Qarshi, 138; Qashani, *Ta'rikh-i Uljaytu* (ed. M. Hambly, Tehran, 1969), 214.
39. See Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 124-25.
40. YS, 63/1569; Wassaf, 12 / Ayati, 2; Rashid/Boyle, 259-60; Liu Yingsheng, "Zhiyuan chu nian de Chahatai Hanguo," *Yuanshi ji beifang minzu shi yanjiu jikan*, 9 (1985), 48 (hereafter: Liu, "the Chaghadaï ulus").
41. Rashid/'Alizadah A, 343; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 491.
42. YS, 122/3001; Yu Ji, *Daoyuan xue gu lu* (Wanyou wenku ed., Rpt. Shanghai, 1937), 24/403.
43. Rashid/'Alizadah, 108; Wassaf, 68-69 / Ayat, 38-39; MTrkhwand, V, 285-86; and see later in the chapter.
44. YS, 63/1569. (translation in E.V. Bretschneider, *Medieval Researches from Eastern-Asiatic Sources* (London, 1910), II, 36). Cf. T. Allsen, "The Yuan Dynasty and the Uighurs in Turfan in the 13th Century," in M. Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals* (Berkeley, 1983), 254, see M. Biran, "The Battle of Herat" [Hebrew], Seminar Paper, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1990), 40). Rashid al-Din may have been referring to the events that preceded this battle (Rashid/Bloch, 434-35 / Rashid/Boyle, 266). One *li* is equal to half a kilometer.
45. Wassaf, 68 / Ayat, 38.
46. Rashid/Bloch, 188 / Rashid/Boyle, 151.
47. Qarshi, 138.
48. Juwayni/Qazwini, III, 64-65 / Juwayni/Boyle, II, 591-92; V.V. Barthold [J. A. Boyle], "Burak Khan," *EI2*, I (1965), 1311. (See Boyle's note on the correct reading of this name [Baraq and not Buraq])
49. Rashid/Bloch, 7, 169, 188 / Rashid/Boyle, 23, 139, 151; Barthold, *four Studies*, I, 125.
50. YS, 5/91; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 76.
51. Rashid/Bloch, 188 / Rashid/Boyle, 151; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 125.
52. Rashid/Bloch, 189 / Rashid/Boyle, 151; al-'Umarī, *Das Mongolische Weltreich: al-'Umarī's Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-absār ft' l-mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. K. Lech (Wiesbaden, 1968), 2.
53. Rashid/Bloch, 169 / Rashid/Boyle, 139-40; Wassaf, 16, 67 / Ayat, 5, 37.
54. Wassaf, 68 / Ayat, 38.
55. Rashid al-Din also notes in one of his references to the matter that Baraq asked to return after Arigh Böke's surrender. Rashid/Bloch, 189 / Rashid/Boyle, 151.
56. Rashid al-Din, *Ta'rikh-i mubārak Ghāzāni* (ed. K. Jahn, Le Hauge, 1957), 11 (hereafter: Rashid/Jahn) / Rashid/'Alizadah, 107; Mirkhwand, V, 295-96; Grousset, 332.
57. YS, 6/118; Liu Yingsheng, "Yuan chao yu Chahatai hanguo de guanxi," in *Yuan shi lun cong*, 3 (1986), 59. (hereafter: Liu, "Relationship "); cf. Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 76.

58. Wassaf, 68 / Ayat, 38.
59. Rashid/Bloch, 169 / Rashid/Boyle, 139-40.
60. Rashid/Bloch, 9 / Rashid/Boyle, 23; Cf. Liu, "Relationship", 59.
61. Rashid/'Alizadah, 107; MTrkhwand, V, 284-85. According to Wassaf, Qaidu was victorious in the first battle, and without Mongke Temür's assistance. (Wassaf, 68 / Ayat, 38; see also Rashid/Bloch, 169, 189 / Rashid/Boyle, 140, 152.)
62. Rashid/'Alizadah, 108; Wassaf, 68-69 / Ayat, 38-39; MTrkhwand, V, 285-86.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Wassaf, 68 / Ayat, 38; on *daifu*, the Chinese title of the ruler of Bukhara, see Buell, "Sino-Khitan," 146; on Mas'ud Beg, who later entered Qaidu's service; see Chapter IV, section 3.
65. Rashid/'Alizadah, 109; Wassaf, 69 / Ayat, 39. Wassaf does not establish a date for the *quriltai* but according to the sequence of events that he describes, one can set the date at circa 1267.
66. Rashid/'Alizadah, 108-9; MTrkhwand, V, 286-87.
67. *Hizarah* is a unit of theoretically one thousand men - see Morgan, *The Mongols*, 89. Here the reference seems to be to army units stationed in Bukhara from the time of Mongke, as Barthold suggests (*Turkestan*, 491). In this context, see also Wassaf, 50-51.
68. *kārkhanah* is a workshop that employs enslaved craftsmen, who manufacture cloth, weapons and other goods. On *kārkhanahs* in the Ilkhanate, see I.P. Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Ilkhans," in J. A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. V (Cambridge, 1968), 512-13.
69. Rashid/'Alizadah, 109-10; Wassaf, 69 / Ayat, 39; MTrkhwand, V, 266-68; Rashid/Bloch, 189 / Rashid/Boyle, 152, where the battle plan is clearly attributed to Baraq; d'Ohsson, III, 492-93; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 491.
70. Rashid/'Alizadah, 109-10; Mirkhwand, V, 266-68. On the term *anda* see Doerfer, I, 149-52; Pelliot and Hambis, 232.
71. MTrkhwand, V, 287.
72. Wassaf, 69 / Ayat, 39.
73. MTrkhwand, V, 289.
74. On the "peace" between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans, see e.g. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, 53; R. Amitai-Preiss, "The Mamluk Ilkhanid War: Its Origin and Conduct up to the Second Battle of Horns (680/1281)," PhD Dissertation (Hebrew University, 1990), 107-8; idem, *Mongols*, 89.
75. Rashid/Bloch 9 / Rashid/Boyle, 24; Howorth, I, 175. Cf. Liu Yingsheng, "Lun Talasi huiyi," in *Yuan shi lun cong*, 4 (1992), 264 (hereafter: Liu, "Talas").
76. Liu, "Talas", 264; on the joint administration see introduction, pp. 10-11. There is no evidence to the continuation of this administration after Möngke's death. However, the fact that Mas'ud Beg, the administrator of the areas under Mongke and under Alghu afterwards, remained in charge of the administration shows that mainly the old form of administration was continued. See also Buell, "Tribe," 151-52.

77. Liu, "Talas," 262, 265; Wassaf, 69 / AyatI, 39.
78. *Yuan shi*, 125/3073; Zhou, 152.
79. Han was one of the most important dynasties in Chinese history (221 BC – 220 AD), and its name became a synonym for the Chinese. In the Yuan Period the term *Han ren*, people of Han, applied principally to the northern Chinese.
80. On the northwest, see *YS*, 63/1567-74. With regard to the dates, an anecdote cited before the mention of the meeting of the northwestern princes is ascribed to the year 1268, which leads to the assumption that the conference was held later. The next date mentioned in the biography after 1268 is 1314. Accordingly, the meeting could have been held at any time between 1268 and 1314. The biography also indicates that Gao, the subject of the biography, who was supposed to deliver Qubilai's response to the princes, died on the way (in Shangjing in Manchuria!), and his son took his place. At the time of assuming his father's function, the son was sixteen years old. This son died, according to his biography, in 1314 at the age of sixty-six (*YS*, 125/3074). He was thus sixteen in 1264, so that the meeting referred to is likely to have been related to Arigh Böke's revolt, although it is strange that an event that occurred in 1268 is mentioned before it. Zhu Feng and Wang Liu solved the geographic and chronological problems by asserting that the claims of the meeting were expressed jointly by Arigh Boke, Qaidu and Nayan (who dwelt in Manchuria - see Chapter II, section 1) (Zhu Feng, 59). Muraoka suggests that this was the assembly of the princes, who rebelled against Qubilai circa 1276/7 (Muraoka, Rin, "Haidu yu Tiersitan: lun Talasi hultai dahui," in *Papers Contributed to the Symposium for the History of the Yuan Dynasty - Abstracts* (Nanjing, 1986), 191). On this subject see chapter II, section 1. Muraoka does not explain his supposition, but he apparently assumes that the messenger was in fact twenty-six years old, and thus the complaint was addressed in 1274, close to the time of the princes' rebellion. Certainly the years of the princes' rebellion are within the time span from 1268 to 1314. (See also note 81 for further considerations in support of this opinion.) As regards the dates, it may also be noted that the princes' opposition to changing the system of writing probably relates to Qubilai's adoption of the 'Phags-pa alphabet. Qubilai announced this change only in 1269, and the alphabet was in widespread use only in the early 1270s (Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 155 ff, and see Chapter II, section 1, note 79). It is improbable that in early 1269 the princes who assembled in Talas were already aware of the use of this alphabet. Neither Rossabi nor other Western scholars of the Yuan cite this reference from the *Yuan shi*.
81. These considerations strengthen Muraoka's opinion that the princes who rebelled in 1276/7, most of them the sons of Arigh Boke and Mongke, whose original appanages were in Mongolia and the Yenisei region, which were part of the northwest region, and closer to Manchuria than to Talas, lived within the boundary of Qubilai's kingdom. They were better acquainted than Qaidu and his colleagues with the changes in script, in law and in the way of life introduced by Qubilai, and were more influenced by them. Their appanages also probably diminished in importance when the capital was moved from Mongolia to China. In their opposition they could also see themselves as the successors of Mongke (and Arigh Böke?). (On the frictions between Qubilai and Mongke, see e.g., Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 50-51; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 33-34.)
82. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 48, 126. See subsequently, e.g., Grousset, 333; Allsen, "Uighurs," 254.
83. Barthold, *Turkestan*, 493; cited by Grousset, 333.
84. Rashid/^cAlizadah, 135.
85. Mirkhwand, V, 308.
86. Howorth, I, 175.
87. On the term *quriltai* see Introduction, note 37, also E. Endicott West, *Mongolian Rule in China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 44.
88. J.W. Dardess, "From Mongolian Empire to Yuan Dynasty," *Monumenta Serica*, 30 (1972-73), 133.
89. Wassaf, 69 / AyatI, 39; Mirkhwand, V, 288.
90. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, 53.
91. *Zhi yuan* is the reign title (*nian hao*) for the main part of Qubilai's rule (1264-94).
92. *YS*, 134/3247-48.
93. See e.g., *YS*, 117/2909 and also Chapter II.
94. Chinese writers from the late Qing period situated the war between Mongke Temür and Qaidu before the *quriltai* and related it to Möngke's response to Qubilai's mission. They maintained that Qaidu, who found himself confronted with the Qa'an, the Golden Horde and Baraq, sued for peace with Mongke Temur, who indeed later helped him. (Hong Jun, *Yuan shi yi wen zheng bu liao jiaozhu* (rpt. Hebei, 1990), 212-13; Tu Ji, 74/7B; *YXS*, 110/523). This approach clearly originates in d'Ohsson's description of the events of that period (d'Ohsson, III, 428). D'ohsson speaks of two *quriltas*: first the *quriltai* as recounted by Wassaf, which he says was followed by the war between Qaidu and Mongke Temur, and subsequently the *quriltai* as recounted by Rashid al-Din. Barthold rightfully maintains that it is improbable that these were two separate events, and accordingly there is no justification for situating the war prior to the *quriltai*. (If the war had been waged before the *quriltai*, Baraq would have had no reason to return to Bukhara, where he ruled before the battles with Qaidu.)
95. Wassaf, 69 / AyatI, 39; Rashid/Jahn, 9 / Rashid/^cAlizadah, 113; Mirkhwand, V, 289.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Wassaf, 70 / AyatI, 40; Rashid/Jahn, 15 / Rashid/^cAlizadah, 114; Rashid/Bloch, 173, 192 / Rashid/Boyle, 142, 150; Mirkhwand, V, 293.
98. Rashid/Jahn/^cAlizadah, *loc.cit.*; Mirkhwand, V, 293; Wassaf, 70 / AyatI, 40. Wassaf notes that apart from Qipchaq and Chabat, Qaidu also sent Mubarak Shah. This is not apparently the Mubarak Shah expelled by Baraq, but the grandson of Ogödei's son, Qadan. (On this Mubarak Shah, see Hambis, 107, 84).
99. Wassaf, 70.

100. Rashīd/Jahn, 15 / Rashīd/°Alizādah, 114; Harawī, *Ta'rikh nāmah-i Harāt* (Calcutta, 1944), 303; Yunīnī, *Dhaylmira't al-zamān* (Hyderabad, 1954-55), II, 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-Durar* (Freiburg - Cairo, 1971), VIII, 149. (The latter two base themselves on a common source, perhaps al-Jazārī. See Little, 10-11, 33-36, 53-61.)
101. Teguder was the Chaghadaid representative in the army that set out with Hülegü to Iran in 1253. Afterwards he remained in the service of the Ilkhans, apparently as commander of a *tümen* (a unit numbering, theoretically, 10,000 men). When Baraq had planned to invade Khurāsān, he contacted Teguder and urged him to join him. Teguder then asked Abaqa to return to his appanage in Georgia, intending to join Baraq through Darband, and meanwhile raided Armenian and Georgian villages. Abaqa suspected Teguder, and when the latter refused his summons sent a sizeable Mongol force accompanied by Armenian and Georgian units against him. Teguder was defeated, and he capitulated to Abaqa who exiled him. On Teguder's rebellion, see Rashīd/Jahn, 14-15 / Rashīd/°Alizādah, 111-13; Waṣṣāf, 72-73 / Ayātī, 42; Mlrkhwand, V, 291; Harawī, 309; *Shajarat al-Atrāk*, f. 84a-b; Baybars al-Manṣūrī, *Zubdat al-fikra ft ta'rikh al-hijra* MS British Library. Add. 23325, f. 81A-82B; al-°Aynī, *°Iqd al-jumān fi ta'rikh ahl al-zamān*, MS Topkapı Sarayı, Ahmet III 2912, f. 106A; Ibn Furāt, *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-mulūk* (Beirut, 1942), VII, 9; al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-Arab* (Cairo, 1984), XXVII, 396; Grigor of Akanc' (should be Akner) in R.P. Blake and R.N. Frye (eds. and trs.), "History of the Nation of the Archers," *HJAS*, 12 (1949), 375-77; M. Brosset (tr.), *Histoire de la Georgie* (St. Petersburg, 1895), Part I, 583-85. See also J.A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Ilkhans," in *idem* (ed.), *Cambridge History of Iran* vol. V, 357; Biran, 10-12.
102. Rashīd/Jahn, 16 / Rashīd/°Alizādah, 114-15, and Harawī, 310, maintain that there was not really a battle and a defeat, but that Tūbshin fled immediately; see also Mlrkhwand, V, 294; Waṣṣāf, 71 / Ayatl, 41; Yunīnī, II, 435; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, 149.
103. Rashīd/Jahn, 17-18 / Rashīd/°Alizādah, 115-19; Mlrkhwand, V, 299.
104. Rashīd/Jahn, 17 / Rashīd/°Alizādah, 117; Doerfer, II, 25-27. Rashīd/Bloch, 9 / Rashīd/Boyle, 23, may be referring to the same thing when saying that Qaidu and Abaqa called each other *shighaldash*, which has a similar meaning to *ortogb* (see Doerfer, I, 368).
105. On this important battle and its outgrowths see e.g. Rashīd/°Alizādah, 107-37; Rashīd/Jahn, 9-31 (where the passage dealing with the course of the battle is missing); Rashīd/Bloch, 170-71, 189-93 / Rashīd/Boyle, 140-41, 152-53; Waṣṣāf, 66-80 / Ayatl, 37-46; Harawī, 303-30; Mlrkhwand, V, 283-312; Hamd Allah Mustawfī Qazwīnī, *Ta'rikh-i guzida* (Leiden, 1913), 577, 582; Mu'in al-Dīn Natanzī, *Muntahab al-tawārikh-i Mu'ini* (ed. J. Aubin, Tehran, 1957), 104-5; *Shajarat al-Atrāk*, f. 84a-b, 109b-IIIb; Brosset, 573-86; Yunīnī, II, 410-11, 434-36; Ibn al-Dawādārī, VIII, 140-41, 148-50; Mufaddal, *al-Nahj al-sadīd* (ed. Blochet, Paris, 1919-28), 178-83; *Zubda*, f. 77A; °Aynī, f. 100A, 104A; Ibn Kathir, *al-Bidāya wa'l-Nihāya* (Cairo, 1939), XIII, 255; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, *al-Hawādith al-jāmi'a* (Baghdad, 1932), 357; and see also Boyle, "Ilkhans," 357-61; Biran, *passim*.
106. The name of Baraq's brother is reproduced as Yasa'ur in Boyle's translation of Rashīd al-Din (Rashīd/Boyle, 139, 153), but according to the MS. reading it should be Basar (see, e.g., *Shu'ab-i panjāna*, f. 120a). For the name Basar, see Pelliot, *Horde d'Or*, 72. I thank Dr. P. Jackson for the reproduction of Basar's name.
107. Waṣṣāf, 75 / Ayātī, 43; Rashīd/°Alizādah, 133-35; Mlrkhwand, V, 308; *Mu'izz al-ansāb*, f. 36a.
108. Rashīd/°Alizādah, 135-37; Rashīd/Bloch, 192 / Rashīd/Boyle, 153.
109. Waṣṣāf, 76 / Ayatl, 44; MTrkhwand, V, 309; *Shajarat al-Atrāk*, f. 111b also attested that Baraq was poisoned by Qaidu.
110. QarshT, 138.
111. *Ibid.*; Mlrkhwand, V, 130.
112. Mlrkhwand, V, 309.
113. Qarshī, 139-40.
114. E.A. Davidovitch, "Denezhnoekhoziaistvo i chastichnoe vosstanovlenie torgvli v Srednei Azii posle mongolskogo nashestvia," *Norody Azii i Afriki*, 6 (1970), 66-67. See Chapter IV, section 3.
115. Rashīd/Bloch, 192 / Rashīd/Boyle, 153. Nothing is known of such a grandson of Ögödei. Rashīd might have referred to Chabat, Güyüg's grandson, who was sent by Qaidu to accompany Baraq. It should, however, be noted that according to Rashīd/Bloch, 230 / Rashīd/Boyle, 175 Chabat fell ill and died of fear after the battle of Herat. This prince is not mentioned in the *Yuan shi*. It should also be noted that the descendants of Köten, son of Ögödei, did not support Qaidu. Rashīd/Bloch, 6 / Rashīd/Boyle, 21.
116. Rashīd/°Alizādah, 138.
117. He was sent to command the Negudarid section of the Qara'unas in the Ghazna region. (Rashīd/Bloch, 230 / Rashīd/Boyle, 175). On the Qara'unas see Chapter II, section 2, note 187.
118. Waṣṣāf, 77 / Ayatl, 45; Mlrkhwand, V, 311-12.
119. *Ibid.*
120. *Ibid.*
121. J.A. Montgomery (tr.), *The History of Yabballah 3rd* (New York, 1966), 35; E.A.W. Budge (tr.), *The Monks of Khubilai Khan* (London, 1928), 59.
122. YS, 12/249, 252; Rashīd/Bloch, 433, 539 / Rashīd/Boyle, 265, 299-300 indicates that they went over to the Qa'an's side. Marco Polo (*Polo*, IV, 459) describes a great battle between Qaidu and the "Qa'an's barons" Chibai and Chiban, identified as the sons of Alghu, Chübei and Qaban, although he dates it 1266. According to Polo, Qaidu scored a crushing victory, but the princes escaped thanks to their good horses. There may be an echo here of Qaidu's response to their actions. See also Pelliot, Po/o, I, 263, and Chapter II below.
123. QarshT, 138-39; MTrkhwand, V, 310. According to both authors he ruled for one year. According to Rashīd/Bloch, 193 / Rashīd/Boyle, 154, Negübei reigned for three years. This version is reinforced by the YS, 8/152 which describes an encounter, dated early 1274, between

Qubilai's forces and the "rebel vassal" (*fan chen*) Niegubai, identified as Negübei. It is possible that Negübei was expelled after his revolt, and that he reigned for one year only, but found his death later, circa 1274. Mu'izz al-ansāb's dating for Negübei's death (by the hands of Baraq's emissaries!) - 669/1268 is inconceivable with the information of the other sources. However, his testimony that soon after Baraq was defeated by Abaqa Negiibeï deserted him and went to Turkestan (to join Qaidu?), a fact attested also by Rashīd al-Dīn, might explain why Qaidu chose Negiibeï to be the new Chaghadaid Khan. (*Mu'izz al-ansāb*, f.36a; Rashīd/Alizādah, 133-35).

124. Qarshī, 138-39; Rashīd/Bloch, 193 / Rashīd/Boyle, 154.
125. Qarshī, 139. In accordance with Rashīd al-Dīn (Rashīd/Bloch, 193 / Rashīd/Boyle, 154), according to whom Negiibeï reigned for three years and Buqa Temür fell ill and died, d'Ohsson and others concluded that Du'a was enthroned in 1274. (See e.g. d'Ohsson, III, 451; Grousset, 316.) Through Rashīd al-Dīn this version was also accepted in late-Qing Chinese studies (e.g., Tu Ji, 74/7B; XYS, 110/511).
126. On the combined activity of Qaidu and Du'a see the following chapters.
127. YS, 127/3113, 193/4384; Rashīd/Boyle, 266-67. See a detailed discussion of the subject in Chapter II, section 1.
128. Cf. Muraoka, 192. (He was not aware of Qaidu's enthronement in 1271.)
129. See Chapter II, section 2.
130. Wassaf, 67 / AyatT, 38; Mufaḍḍal, 631-32.
131. On the raids into India see Chapter III, note 36. On the changes in the southern border, see Chapter II, section 1.
132. Rashīd/Alizādah I, 91. On the White Horde see T. Th. Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 5 (1987), *Passim*. See Chapter II, section 3.
133. Qarshī, 150-51.
134. See e.g. Qāshānī, 33; Wassaf, 451 / AyatT, 266.
135. Wassaf, 67 / Ayatī, 38; YS, 134/3248. See Chapter IV, section 1.
136. Rashīd/Bloch, 9 / Rashīd/Boyle, 23, 27.
137. Wassaf, 66 / Ayatī, 38. Cited in D.O. Morgan, "The Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khan and the law of the Ilkhānate," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African studies*, 49 (1986), 170.
138. Jackson, "Dissolution", 203; Waṣṣāf/Ayatī, *loc.cit.*; "Umarī, 2; and see Introduction.
139. Qarshī, 136, and see p. 19.
140. See Chapter II, section 1. Qaidu could explain his supremacy over the Chaghadaids also by Berke's promise to accord him the leadership of the Chaghadaid *ulus* if he subdued Alghu, and Qaidu subdued Alghu's successor, Baraq. However, the Chaghadaid resistance to Qaidu's rule proves that it was the military force and not any ideological claims that brought the Chaghadaids ultimately to accept Qaidu's supremacy.
141. Wassaf, 50-51 / Ayatī, 27-28.
142. Qāshānī, 235-36 (who maintains that Qaidu's claim was justified).

Chapter II: Qaidu and the Mongol *uluses*

1. These events are dealt with in Chapter I.
2. Mirkhwānd, V, 204.
3. YS, 203/4537.
4. *Daoyuan*, 23/389; YS, 128/3132.
5. YS, 12/265; Tu Ji, 74/8B; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 795; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 107. On Nomuqan see Tu Ji, 76/8a-9b.
6. YS, 6/111. The "north of the desert" is roughly equivalent to the modern state of Outer Mongolia and borders on the Altai mountains. Zang Lihe (ed.), *Zhongguo gujin di ming da cidian* (Hong Kong, 1982), p. 101.
7. Chen Dezhi, "Yuan Lingbei xingsheng jianzhi kao - zhong", *Yuanshiji beifang minzu shi yanjiujikan*, 11 (1987), 5. (Hereafter, Chen II). See there also for details of the steps taken by Qubilai. See also Rashīd/Boyle, 311-12.
8. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 135-36; Liu, "Relationship," 62; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 108. Rossabi maintains that Nomuqan was appointed also over the force that set out to the south of the Tarim basin, whereas Liu and Dardess think that these were two separate forces.
9. YS, 7/136; Liu, "Relationship," 62; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 135-36. On Hexi see chapter 1, note 3.
10. Liu, "Relationship," 62.
11. YS, 8/153; Liu, "Relationship," 63; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 136. On the Mongol post, see e.g., Morgan, *The Mongols*, 103-8, and for further details P. Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter den mongolen Herrschaftim 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, (Wiesbaden, 1954).
12. YS, 8/154; Liu, "Relationship," 63; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 136.
13. YS, 9/177, 132/3210-11, 162/3797; Montgomery, 35-36; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 64-65, 207, 416, 423.
14. XYS, 111/513.
15. YS, 6/118.
16. YS, 7/130, 7/144, 8/147, 8/157, 8/164, 9/185; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 795-96; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 108.
17. YS, 8/152; Tu Ji, 76/8b; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 795-96; Liu, "Relationship," 62; Cf. Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 108. On Negiibeï and the different reports on his death, see also Chapter I, notes 123, 125. It is of course possible that the Chinese transcription refers to another rebel.
18. YS, 117/2908.
19. *Polo*, II, 460-62; Nuwayrī, XXVII, 354-55. Both authors seem to have confused these with the battles waged in order to suppress the princes' revolt that began in 1276. On this revolt see later in the chapter. Yule's assertion that *Polo* is referring to a battle waged by Qaidu and Shiregi against Bayan is untenable since Qaidu never fought alongside Shiregi. See below.
20. YS, 8/160; Wei Su, *Wei Taiyu wen xu ji*, rpt. in Wang Deyi (comp.), *Yuan ren wenji zhen ben ben cong kan* (Taipei, 1985), VIII, 7/16a; Pelliot,

- Polo*, I, 128; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 108. On the *paiza* see e.g. *Polo*, I, 14-15. It is unclear when Qaidu had received those tablets in the first place.
21. YS, 203/4537; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 796; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 108. On An Tong, the descendant of the famous Mongol general Muqali, see I. De Rachelwiltz, "Muqali, Bol, Tas and Antung," *POFEH*, 15 (1977), 56-58 and references there. (Rpt. in *idem* et al. (eds.), *In the Service of the Khan* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 3-12.)
 22. YS, 134/3246-47.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. For discussion of the different dates appearing in the *Yuan shi* for the princes' rebellion, see e.g. Tu Ji, 74/8a; Liu, "Relationship," 62.
 25. Rashid/Bloch, 438 / Rashid/Boyle, 266.
 26. YS, 203/4537.
 27. See Chapter I, notes 80, 81.
 28. Rashid/Bloch, 203, 438, 596-97 / Rashid/Boyle, 160, 266, 323.
 29. YS, 12/239, 153/3619, 203/4537. See also *Qinzhai ji*, 3/14b.
 30. Wassaf, 67 / Ayāri, 38.
 31. YS, 9/191, 12/239; Yelu Zhu, *Shuangxizuiyin ji* (Si qu quan shu ed.), 2/3b; Rashid/Bloch, 438-39 / Rashid/Boyle, 267.
 32. Tu Ji, 74/7b; Zhou, 158; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 796.
 33. Wassaf, 76, and see Chapter I.
 34. Rashid/Bloch, 439-44 / Rashid/Boyle, 267-68.
 35. On the princes' rebellion, see e.g., Tu Ji 74/8b-10a; Zhou, 155-59; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 113-14. Grousset's indication (Crousset, 292) that Qaidu attacked Qara Qorum is due to a confusion between the princes' action and Qaidu's.
 36. YS, 153/3619, which says that An Tong served as a minister of Qaidu.
 37. YS, 128/3129.
 38. On the conquest of the Southern Song by Qubilai, see e.g., Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 77-95; Zhou, 111-25.
 39. YS, 12/249, 252; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 263. See also Rashid/Bloch, 176, 433, 539 / Rashid/Boyle, 144, 265, 300.
 40. See Chapter I.
 41. Rashid/Bloch, 444, 606; Rashid/Boyle, 268, 327; YS, 128/3134; Wassaf, 510-11. It is interesting to note that Melik Temur does not appear in the *Yuan shi* as the son of Arigh Bb'ke, and his genealogy is known only from Persian sources. On this and on the different forms of *Yomuqur's name see Hambis, 107, 94-97.
 42. Rashid/Bloch, 574-80 / Rashid/Boyle, 313-14.
 43. On the senior status of Melik Temur with Qaidu and subsequently with Chapar his son see e.g. YS, 23/525, 127/3114; Qāshānī, 34, 37. See also Chapter III.
 44. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137; Liu, "Relationship," 70.
 45. YS, 63/1569.
 46. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137, 140.
 47. YS, 11/221, 232, 12/240, 244, 246, 248, 251, 63/1569, 165/3883; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 139; Liu, "Relationship," 70; Allsen, "Uighurs," 255.

48. YS, 63/1569; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 139; Liu, "Relationship," 70.
49. *Ibid.* On the military colonies, garrisons in which the soldiers engaged in agriculture in order to supply their own needs, see YS, chapter 100; Hsiao Ch'i-Ch'ing, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), 177, n. 77. For a picturesque description of the *tun tian*, see Wassaf, 67.
50. YS, 10/204, 89/2273; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137, 140; Liu, "Relationship," 70; Allsen, "Uighurs," 255. On this bureau see D.M. Farquhar, *The Government of China under Mongolian Rule - A Reference Guide* (Stuttgart, 1990), 242.
51. YS, 12/253, 63/1569; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137, 140; Allsen, "Uighurs," 255; Liu, "Relationship," 70. On this bureau see Farquhar, 411-12.
52. YS, 11/228, 230; 63/1569. The *duhufu* was the Uighur court of justice. Since its administrative authority was far greater than that of a court, it is thus translated as protectorate; see Farquhar, 245; Allsen, "Uighurs," 256, 275; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137, 140.
53. On the subordination of the Uighur society and economy to the Yuan rule see Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 140; Allsen, "Uighurs," 256; Liu, "Relationship," 71.
54. YS, 10/197, 99/2539, 2541; Hsiao, *Military*, 110, 112; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 138.
55. YS, 14/285; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 140; Liu, "Relationship," 73; and see map 2.
56. YS, 14/295, 299; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 140; Liu, "Relationship," 73.
57. Liu, "Relationship," 73.
58. YS, 15/314; Liu, "Relationship," 73.
59. See Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 137-38 for details of these steps.
60. *Yuan shu*, 43/5a; Tu Ji, 74/17a; XYS, 110/525. It is unclear where these appanages were or when Qaidu received them. On the appanages of the princes in the Yuan period, the *Wusi hu* ("the five silk farms") see H.F. Schurmann, *Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty* (Cambridge Mass, 1956), 90-91, 94; Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule*, 88 ff.
61. YS, 11/225; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 142, n. 94; Liu, "Relationship," 72.
62. YS, 166/3897; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 141.
63. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 141.
64. YS, 117/2908. *Yaqudu was the son of *Böchök, Tolui's son by a concubine. (Hambis, 107, 100-102).
65. YS, 122/3001. There and on the Gaochang inscription, from which this passage of the *Yuan shi* is taken (Daoyuan, 24/403), the date suggested for this battle and for the subsequent siege is the twelfth year of the *Zhi yuan* period - 1275. (See the translation of this passage in F.W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in memory of Prince Hindu," *HJAS*, 12 (1949), 50.) Moreover, this passage served as testimony to the beginning of a large-scale confrontation between Qaidu and Qubilai in 1275 (Howorth, I, 176; Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 128; *Polo*, II, 460-62), even

though Qaidu took no part in the battle and it is unlikely that Du'a and Buzma were already acting in conjunction with him in 1275.

As early as the Qing period (1644-1911) Chinese historians barely acknowledged a relation between this passage and 1275 (see Wei Yuan, *Yuanshixinbian* (Rpt. Yangzhou, 1990), 19/10; Tu Ji 74/8a): in 1275 Nomuqan's troops were still in Almalig and it is difficult to imagine that Du'a's troops could get round them, reach Qara Qocho which is much further east and lay siege to it for six months without any response from Nomuqan's forces. Moreover, the *Yuan shi* shows clearly that the princes who, according to Du'a's boasts to the Uighur governor, did not resist him (Ajiki and *Ayachi), were not stationed in Central Asia in the 1270s. These problems, and the mention of Ajiki's dismissal from the border command in 1285 and his replacement by Bayan (YS, 127/3113; F.W. Cleaves, "Biography of Bayan of the Barin in the Yuan Shih," *HJAS*, 19 (1958), 261), moved Tu Ji to assert that on the inscription, and subsequently in the *Yuan shi*, the twenty-second year of the *Zhi Yuan* (1285) was accidentally replaced by the twelfth year (1275).

It can be further noted that in 1275/6 the sons of Baraq and Alghu laid waste to Bukhara (Waṣṣāf, 76). There is a good chance that Du'a and Buzma participated in this raid, and it is difficult to imagine how in the same year they were able to lay siege for six months to Qara Qocho before going on to destroy Bukhara. The *Yuan Shi* mentions that in 1285 a certain Alan called Bodaer occupied Besh Baliq, and when his army was at (the unidentified) Yilahun chahaner he fought with Tuhe (Du'a) and Buzaoma (Buzma) and was successful (YS, 132/3206; Liu, "Relationship," 68). While Bodaer's success can be local or even refer to the Chaghadaids retreat, this reference certainly proves that Du'a and Buzma were in Uighuria in 1285.

Tu Ji's view was approved by Pelliot (*Polo I*, 128), and the former's approach is accepted in Chinese scholarship (see e.g. Han, *Yuan*, 272; Zhou, 155; cf. Liu's ambivalent reaction in "Relationship," 66-72). Although Liu dates the siege to 1275, he brings several arguments which reinforce Tu Ji's view, and did not solve the problems pointed by the latter. While the inscriptions indeed imply that there were two attacks on the Uighurs (perhaps one in 1275 and one in 1285 as Liu suggested), the siege was certainly the later incident.

On the other hand, the Japanese scholar Abe Takeo, an authority on the Uighurs, does not accept Tu Ji's qualifications. (He is the source for Allsen ("Uighurs", 254), who used only an English summary of Takeo's study.) Takeo maintains, without references, that the battle between Du'a and Ajiki (the battle in which Du'a boasts that the commanders did not resist him) was waged in 1270. (Abe Takeo, *Xi huihu guo shi de yanjiu* (Xinjiang, 1986), 106.) In addition to the fact that this does not solve the problems raised by Tu Ji, it is difficult to accept in view of the fact that in 1270 Baraq, Du'a's father, was fighting against Abaqa in Herat, and it is improbable that he could allocate any force, and particularly such a large force (estimated at 120,000) to a war on such a distant front. Takeo's determination that

the Uighurs went from Qara Qocho to Hami circa 1280 (and then it is strange that Du'a laid siege to the Uighur ruler in Qara Qocho in 1285, when the latter was supposed to be in Hami) is not as clear cut as Rossabi and Allsen asserted. While Takeo hesitates between 1283 and 1284, it is very possible that the transfer of the Uighur court occurred after 1285/6, perhaps precisely after the siege and Qaidu's and Du'a's attacks, as asserted, e.g., by Han and Zhou. (Abe Takeo, 92-94, 108; Han, *Yuan*, 272; Zhou, 155; Cf. Liu, "Relationship," 68).

66. Rashīd/Bloch, 536-37 / Rashīd/Boyle, 301-2. Rashīd al-Dīn dates this battle "at the end of Qubilai's life," which is closer to 1285 than to 1275; Liu, "Relationship," 70.
67. On this title of the Uighur ruler, which means in Turkish "holy luck," see Allsen, "Uighurs," 246 n. 15.
68. YS, 122/3001; Daoyuan, 24/403. In the Uighur text of the Gaochang inscription the siege is mentioned but undated (see Geng Shimin and James Hamilton, "L'inscription Ouigoure de la stèle commémorative des Iduq Qut de Qocho," *Turcica*, 13 (1981), 11-47; Kahar Barat and Liu Yingsheng, "Yiduhu Gaochang wang shixun bei Huigu bei wen zhi jiaokan yu yanjiu," *Yuan shi ji bei fang minzu shi yanjiujikan*, 8 (1984), 57-106). The siege is also mentioned, oncemore undated, is the inscription in the memory of prince Hindu (Cleaves, "1362," 32 (Chinese text), 86 (Mongolian text)).
69. YS, 154/3640, 165/3884; Allsen, "Uighurs", 255; Liu, "Relationship," 72; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 112.
70. YS, 14/292; Liu, "Relationship," 72.
71. Rashīd/Bloch, 530 / Rashīd/Boyle, 296-97. The event described occurred in the period of the minister Sang Ge, i.e. prior to 1291. On Sang Ge, see e.g. Cai Meibiao, *Zhongguo lishi da cidian*, Liao, Xia, Jin, *Yuan shi* (Shanghai, 1986), 423; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 192-94; H. Franke, "Sangha", in de Rachewiltz et al. (eds), *In the Service of the Khan* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 558-83. Even if the specific accusation is untrue, the very fact that Qubilai believed it can imply that Qaidu had harmed his revenues.
72. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 142 dealt with these reasons. He is quoted by Allsen, "Uighurs," 261. On the damage of Qaidu's revolt to the Yuan revenues, see also H. Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der mongolen Herrschaft* (Leipzig, 1949), 277-78.
73. YS, 15/316; Liu, "Relationship," 73.
74. YS, 100/2560; Liu, "Relationship," 73.
75. YS, 15/325; Liu, "Relationship," 73.
76. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 142.
77. Rashīd/Bloch, 502 / Rashīd/Boyle, 286. (Even though he is in fact referring to Temür's period, and see below.)
78. YS, 16/333; Rashīd/Bloch, 576 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314; Allsen, "Uighurs," 255.
79. On Tibet under the Mongols see T.V. Wylie, "The First Mongol Conquest of Tibet Reinterpreted," *HJAS*, 37 (1977), *passim*; H. Franke, "Tibetans in Yuan China," in J.L. Langlois (ed.), *China under Mongol*

- Rule (Princeton, 1981), *passim*; L. Petech, "Tibetan Relations with Sung China and with the Mongols," in M. Rossabi (ed.), *China among Equals* (Berkeley, 1983), *passim*; Wang Puren et al. (eds.), *Meng-Zang minzu guanxi shilue* (Beijing, 1985); L. Petech, *Central Tibet and the Mongols* (Rome, 1990), *passim*. On Phags Pa and the script called after him, see e.g. Franke, "Tibetans," 305-11; Han, *Encyclopedia*, 5-6; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 40-42, 143-46, 155-60, 221-22; L. Petech, "Phags Pa," in I. de Rachewiltz et al. (eds.), *In the Service of the Khan* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 646-54.
80. Petech, "Relations," 189; idem, *Central Tibet*, 26-31.
81. *Ibid.*; Wylie, 131-32; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 222; Wang Puren et al. maintain that the reference is probably to a prince hostile to Qubilai, such as Qaidu, but does not take a categorical stance (p. 34): I tend to accept this view. I have been unable to identify a Mongol prince with a name similar to that of Rin Chen.
82. Petech, "Relations," 189-90; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 222.
83. Wylie, 132; Petech, "Relations," 180-82. See also Chapter I, note 115.
84. Petech, *Central Tibet*, 21-22, 25.
85. Rashid/Bloch, 500 / Rashid/Boyle, 286.
86. Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 223; see the same argument in Zhou, 160-61.
87. Zhou, 154, 160; Chen II, 11-12; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 53.
88. On these changes see YS, 14/290, 59/1395, 91/2306; Farquhar, 391-92; Zhou, 161; Yao Dali, "Nayan zhi luan za kao", *Yuan shi ji beifang minzu shi yanjiu jikan*, 7 (1983), 75. Yao also suggests that the revolt had a religious nuance, since Nayan was a Nestorian Christian. However, Qubilai's religious tolerance, exemplified in the fact that he did not impute Nayan's crime to all Christians (Rashid/Boyle, 286), makes this factor marginal at most.
89. *Polo*, II, 333.
90. Rashid/Bloch, 533-34; Rashid/Boyle, 298.
91. *Polo*, *loc. cit.*; see also Rashid/Bloch/Boyle, *loc. cit.*
92. Hambis, 107, 92; Zhou, *loc. cit.*; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 222-23.
93. YS, 14/298, 299; Rashid/Bloch *loc. cit.* / Rashid/Boyle, *loc. cit.*; *Polo*, II, 333-48 where there is also a detailed description of Nayan's execution; Pelliot, *Polo*, II, 789; Yao, 74; Zhou, 161; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 223-24.
94. Rashid/Bloch, 534-35 / Rashid/Boyle, 298; Chen II, 13. (Chen assumes that the fate of the *ulus* of Nayan and his allies was analogous to the destroying of the Ogödeid *ulus* by Möngke - see Introduction.)
95. On the battles with the remnants of Nayan's faction, see e.g. YS, 15/320, 323, 16/333, 339, 345, 352, 353.
96. YS, 15/308, 313, 315, 316, 317, 162/3798, 131/3195. The increase in Qaidu's activities at this time is attested to by the fact that Shao Yuanping and Chen Bangzhan maintain that Qaidu's revolt commenced only after Nayan's revolt. Shao Yuanping, *Yuan shi leibian* (Rpt. Taipei, 1968), 30/10; Chen Bangzhan, *Yuan shi jishi benmo* (Rpt. Beijing, 1979), 2/8 (hereafter YSJSBM).
97. Rashid/Alizadah, 207. See section II.
98. YS, 15/323.
99. YS, 128/3134, 169/3974-75; Su Tianjue, *Yuan chao ming chen shilue* (Rpt. Beijing, 1962), 3/8a (hereafter, *ming chen*); *Daoyuan*, 23/390; YYS, 110/523.
100. YS, 15/325, 128/3134; *Ming chen*, 3/8a; *Daoyuan*, 23/391; *Jingxuan ji*, 3/19b; Tu Ji 74/12a; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 224. See also Yao Sui, *Muan ji*, (Sibu Congkan ed.), 12/10a.
101. On Bayan see F.W. Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan of the Barin in the *Yuan shi*," *HJAS*, 19 (1958), *passim*; Cai, 224; C.C. Hsiao, "Bayan", in I. de Rachewiltz et al., eds. *In the Service of the Khan* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 584-607 and the references there.
102. YS, 117/2908-9; Chen II, 15.
103. YS 127/3114; Cleaves, "Bayan," 267-68.
104. YS, 128/3134; *Ming chen*, 3/8a; *Daoyuan*, 23/391; *Jingxuan ji*, 3/19b.
105. YS 127/3115; Cleaves, "Bayan," 269-70; *Ming chen*, 2/7a-8b; Yuan Mingshan, *Qinghe ji* (Ouxiang shiling ed., 17-18), 2/12b-13a. (See also Chapter IV, section 1.)
106. YS, 128/3134; *Ming chen*, 3/8b-9a; *Daoyuan*, 23/391; *Jingxuan ji*, 19b.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 151.
109. The Alans dwelt originally in the area of northern Iran and modern Georgia. In Mongke's time they were invaded by the Mongols and some of them were transferred in 1256 to the east, where they participated in Mongke's campaigns to conquer China. Qubilai employed them during the conquest of the Song, and they continued to be part of the Qa'an's army in the time of Temür. (Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 16, 25; Cai, 389; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 200, 208.)
110. YS, 18/389.
111. *Muan ji*, 12/10a.
112. YS, 128/3135; *Ming chen*, 3/8b-9a.
113. For Nauruz and his rebellion see section 2.
114. Chen Dezhi, "Yuan lingbei xingsheng jianzhi kao - Xia," *Yuan shi ji beifang minzu shi yanjiu jikan*, 12-13 (1990), 2 (hereafter Chen III). On Qubilai's campaigns towards Japan and southeast Asia, see Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 206-20. For reasons of convenience and in order to avoid confusion with the Ilkhan Oljeitu, I will not use Temur's full name (Temir Öljeitu), but only the name Temir.
115. Rashid/Bloch, 500 / Rashid/Boyle, 285. The passage appears in the section devoted to Qubilai, yet the description of the border commanders (see below) and comparison of their biographies in the *Yuan shi* makes it clear that it actually refers to Temur's period.
116. Kammala was Temur's brother of both mother and father (Rashid/Bloch, 500), and Boyle's translation (Rashid/Boyle, 298) according to which Kammala was the great uncle of the Qa'an on the father's side is therefore wrong. The location of the battles between Qaidu and the Qa'an in the next few years places in doubt the supposition that Kammala's control reached to Qayaliq (Rashid/Bloch/Boyle, *loc. cit.*).
117. Rashid/Bloch, 500-2, 593, 604-5, 609 / Rashid/Boyle, 285-86, 322, 323-25, 328; Hsiao, *Military*, 58-59; Chen III, 1-2. On the border commanders see Tu Ji, 97/1, 76/5, 13, 116/5.

118. YS, 18/380, 381; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire", 142; Liu, "Relationship," 75; Liu Yingsheng, "Yuan dai Quxian Talin kao," *Zhongya xuekan*, 1 (1984), 243-52.
119. YS, 19/412, 413; Liu, "Relationship," 75.
120. Qāshānī, 34; Allsen, "Uighurs," 259; Liu, "Relationship," 76.
121. YS, 128/3135; *Ming chen*, 3/9a; *Daoyuan* 23/391; *Jingxuan ji*, 3/19b. From Rashid al-Dīn (Rashid/Bloch, 606 ff. / Rashid/Boyle, 328), it can be understood that these princes returned to the Qa'an only in 1298 or later. The fact that they are mentioned in the *Yuan shi* in 1296 and 1297 makes it clear that they returned earlier. (Liu, "Relationship," 77). On *Durdoka see Rashid/Alizadah I, 218-19.
122. Rashid/Bloch, 607 / Rashid/Boyle, 328; *Jingxuan ji*, 3/19b; Chen III, 2.
123. YS, 19/408, 410, 411, 414, 420, 166/3909.
124. YS, 118/2925, 128/3135, 132/3209; Su Tianjue, comp. *Yuan wen lei* (rpt. Shanghai, 1936), 23/13a (hereafter YWL); *Daoyuan*, 23/391-92. On Qaidu's general named Balin, who apparently was the head of the forces in the Barin regions, see Pelliot and Hambis, 299-303; Chen III, 3.
125. Rashid/Bloch, 611-12 / Rashid/Boyle, 329. There is no mention of this coalition in the YS. Chen, III, 3. Badakhshan is a mountainous region in the border of modern Afghanistan and Tajikistan, on the upper reaches of the Oxus. Its indigenous rulers retained their hold of the region during the Mongol conquests. On Badakhshan see Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge, 1953), 435-38.
126. YS, 118/2925; YWL, 23/13a.
127. Rashid/Bloch, 605 / Rashid/Boyle, 326; Mirkhwand, V, 215.
128. *Ibid.*; YS, *loc.cit.*; YWL, *loc.cit.*
129. YS, 128/3136; *Daoyuan*, 23/392; Rashid/Bloch, 610 / Rashid/Boyle, 328; Chen III, 4.
130. YS, 118/2925.
131. Rashid/Bloch, 610 / Rashid/Boyle, 328.
132. YS, 118/2925; YWL, 23/13a.
133. Rashid/Bloch, 609 / Rashid/Boyle, 328; Mirkhwand, V, 215.
134. YS, 22/477.
135. YS, 119/2950; on Temür's preparations see also *Qinghe ji*, 2/12b; Mirkhwand, V, 216.
136. Rashid/Bloch, 611-12 / Rashid/Boyle, 329; cf. Liu, "Relationship," 78-79; Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," 23-24.
137. YS, 119/2950; Mirkhwand, V, 216; Wassaf, 450 / Ayati, 265; Rashid/Bloch, 612 / Rashid/Boyle, 329.
138. XYS, 110/511; Grousset, 329.
139. YS, 22/478; *Muan ji*, 26/4a, 4b.
140. YS, 22/478, 119/2950; *Qingheji*, 2/12b.
141. YS, 128/3136; *Daoyuan*, 23/392; Chen III, 5.
142. Mirkhwand, V, 216.
143. Waṣṣāf, 450 / Ayati, 265.
144. YS, 22/478; Ma Zuchang, *Ma Shitian wenji*, Rpt. in Wang Deyi, *Yuan ren wen ji zhen ben cong kan* (Taipei, 1985), IV, 14/4a; Rashid/Bloch, 9 / Rashid/Boyle, 24.

145. YS, 22/478, 128/3136; *Daoyuan*, 23/392; *Ma Shitian*, 14/4a; Rashid/Boyle, 27. (This passage does not appear in Blochet's edition.) This data on the locality of the battle, and later testimonies on domains held by Du'a and Qaidu's sons, make it impossible to accept Waṣṣāf's assertion (450), that the battle between Qaidu and Qaishan's forces was fought in the Qayaliq region, which is far more to the west.
146. Mirkhwand, V, 216; Wassaf, 450/Ayati, 265; YS, 21/451, 131/3185, 139/3335, 138/3321. For estimates of the size of the Yuan garrisons see chapter IV, section 1.
147. YS, 22/478; Mirkhwand, V, 216.
148. *Ibid.*
149. *Ibid.*; Rashid/Boyle, 27 n. 74. On *Qara Qada and a general discussion of the locality of the battle, see Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 128.
150. YS, 119/2951; *Qingheji*, 2/12b. See also *Muanji*, 26/4a.
151. YS, 118/2923, 128/3136; *Daoyuan*, 23/392; Mirkhwand, V, 216; Rashid/Boyle, 24, 188, 329.
152. YS, 132/3210.
153. YS, 22/477. See also Liu, "Relationship," 79; Chen III, 6, both of whom agree that also according to the *Yuan shi* Qaidu was victorious in the battle.
154. Waṣṣāf, 450 / Ayati, 265; Mirkhwand, V, 217. See also Su Tianjue, *Zixi wen gao* (Shiyuan Congshu ed.), 11/9a, where it is said that the pacification office in Mongolia set fire to the granaries upon hearing of Qaidu's approach.
155. Rashid/Bloch, 9 / Rashid/Boyle, 24; Rashid/Alizadah, 356.
156. YS, 21/451. See also *Daoyuan*, 23/392. Also, e.g., d'Ohsson, III, 516; Grousset, 329.
157. On the different dates for Qaidu's death and on the suing for peace, see Chapter III.
158. See Chapter I, p. 23.
159. Wassaf, 50-51 / Ayati, 27-28.
160. Waṣṣāf, 66 / Ayati, 37.
161. YS, 9/177.
162. *Polo*, II, 463; YS, 153/3619.
163. L. Olschki, *Marco Polo's Asia* (Berkeley, 1960), 46; Liu, "Relationship," 76.
164. Rashid/Bloch, 7-8 / Rashid/Boyle, 24; YS/SBM 2/7; Wei Yuan, 19/6, etc.
165. Her'um, "La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient," in *Recueil des Historiens des Crusades, Historiens Armeniens*, II, 214; Qarshi, 138; Waṣṣāf, 66.
166. The clearest example of this is YS/SBM 2/7-9; cf. Tu Ji 74/17a.
167. Mirkhwand, V, 204, 216; Wassaf, 66; Qarshi, 138; *Shajarat al-atrāk*, f.74a. Rashid al-Dīn does not refer specifically to this issue (perhaps not wanting to admit that Qaidu was victorious).
168. See D. Sinor, "On Mongol Strategy," in Ch'en Chieh-hsien (ed.), *Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference* (Tainan, 1975), 240.

169. Shao, 30/10; *Yuan shu*, 42/3B; Wassaf, 66 / AyatI, 37; Liu Yingsheng, "Yuan chu chaoting yu xibei zhuwang guanxi kaolue," *Zhongguo minzu shi yanjiu*, 1987, 133 (hereafter: Liu, "Princes").
170. *Polo*, II, 457.
171. *YS*, 3/45. See also Chapter I.
172. See T.J. Barfield, *The Perilous frontier* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 219.
173. Zhou, 156.
174. Chen III, 18. See also J.D. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians* (New York, 1963), chapter 1.
175. Rashīd/Alizādah, 557; *YS*, 119/2951.
176. For a discussion of trade with China in the time of Qaidu see Chapter IV, section 3-
177. Rashīd/Bloch, 8 / Rashīd/Boyle, 23.
178. On these events see Chapter I.
179. Rashīd/Alizādah, 207.
180. *Op.cit.*, 208.
181. On Nauruz, see e.g. Boyle, *The Ilkhans*, 377-78, 382; on Boqa and Arghun Aqa see their entries in the *Encyclopedia Iranica*, both written by P. Jackson.
182. Wassaf, 313 / AyatI, 190; *Kingshu was the son of Jumqur, Abaqa's brother who was among the princes who joined Boqa's rebellion. (Hambis, 107, 94; Wassaf, 234 / AyatI, 140).
183. Wassaf, 313 / AyatI, 190.
184. Rashīd/Alizādah, 268.
185. Wassaf, 313 / AyatI, 190; Rashīd/Alizādah, 268.
186. Rashīd/Bloch, 6-11 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25; Qāshānī, 54; Barthold, *Four Studies*, 1, 126.
187. On the Qara'unas, which had originated as the garrison (*tamma*) troops sent to Qunduz and Baghlān early in the thirteenth century see Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 183-204; J. Aubin, "L'Ethnogenese des Qaraunas," *Turcica*, 1 (1969), *passim*; H. Shimo, "The Qaraunas in the Historical Materials of the Ilkhanate," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 35 (1977), *passim*; Jackson, "Dissolution," 242 ff; B. Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge, 1989), 25-27 and 179, n.19, 159-60. I follow Jackson's assertion that the Qara'unas surrendered to the Chaghadaids only in the last 1290s. On Nauruz as the commander of the Qara'unas see Waṣṣāf, 253, 314 / AyatI, 152, 191; P. Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," *ÉIR*, V (1992), 345.
188. Wassaf, 314 / AyatI, 191; Rashīd/Alizādah, 268.
189. On the Ilkhans after Arghun's death, see Boyle, "Ilkhans," 372-379.
190. Waṣṣāf, 314 / AyatI, 192.
191. *Ibid*; Mirkhwānd, V, 103.
192. Rashīd/Bloch, 14 / Rashīd/Boyle, 28.
193. Rashīd/Alizādah, 273; Qasham, 18, 54.
194. Harawī, 402; Rashīd/Bloch, 171 / Rashīd/Boyle, 141; Rashīd/Alizādah, 302, Harawī maintains that Du'a was able to stay in Māzandarān since Ghazan and his followers were engaged in the conquest of the *Shām* (greater Syria) and *Rūm* (Anatolia). I have found no evidence that the Ilkhanid troops campaigned in these areas in 1295,

- and Harawl might have confused the events of this year with Ghazan's incursion in 1300.
195. Harawl, 407-18.
196. *Op.cit.*, 417-21.
197. Rashīd/Alizādah, 302-8; B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran* (Berlin, 1968), 93-96. In 1297, Nauruz found himself again in conflict with Ghazan. Yet, he knew that he could not turn to Qaidu, because of his former betrayal. His brothers, however, found refuge in Du'a's army. Wassaf, 342 / AyatI, 206-7.
198. Waṣṣāf, 367-71 / AyatI, 218-21; Rashīd/Alizādah, 152; Aubin, 84; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345.
199. Wassaf, 367 / AyatI, 218; Rashīd/Alizādah, *loc.cit*; Aubin, *loc.cit*; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345.
200. Qasham, 193, 201.
201. Waṣṣāf, 370-71 / AyatI, 220-21.
202. Rashīd/Alizādah, 356.
203. Qasham, 18-19; Rashīd/Bloch, 12 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25-26; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345.
204. Qasham, 34; cf. Spuler, *Iran*, 107.
205. Qasham, 54; Het'um, 214; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345.
206. Qasham, 54; Wassaf 511 / AyatI, 287-88.
207. Rashīd/Bloch, 12 / Rashīd/Boyle, 26. On Qutulun see introduction, p. 2; also Chapter III.
208. On these incursions see, e.g. Boyle, "Ilkhans," 405; K. Kato, "Kebek and Yasawr - The Establishment of the Chaghatai Khanate," *Memoires of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, 49 (1991), 97-118, especially 106-11. On the persistent nature of Central Asian forays into Khurāsān see 'Umārī, 39-40.
209. See Qasham, 34, where Du'a declares himself ruler of Turkestan and Khurasan.
210. Th.T. Allsen, "Changing Forms of Legitimation in Mongol Iran," in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe* (Los Angeles, 1991), 232-236; *YS*, 29/643, 645, 646, 651, 661, 662, 30/667, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 677, 678, etc.
211. Allsen, "Legitimation," 235.
212. Amitai-Preiss, "PhD," I, 188-89; idem, *Mongols*, 88.
213. Het'um, 215; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345; R. Amitai, "From Holy War to Reconciliation," (MA thesis, Hebrew University, 1984) 30-31; on the battle of Wādī Khaznadār, see Amitai, 24-32; See also D.O. Morgan, "The Mongols in Syria 1260-1300," in P.W. Edbury (ed), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), *passim* for another opinion on the Ilkhans' failure to conquer Syria.
214. Boyle, "Ilkhans," 393. See also Amitai, 37-40.
215. Boyle, "Ilkhans," 399; For the text of the letter in translation, see A. Mostaert and F.W. Cleaves, *Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des Ilkhan Arghun et Oljeitua Philippe le Bel* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 55-88. See also Chapter III, pp. 71-72 and further references there.
216. Mufaḍḍal, 631-32; B. Spuler, *Die goldene Horde* (Wiesbaden, 1965), 54. The aforesaid letter is dated 680/1280-81, after the deaths of

- Baybars and Möngke Temür, and it is difficult to determine the exact date on which it was written or delivered.
217. Ibn al-Furāt, VIII, 1; Baybars, 124a, 146a.
 218. Mufaddal, 631-32; Nuwayrī, XXVII, 376-78.
 219. Nuwayrī, XXVII, 354-55. See also Rashīd/Alizādah I, 150, that mentions slaves (*ghulāms*) that were brought (to Iran?) from the *uluses* of Qaidu and the Qa'an.
 220. 'Umārī, 41.
 221. On these matters see Chapter I and the references there.
 222. Rashīd/Bloch, 206, 438, 596-97 / Rashīd/Boyle, 160, 266, 323, and see section 1.
 223. Waṣṣāf 67 / AyatT, 38.
 224. Rashīd/Bloch, 439, 441 / Rashīd/Boyle, 267, 268.
 225. Spuler, *Die goldene Horde*, 54. On the "peace" between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans see Chapter I, note 74.
 226. On Noqai and on the dual rule in the Golden Horde see, e.g., G. Vernadsky, *The Mongols in Russia* (New Haven, 1953), 174 ff; Spuler, *Die goldene Horde*, 64-76.
 227. Rashīd/Bloch, 444 / Rashīd/Boyle, 268.
 228. Qarshī, 151-52. See also Chapter IV, section 3.
 229. Waṣṣāf, 67/Ayātī, 38; Rashīd/Bloch 206 / Rashīd/Boyle, 160. Rashīd and Waṣṣāf may be referring to the steps taken by the White Horde after returning Nomuqan, about which see below.
 230. YS, 117/2909.
 231. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-97 / Rashīd/Boyle, 102-3.
 232. Vernadsky, 188.
 233. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-97 / Rashīd/Boyle, 100 (n. 13), 102; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 127. On the White Horde see Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," *passim*.
 234. Rashīd/Bloch, 439 / Rashīd/Boyle, 266.
 235. Rashīd/Bloch, 444 / Rashīd/Boyle, 268.
 236. YS, 15/307,320; Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," 21.
 237. Rashīd/Bloch, 94 / Rashīd/Boyle, 101; Allsen, "Princes of the Left hand," 21. Allsen (*loc. cit.*) claims that in 1293 an ambassador from Qonichi arrived at the Ilkhanid court requesting a formal alliance, but the reference he cites (Rashīd/Jahn, 86) does not confirm this.
 238. His name is reproduced that way by Boyle, yet Allsen restores it as Kūpālāk, (Mongolian, Köbelek) on the basis of the *Shu'ab-ipanigana-h*. (Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," 22.)
 239. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-98/ Rashīd/Boyle, 102-3.
 240. *Ibid.* Rashīd/Bloch, 538-39 / Rashīd/Boyle, 300 mentions that Turkestan was ravaged by Bayan, yet it is hard to determine whether this happened during those fights or after Qaidu's death.
 241. Rashīd/Bloch, 611/ Rashīd/Boyle, 329. See section 1.
 242. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-98 / Rashīd/Boyle, 102-3; Cf. Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand", 22-23.
 243. Many different versions for the name *Yangichar appear in the sources. (For instance, Rashīd/Boyle 103 transcribes it to *Bayanchar, and on page 24 as *Yangichar, although he is obviously referring to the same

- person.) On *Yangichar and his brother Shah, see Chapter III and the references there.
244. Rashīd/Bloch, 10, 97-98 / Rashīd/Boyle, 24, 103.
 245. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-98/ Rashīd/Boyle, 102-3.
 246. Waṣṣāf, 475 notes that among the envoys who came to inform Öljeitu of the Mongol peace there were also envoys of *Qonchi and *Tarsu. This Qonchi is Qonichi, the head of the White Horde before Bayan (Waṣṣāf 454 / AyatT, 268). I was unable to identify Tarsu, (suspiciously looking like Deresü, a place in the border of the Qa'an and the Golden Horde [about which see Rashīd/Boyle, 103, n.25J, yet Waṣṣāf is certainly referring to a prince), but it seems that Waṣṣāf refers here to the contending sides within the Golden Horde, despite the fact that Bayan the son of Qonichi, and not Qonichi himself was then head of the Horde. Cf. Allsen, "Princes of the Left Hand," 24,
 247. Mostaert and Cleaves, 56; Vernadsky, 171-74; Boyle, "Ilkhans," 398-99.
 248. Waṣṣāf, 516 / Ayatī, 241; Qāshānī, 174.
 249. QashanT, 174-76. *Shajaratal-atrāk*, f. 102b gives a blurred version of Baba's activities, and claims that after returning to Öljeitu Baba's decedents settled in Jurjān.
 250. On the Golden Horde's influence in Transoxania and Central Asia before Qaidu's rise, see, e.g., Qarshī, 136; Waṣṣāf, 50-51; Rashīd/Bloch, 403 ff. / Rashīd/Boyle, 258; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 487; Jackson, "Dissolution," 207. See also the introduction of the book.

Chapter III: The Shift into the Chaghadaids: the Collapse of Qaidu's Kingdom after his death

1. Waṣṣāf, 450 / AyatT, 265; Mirkhwānd, V, 218; QashanT, 32. According to Rashīd al-Dīn (Rashīd/Bloch, 9, 173, 613 / Rashīd/Boyle, 24, 142, 329) Qaidu died of an injury sustained at the battle with the Qa'an (1301), but elsewhere Rashīd also indicates that Qaidu died of illness. (Rashīd/Boyle, 27, n. 74.)
2. Qarshī, 138.
3. Qāshānī, 32.
4. Mirkhwānd, V, 218.
5. Rashīd/Alizādah, 356.
6. Rashīd/Boyle, 27, n. 74.
7. YS, 22/478.
8. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 128. Cf. Liu Yingsheng, "Shiji Wokuotai hanguo monian ji shi buzhen," *Yuan shi ji beifangminzu shi yanjiu jikan*, 10 (1986), 49-50, (hereafter: Liu, "Reconsideration"); Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 345; Morgan, *Mongols*, 118. See also notes 76, 80, 87.
9. Qāshānī, 32.
10. Waṣṣāf, 450-51 / AyatT, 266.
11. QashanT, 32.
12. Qarshī, 138.

13. Wassaf, 452 / Ayātī, 266.
14. Wassaf, 451 / Ayātī, 266.
15. Qāshānī, 32-33.
16. Rashīd/Bloch, 9 / Rashīd/Boyle, 24.
17. Liu Yingsheng, "Yuandai Menggu zhuhan de yuehe ji Wokuotai hanguo de miwang," *Xinjiang daxuexuebao*, 1985, 32. (hereafter: Liu, "Peace Agreement").
18. Rashīd/Bloch, 5, 10 / Rashīd/Boyle, 20, 24-25.
19. Qāshānī, 32-33, 34; Rashīd/Bloch, 13 / Rashīd/Boyle, 27. On Qutulun, see introduction, p. 2; Chapter II, section 2.
20. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 128-29.
21. Qarshī, 139; Barthold, *Four Studies*, loc.cit.
22. See e.g., Qashani, 37, 38; Waṣṣāf, 517, 518 / Ayātī, 291, 292; YS, 119/2951.
23. Qāshānī, 33; YS, 119/2951; *Qinghe ji*, 2/13a; Liu, "Peace Agreement," 33-34.
24. Qashani, 33. The YS 21/454 also indicates that after Temür learned of the princes' wish for peace he contacted the prince of the pacification of the west, Ananda. Liu, "Peace Agreement," 34.
25. YS, 119/2951; *Qinghe ji*, 2/12b-13a. On *Yochicar see Tu Ji, 28/10 ff; on Ananda see Tu ji 76/5; see also Chapter II, section 1.
26. Qashani, 33-34. Qara Qorum of course did not originally belong to Ögödei's appanage, but to Tolui's; Ögödei, however, built his capital there. Du'a's proposal might have been an attempt to create dispute between Chapar and the Yuan.
27. Wassaf, 453. (Ayati, 266 indicates only that Chapar agreed to Du'a's wishes.)
28. YS, 21/454.
29. YS, 21/460.
30. YS, 128/3136-37; *Daoyuan*, 23/393; Liu, "Peace Agreement," 35. The date of 1305 is erroneous since the princes surrendered as early as 1303/4 according to both the *Yuan shi* chronicles and Muslim sources. Melik Temur occupied a key position in Chapar's camp, and perhaps this is why he appears in the *Yuan shi* in proximity to the two other princes.
31. Qāshānī, 31.
32. Wassaf, 475-77 / Ayātī, 277.
33. The English translation of the letter is given in B. Spuler, *History of the Mongols* (London, 1971), 142-43. For the Mongol source and an annotated French translation see Mostaert and Cleaves, 55-85. See also W. Kotwicz, "Les Mongols, promoteurs de l'idée de paix universelle au debut du XIII [sic] siecle," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 16 [1950], 428-34; Boyle, "Ilkhans," 399; Hsiao C.C. "Mid-Yuan politics," in H. Franke and D. Twitchett (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6* (Cambridge, 1994), 501-4.
34. See e.g. Pelliot, *Polo*, I, 128; Rashīd/Bloch, 98, 500, 524-25, 618 / Rashīd/Boyle, 103, 285, 298-99, 329; YS, 22/478, 117/2909, 118/2916, 119/2950, 122/3001, 132/3210, 135/3283.
35. See pp. 69-70.
36. On the forays into India see K.S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis, 1290-1320*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta, 1967), Ch. IX; A. Ahmad, "Mongol Pressure

- in alien land", *CAJ*, 6 (1961), 192-93. See also Rashīd/Alizādah, 152; Wassaf, 312 / Ayati, 182; Amīr Khusraw Dihlawī, *Khazā'in al-Futūh* ed. M. Waḥid Mirzā (Calcutta, 1967), 33-41. On the Qara'unas see Chapter II, section 2, note 187. Though Du'a's troops were the main threat to India, Qaidu's forces, probably those under his son Sarban, also took part in the invasions, as attested by Amīr Khusraw (op.cit., 33-36).
37. Mirkhwānd, V, 216.
38. YS, 128/3137; Waṣṣāf, 452-53 / Ayati, 267.
39. Waṣṣāf, 454 / Ayati, 268. See note 36.
40. Wassaf, 454/Ayātī, 268.
41. Waṣṣāf, 476 / Ayati, 277.
42. YS, 128/3137; *Daoyuan*, 23/393.
43. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-98 / Rashīd/Boyle, 102-3; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 129. See also Chapter II, section 3.
44. Liu, "Peace Agreement," 33.
45. Wassaf, 454, 476 / Ayati 268, 277.
46. See below. *Aqa*, elder brother in Mongolian, is used to denote the eldest and senior prince in an *ulus* or among the sons of the Chinggisid family.
47. See Chapter I and the references there.
48. Wassaf, 454 / Ayatī, 268.
49. This attitude towards the Qa'an is explicitly expressed, some ten years later in another arena, by the adviser of Özbeg, Khan of the Golden Horde (1313-41). This adviser counselled Özbeg not to engage in battle against the Qa'an, since he would achieve more by obeying him (Qashani, 146). In this context 'Umārī's perception of the Qa'an's authority may also be mentioned: according to 'Umārī (died 1349), the heads of the Mongolian states informed the Qa'an of important events in their kingdoms, but did not require his permission in these matters ('Umārī, 26). See also Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 130.
50. On the relations between China and Central Asia, see e.g. Barfield, 59-60. For more details see for instance J.K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).
51. YS, 21/460, 462, 463, 466, 468.
52. Liu, "Peace Agreement," 33.
53. Qashani, 33-34. The fact that Du'a presented himself to Chapar as the ruler of Turkestan and Khurasan although he had received no endorsement for rule of the latter region from the Qa'an, also attests to the opportunistic nature of his subjection to the Qa'an.
54. YS, 22/483, 496-97, 53/1383, 91/2307; Liu, "Reconsideration," 57; Chen III, 10-12. See also below.
55. See map 3. For discussion of the original 1330s map and its locations see Bretschneider, Vol. II.
56. Qāshānī, 34-35.
57. Qāshānī, 34.
58. Qāshānī, 36, 54-55; Waṣṣāf, 510-12 / Ayati, 286-88.
59. Qashani, 35-36; Waṣṣāf, 515-16 / Ayati, 290-91.
60. Qāshānī, 36-37, 209, 214; Waṣṣāf, 516-17, 519 / Ayati, 290-91, 294. According to Wassaf, Shah fled to *Yangichar, Qaidu's son who dwelt

- on the border with the White Horde and then surrendered to Toqto'a. However both Wassaf (519) and Qashani (209, 214) mention Shah subsequently as active in the ranks of the Chaghadaid army.
61. YS, 22/477.
 62. Qashani, 35 (where he mistakenly indicates that Du'a sent his brother Orus; the fact is, of course, that Chapar sent Orus), 38.
 63. Qashani, 38.
 64. YS, 22/477-78; Ma Zuchang, 14/4a; Qashani, 38; Wassaf, 517 / Ayati, 291-92.
 65. Wassaf/Ayati, *loc.cit.*
 66. Qashani, 38.
 67. Qashani, *loc. cit.*; Wassaf, 517 / Ayati, 292.
 68. YS, 22/478.
 69. Qashani, *loc.cit.*; Wassaf/Ayati, *loc.cit.*
 70. Qashani, 38-39 and it is difficult to accept his words on the size of the reinforcements sent by the Yuan to Du'a; YS, 22/478 indicates only that after Melik Temur's surrender Qashani seized the camp and the family of Chapar, while Chapar fled to Du'a.
 71. Qashani, 40; Wassaf, 518 / Ayati, 292; YS, 119/2951.
 72. YS, 118/2909.
 73. YS, 22/496-97. This number probably also includes a large part of the army. It should be noted that in a *Daoyuan* 23/393 the number of men who surrendered to the Yuan at the time of Chapar's and Melik Temur's surrender is estimated at over a million, but it is difficult to imagine that there were so many people living in Mongolia in the said period. Liu, "Reconsideration," 57; Chen III, 11.
 74. YS, 91/2307; 58/1383; 22/483.
 75. On Lingbei see Chen III, 10-12; Farquhar, 396-97 and see map 3.
 76. Qashani, 39-40. Qashani dates these events to 704 / 1304/5, but since according to his report the events described occurred after Temür Qa'an's death (early 1307) it is clear that his dates are incorrect. Among the heads of Qaidu's followers who were captured mention is also made of *Tudkur Oghul, who is probably identical to *Burkur who is mentioned in a similar context on page 38, but I have been unable to identify him.
 77. Qashani, 40; Wassaf, 518 / Ayati, 292. Unlike Qashani, Wassaf does not indicate explicitly that *Yangichar was enthroned, but merely notes that Du'a gave him Chapar's private lands. On the enthronement of *Yangichar, see also Liu, "Reconsideration," 54-55.
 78. Wassaf, 518/Ayati, 292; Qashani, 39, where the allocation of domains to Tügme appears only as a lure to bring him to Du'a's territory.
 79. Wassaf, 513 / Ayati, 288-89. (Although according to Qashani, Kürsebe, the chief prince among Qaidu's followers who fought at this time, had wished to go over to Du'a's house some years previously, and had been killed by the supporters of the house of Qaidu (Qashani, 35)).
 80. According to Wassaf, 518 / Ayati, 293 (late 706 a.h.). According to Qashani, the news of Du'a's death reached Oljeitu's court in late December 1306. Again, since according to Qashani's description Du'a's death clearly occurred after the death of Temür Qa'an (early 1307), his chronology is again mistaken.

81. Wassaf, 518-19 / Ayati, 293-94 (where Taliq is called Balighu); Qashani, 148; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 131-32.
82. Wassaf, 518 / Ayati, 293; Barthold, *Four Studies*, *loc.cit.*
83. Wassaf, 519 / Ayati, 294; Qashani, 148-49. Most surprisingly, Qashani estimates the troops of the house of Ogödei at that time at 30 *tumens*, a magnitude that seems exaggerated in relation to other estimates of the army of Qaidu-Chapar, and especially after they lost most of their force. (See Chapter IV, section 1.)
84. Qashani, 148-49.
85. YS, 119/2951.
86. YS, 22/502.
87. Qashani, 149. The date that he gives for these events, 1313/712, is inaccurate, since according to the *Yuan shi* Chapar surrendered in 1310.
88. YS, 119/2951.
89. Qashani, 149. This may have been accompanied by a ceding of Tügme's appanage, since the Emül remained in the possession of the Chaghadaids. See map 3.
90. Qashani, 41.
91. YS, 23/525.
92. Qashani, 149. The conditions of surrender to the Yuan were not modified, it emerges, from the 1260s until the early fourteenth century. They consisted of: 1) a cessation of fighting; 2) establishment of postal stations; 3) attending the court. (See Chapter II, section 1.)
93. YS, 23/525.
94. XYS, 110/525; Tu Ji, 74/16A-B.
95. YS, 25/570; Hambis, 107, 79-80. See Map 3.
96. Tu Ji, *loc.cit.*; Hambis, *loc.cit.*; and see there also the discussion of the family relationship between Chapar and his two successors.
97. *Ibid.*; on the struggle between Aragibag, the eight-years-old son of the Yuan emperor Yesün Temür (1324-28) and between Tugh Temür, Qaishan's second son, see Dardess, *Conquerors*, 31-52; Hsiao, "Mid-Yuan," 541-45.
98. YS, 27/600; Liu, "Reconsideration," 57.
99. YS, 27/610; Liu, "Reconsideration," 57. See Map 3.
100. Liu, "Reconsideration," 57.
101. Ratchnevsky, 280. On Temür Lang and his Chaghadaid and Ögöeid puppet rulers see Manz, *passim*.
102. Hsiao, *Military*, 56.
103. On Nayan's rebellion see Chapter III, section 1. On Tegüder's revolt see Chapter I, note 101.
104. See Chapter IV, section 1.

Chapter IV: The Mongol State of Central Asia: Internal Administration under Qaidu

1. YS, 134/3248; *Zixi wen gao*, 11/9a; Wassaf, 67 / Ayati, 37; Polo, II, 457; Het'um, 214; 'Umarī, 39 (where he speaks of the Transoxanian army in general).

2. Rashīd/Bloch, 8 / Rashīd/Boyle, 24.
3. Rashīd/Karīmī, 410-11.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Shajarat al-atrak*, f. 73b-74a.
6. See Chapter I and references there.
7. Aba Ghāzī Bahadur Khan, *Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares*, Tr. Peter I. Desmanisons. (Rpt, Amsterdam and St. Louis, 1970), 42.
8. Mīrkhwānd, V, 201. See Chapter I.
9. Wassaf, 51 / Ayatī, 28; see also Chapter I.
10. On Hoqu see Chapter II, section 1. Princes of the house of Ogōdei who played a major role in Qaidu's forces are the descendants of Hoqu, the sons of Ogōdei's son Qadan, and Qaidu's sons. Among his supporters are also identified descendants of Ogodei's sons Kōchū and Melik. See also Chapter I, note 115 and the genealogical table of the house of Ogōdei.
11. Rashīd/Alizādah, 135-37, and see Chapter I.
12. See Chapter I. Yet several Chaghadaid princes retained allegiance to other Mongol branches. Alghu's sons and Ajiqi (Azhiji) son of Būri are eminent in the Qa'an troops (YS, 15/312; Rashīd/Bloch, 174, 423, 526-27 / Rashīd/Boyle, 139, 265, 299-300 and see Chapter II, section 1), and Mubarak Shah and his sons, for example, retained allegiance to the Ilkhanate (Rashīd/Alizādah, 137-38; 152-53. See also the genealogical table of the house of Chaghadaid).
13. YS, 133/3231; Rashīd al-Dīn indicates that in Ogodei's time several princes of the house of Jochi Qasar served under the command of Chaghadaid. They fought with Baraq against Abaqa and subsequently, again according to Rashīd al-Dīn, chose to surrender to Abaqa. Some of them may have decided to join Qaidu. Although the main princes from the house of Jochi Qasar who supported Qaidu, Ebügen son of Toqu son of Jochi Qasar and his sons Baba and Temūr, are not among the princes who were sent according to Rashīd al-Dīn (sons of Qaralju and *Jirqдай). (Rashīd/Karīmī, I, 206.) On the other hand it is possible that Qutuqu, who fought with Qaidu against Alghu circa 1263 (Rashīd/Bloch, 398 / Rashīd/Boyle, 255), is the son of Qaralju son of Jochi Qasar, who was, as aforesaid, in Central Asia at this time. If this is so, then the cooperation between Qaidu and the house of Jochi Qasar commenced long before the 1280s.
14. See Chapter II, section 1.
15. See Chapter II, section 2.
16. See Chapter II, section 2, note 187.
17. Rashīd/Bloch, 14, 173 / Rashīd/Boyle, 28, 142.
18. See Chapter II, section 1.
19. On Chinggis Khan's organization of the army see, e.g., Ratchnevsky, 92-94; Morgan, *Mongols*, 84-96.
20. Rashīd/Bloch, 96-98 / Rashīd/Boyle, 103; Qāshānī, 34-38. See also Chapter III.
21. Qāshānī, 18; Wassaf, 510 / Ayatī, 294.
22. Qāshānī, 36, 37, 39, 207, 209.
23. Qasham, 38. Cf. the dispersing of the forces of Nayan after his surrender to Qubilai; the dispersing of Tegüder's troops after his

- surrender to Abaqa, and the dispersing of Chapar's army after his surrender to the Qa'an. On the consequences that the failure to disperse the Chaghadaid forces had on Qaidu's kingdom, see Chapter III.
24. Wassaf, 510 / Ayatī, 286. For further evidence of the separation see Wassaf, 314.
25. Wassaf, 510 / Ayatī, 286. In this context see also Wassaf, 51 / Ayatī 27, where it is indicated that the descendant of Chinggis who will serve as the Qa'an (*ulūgh qūl*) will see eight of the *hizarabs* in Bukhara as his *Khāssa* (apparently the army directly subject to him).
26. Rashīd/Bloch, 5, 330 / Rashīd/Boyle, 20, 175; Mīrkhwand V, 293. Cf. Umarī, 99.
27. See e.g., the list of *Amirs* in Wassaf, 511 / Ayatī, 286; YS, 15/313, 166/3897, 128/3134; *Daoyuan*, 23/390-91; *Muanji*, 13/10a (where an unidentified prince Elinjing appears).
28. Rashīd/Alizādah I, 343-45 and see Chapter I.
29. *Shajarat al-atrak*, f. 74a; Rashīd/Bloch, 579 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314. On the Arulad see Pelliot and Hambis, 342-59.
30. Rashīd/Bloch, 580 / Rashīd/Boyle, 27 note 74, 315. On Qorulas/Qorulat see Pelliot and Hambis, 59-60.
31. *Shu'ab-i panjgāna*, f. 127a; *Mu'izzal-ansāb*, f.44a; On the Olqunu'ud see Rashīd/Alizādah I, 402-4.
32. Rashīd/Bloch, 576, 579 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314; Rashīd/Alizādah I, 139.
33. Rashīd/Bloch, 575, 577, 578, 580 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314, 315. On the Süldüs see Rashīd/Alizādah I, 441-54.
34. Rashīd/Bloch, 575, 578 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314. On them see Pelliot and Hambis, 73-74.
35. Rashīd/Bloch, 578 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314. On the Merkid see Pelliot and Hambis, 227-28.
36. Rashīd/Bloch, 580 / Rashīd/Boyle, 315. On this tribe see Pelliot and Hambis, 81-82.
37. Rashīd/Bloch, 576 (where they are called the *Qanqiyat*) / Rashīd/Boyle, 314. On them see Pelliot and Hambis, 159-60, 393-95.
38. Rashīd/Bloch, 579 / Rashīd/Boyle, 314.
39. On this subject see, e.g., Hsiao, *Military*, 12-17; D.O. Morgan, "The Mongol Armies in Persia," *Der Islam* 56 (1979), 89; Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols*, 26, 40, 183, 189, 195, 196, 199, 225, 227.
40. Rashīd al-Dīn, e.g., mentions a *tumen* made up of residents of Uighuria, Kashgar, and Kocha that accompanied Hülegü on his campaign into Iran (Rashīd/Alizādah I, 154; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 203-4) and a *hizarab* of the Bekrin that was also sent to Iran in Hülegü's time (Rashīd/Alizādah I, 353; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 211).
41. YS, 132/3209; Pelliot and Hambis, 300.
42. Rashīd/Bloch, 580 / Rashīd/Boyle, 315.
43. Harawī, 409.
44. Qarshī, 139; O.D. Chekhovitz, "Bukhariskii Vakf XIII veka," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 3 (1967), 75, 80-82.
45. Qarshī, 140; Chekhovitz, 75; and see Chapter I.

46. See e.g., J. Paul, *The state and the Military: the Sāmānid case* (papers of Inner Asia no. 26, Bloomington, 1994), *passim*.
47. YS, 128/3135.
48. According to Moule's and Pelliot's translation of Marco Polo's account of Nayan's revolt it can be concluded that both Nayan and Qaidu had foot soldiers. (Moule and Pelliot, I, 174, cited in D. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History", *Oriens Extremus*, 19 (1972), 172). Cf., however, Yule's translation (*Polo*, II, 335-37), which does not mention this fact at all. In the two translations, Polo clearly emphasized the horsemen as the major component of the princes' army.
49. See e.g. QashanT, 18, 36, 37, 38, 39; Wassaf, 510, 511, 512, 514, 515, 516, 517; Rashīd/Alizādah, 136, 137.
50. On the number of men in a *tūmen* see e.g. Morgan, "Army," 89-91; Hsiao, *Military*, 170-71, note 27; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 193; Cf. J.M. Smith, "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population", *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 18 (1975), 271-78.
51. Wassaf, 516. On the definition of *amir qūl* among the Ilkhans, see "Umārī, 93.
52. QashanT, 36.
53. Rashīd/Blochert, 575-80 / Rashīd/Boyle, 313-15.
54. Het'um, 214.
55. Polo, II, 457-58.
56. YS, 119/2951.
57. E.g., Wei Yuan, 19/6.
58. Wassaf, 517. (AyatI, 292 translates this into a hundred thousand men; on this see note 50.)
59. QashanT, 37, 148. The highest estimate appears precisely at a time when the situation of Chapar and his allies was likely to have been at the lowest. See also Chapter III.
60. YS, 122/3001; Cleaves, "1362", 59, 80.
61. Harawi, 402.
62. *Ibid.* Qaidu's son, Sarban, for example, accompanied Du'a.
63. QarshI, 138.
64. Although Smith does so. For the Chaghadaid army, Smith chose to accept Het'um's estimate of Chapar's army, which is the highest estimate. The division that he suggested, between seventeen Mongol *tūmens* and twenty-three *lumens* of auxiliary forces is unfounded as he himself admitted (Smith, "Manpower," 290). As shown by Morgan, the *tūmens* that Smith cited from Temür's time are administrative units and not military units. (Morgan, "Army," 89-90; see also section 3 of this chapter.)
65. Het'um, 215.
66. Polo, II, 335; Smith, "Manpower", 289.
67. "Umārī, 29, 39, 68.
68. MTrkhwand, V, 217; *Zixi wen gao*, II/10b, cited in Chen III, 7.
69. See note 1.
70. Rashīd/Blochert, 600 / Rashīd/Boyle, 324; Hsiao, *Military*, 59.
71. Cleaves, "1362", 89; Hsiao, *Military*, 59.
72. Rashīd/Blochert, 500-2 / Rashīd/Boyle, 285-86; Hsiao, *Military*, 59.
73. Rashīd/Alizādah, 107; MTrkhwand, V, 284-85; YS, 166/3897. Although in both cases the garrison in question was stationed in Khotan (in 1266 and 1281).
74. YS, chapter 99; Hsiao, *Military*, 109-15.
75. *Muan ji*, 24/15a; Hsiao, *Military*, 59. On North West see YS, 63/1567-74. Cf. Hsiao, *ibid.* On Yao Sui see Cai, 385-86.
76. See e.g., Wassaf, 67-68, 74, 450, 511, 516; Mirkhwand, 306; Polo, II, 460.
77. See e.g., Wassaf, 67-68, 313, 450, 510, 511, 515, 516; Polo, *loc.cit.*
78. See e.g., Wassaf, 67-68, 450, 511; Polo, *loc.cit.*
79. See e.g., Mirkhwand, V, 290; Wassaf, 71, 511, 516; Polo, *loc.cit.*
80. See e.g., Wassaf, 514.
81. See e.g., Wassaf, 450, 511.
82. Mirkhwand, V, 249, 306; Wassaf, 369, 450, 516.
83. Polo, II, 460.
84. Harawi, 406.
85. Harawi, 328; Wassaf, 518.
86. R.W. Reid, "Mongolian Weaponry in *The Secret History of the Mongols*," *Mongolian Studies*, 15 (1992), 88-89; Dawson, 33-35. On Mongolian arms, see also H.D. Martin, "The Mongol Army," *JRAS*, 1943, 50-53.
87. Rashīd/Alizādah, 110; Wassaf, 69 / Ayatī, 39; see Chapter I.
88. Wassaf, 68 / AyatI, 39.
89. Harawi, 314-15; Wassaf, 68 / AyatI, 38. Plunder of arms is not described in the sources as part of Qaidu or Du'a's invasions.
90. Het'um, 214.
91. *Zixi wen gao*, II/10b, cited in Chen III, 7.
92. YS, 90/2284-88; YYS, Chapter 61; Farquhar, 275-82.
93. *Ming chen*, 3/8b-9a, 22a; *Muanji*, 26/4a; *Daoyuan*, 23/392; *Qinghe ji*, 2/12b.
94. Biran, 22; Cf. A.P. Martinez, "Some Notes on the Ilkhanid Army", *Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi*, 6 (1988), 155.
95. YS, 8/166 and see Chapter II, section 1.
96. Rashīd/Alizādah, 107.
97. YS, 154/3640.
98. *Zixi wen gao*, I I/10b, cited in Chen III, 7.
99. Polo, II, 461.
100. MTrkhwand, V, 217.
101. Wassaf, 370 / AyatT, 220-21.
102. Harawi, 406; Cf. Dawson, 37.
103. See Chapter II, section 2.
104. *Ibid.*
105. See Chapter II, section 1.
106. *Ibid.*
107. YS, 128/3135, 132/3209.
108. YS, 128/3136; *Daoyuan*, 23/391-92.
109. Rashīd/Alizādah I, 343-45. See also Chapter I.
110. Rashīd/Blochert, 500-2 / Rashīd/Boyle, 285.

111. YS, 134/3248.
112. Y5, 117/2908. On *Yaqudu see Chapter II, section 1, note 64.
113. YS, 127/3114; Cleaves, "Bayan," 268.
114. On this subject, see Chapter II, section 2.
115. Rashīd/Jahn, 20-21 / Rashīd/Alizādah, 124-26; Mirkhwānd V, 303-5; Harawī, 320-23; Boyle, "Ilkhans", 539; Biran, 18-19. On Ilkhanid (and Mamluk) spies see Amitai-Preiss, "PhD," I, 158-79; *idem*, *Mongols*, chapter 6, esp. 152ff.
116. Mirkhwānd, V, 217.
117. Harawī, 402, 409. It is possible that these descriptions are only a rhetorical means employed by the author, in order to accentuate Du'a's failure.
118. On this subject see, e.g. Fletcher, "Mongols", 40-43.
119. Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," 178; S. Jagchid and C.R. Bawden, "Some Notes on the Horse Policy of the Yuan Dynasty," *CAJ*, 10 (1965), 246; also, e.g., YS, 15/324, 325, 154/3640, 118/2925; Cleaves, "Bayan", 269.
120. Qāshānī, 18; Rashīd/Blochert, 11-12 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25-26; YS, 15/316, 118/2925; YWL, 23/13b.
121. Qashanī, 18; Rashīd/Blochert, 11-12 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25-26.
122. Wassaf, 450; Polo, II, 338; and see also Rashīd/Blochert, 22 / Rashīd/Boyle, 37.
123. See e.g., Polo, II, 461; Harawī, 411.
124. Wassaf, 315 / Ayatl, 192; YS, 22/477-78. During raids Qaidu might have tried using night attacks, not always successfully. See Rashīd/Blochert, 526-27 / Rashīd/Boyle, 299; *Muan ji*, 26/4a.
125. Wassaf, 510, 516 / Ayatī, 206.
126. See e.g. YS, 127/3114; Cleaves, "Bayan", 267; Wassaf, 450.
127. YS, 122/3001; Cleaves, "1362", 50, 89; HarawT, 402-418.
128. Harawī, 402-18. This description is similar to Carpini's descriptions of the Mongol siege (Dawson, 37) and to the description of Hülegü's siege of Baghdad (Wassāf, 25-45 / Ayatl, 13-25). On the Mongol siege, see also Martin, 65-68.
129. See note 127.
130. Grousset, 339. Although his withdrawal can be attributed also to the Delhi Sultan's strong garrison force.
131. YS, 134/3248.
132. YS, 169/3974.
133. *Zixi wen gao*, 11/9a.
134. H. Masaki, "On the Xuanwei Inscription and the Xuanweijun Fortress," in *Papers Contributed to the Symposium for the History of the Yuan Dynasty* (Nanjing, 1986), 73. This is the only evidence that the Han army encamped in a fortress.
135. On the garrisons see Hsiao, "Military," 57-60; Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 149-59; Chapter II, section 1.
136. See e.g. YS, 117/2908, 118/2916, 135/3282.
137. YS, 128/3134.
138. De Rachelewiltz, "Turks," 289; Hsiao, *Military*, 46-47, 99-110.
139. YS, 128/3133-37; *Daoyuan*, 23/390-92. See also Chapter II, section 1.
140. Cleaves, "Bayan," 268.
141. *Op.cit.*, 268-69, 283; Dardess, 158-59, and compare there. See also *Ming chen*, 2/5a-b; *Qinghe ji*, 2/12b-13a.
142. On the horses and their role in the relationship between China and Central Asia, see, e.g., H.G. Creel, "The Role of the Horse in Chinese History," *The American Historical Review*, 70 (1965), 647-72; Sinor, "Horse and Pasture," *Passim*.
143. YS, 7/130, 144, 8/147, 152, 157, 164, 9/185. See also Chapter II, section 1.
144. YS, 162/3798.
145. Jagchid, 256-63.
146. See Chapter II, section 2.
147. Het'um, 214; YS, 119/2951; Jagchid, 253.
148. Mirkhwānd, V, 219; cf. Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 199.
149. Rashīd/Boyle, 27, n.74; Mirkhwānd, V, 219. Qaidu also ordered that Baraq be buried on a high mountain, even though Baraq converted to Islam before his death (Rashīd/Alizādah, 137). On the nomadic burial practices, see e.g. J.A. Boyle, "The 13th Century Mongols' Conception of the After life: The Evidence of their Funerary Practices," *Mongolian Studies*, 1 (1974), 5-14.
150. HarawT, 413. There may be a connection between these "incantations" and "the science of stone and rain" in which *Marghāvil, Baraq's general at the battle of Herat, was versed (Wassaf, 68 / AyatT, 38). On Shamanist ceremonies for changing the weather among the Mongols and the Turks, see J.A. Boyle, "Turkish and Mongol Shamanism in the Middle Ages," *Folklore*, 83 (1972), 184-91.
151. HarawT, 410, 415. (Referring to Du'a's invasion to Kusui and Fushang in 1295); DilhawT, 33-36 (Referring to Qaidu's forces that invaded Delhi in 1298).
152. Wassāf, 517 / AyatT, 293; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 131-32. The fact that he was not a descendant of Du'a also contributed to Taliq'u's fall. See Chapter III.
153. 'Umarī, 38, 41; and see also Qazwīnī, 575. Under Tarmashirin, as well, the rise of Islam did not go without opposition. On this subject see e.g. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 134-35; Jackson, "Chaghatayid Dynasty," 346.
154. Rashīd/Blochert, 14 / Rashīd/Boyle, 28; Wassāf, 314 / AyatT, 192; Mirkhwānd, V, 103.
155. Rashīd/Blochert, 11, 14 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25, 28; *Shu'āb-i panjāna*, f. 126b.
156. Rashīd/Blochert, 11, 14 / Rashīd/Boyle, 25, 28; Hambis, 107, 83; in *Shu'āb-i panjāna*, f. 127a, 'Umar appeared as Qaidu's grandson.
157. Qarshī, 139; Wassāf, 68 / Ayatl, 38; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 491.
158. Rashīd/Alizādah, 133; Wassaf, 75 / Ayatl, 43; Mirkhwānd, V, 308.
159. Thus, e.g., Baraq's son was called Mu'min, and his cousin Ahmad. Another Ahmad of the house of Chaghadai was the son of Mochi Yebe, Chaghadai's oldest son. This Ahmad's sons were 'Amr and Mubarak Shah, and thus they were also Muslims. In another branch of the family, one 'Abdallah appears (Rashīd/Blochert, 159, 163, 167 / Rashīd/Boyle, 136, 138, 139; Hambis, 107, 63-64.) Yasa'ur, son of Urūk Temür was

- also a Muslim (Qāshānī, 213). On Yasa'ur's Islam see Kato, 100, 110. See also the Chaghadaid genealogical table.
160. Qashanl, 37.
 161. See Chapter I, note 2.
 162. Qarshī, 141 ff.; *Polo*, I, 164, 169, 173, 179, 180; Dawson, 81.
 163. *Polo*, I, 169, 173; Dawson, 137; Pelliot, *Polo* I, 164, 207, 209. Further testimonies of the presence of Christians in Central Asia can be found, e.g., in Rashīd/Boyle, 298 (in Alghu's territories), and in the descriptions by Rubruck and Carpini of Güyüg's and Möngke's courts.
 164. *Polo*, I, 173.
 165. *Polo*, I, 184; *Rubruck*, 137-39.
 166. Mirkhwand, V, 218.
 167. Qarshr, 138; Barthold, *Turks*, 197-98.
 168. Qarshī, 138, who gives the impression that Chapar almost converted to Islam.
 169. Qarshī, 139.
 170. Chekhovitz, 78.
 171. *Op. cit.*, 81-82.
 172. Qarshī, 141-50. See Chapter IV, section 3 for discussion on the *şadrs*.
 173. See e.g., Qarshi, 141-42.
 174. This contrasts with Chaghadaī's harsh treatment of the Muslims. On this subject, see e.g., Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 115-17.
 175. On Qubilai's anti-Islamic policy see Rashīd/Bloch, 521-24 / Rashīd/Boyle, 293-94; Mirkhwand, V, 210-11; M. Rossabi, "The Muslims in the Early Yuan Dynasty," in J.D. Langlois (ed.), *China under Mongol Rule* (Princeton, 1981), 291-94; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 199-201. I do not accept Rossabi's notion that this policy was partly motivated by the fact that Qaidu was a Muslim - he was not - nor do I agree with Ratchnevsky that it was motivated by the bitter rivalry between the Ilkhans and the Mamluks and the latter's alliance with the Golden Horde (Ratchnevsky, 209). Moreover, Prof. Cleaves recent translation of Qubilai's edict prohibiting the slaughtering of animals by slitting the throat (i.e. in the Muslim fashion) proves that Qubilai banned Muslim ritual slaughter for economic and *not* for religious or political reasons (F.W. Cleaves, "The Rescript of Qubilai Prohibiting the Slaughtering of animals by Slitting the Throat," *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 16 (1992), 72-73). Qubilai was finally persuaded to change his policy (by Central Asian merchants!) also due to economic reasons.
 176. Qarshi, who wrote almost a decade after the conversion of the Mongols in Persia to Islam, still praises Qaidu's attitude towards Islam. Urūk Temūr's son Kūresbe, who according to Rashīd al-Dīn was suspected of Islamic tendencies, was not killed by Qaidu and continued to play a role in the struggles between the houses of Chaghadaī and of Ögödei after Qaidu's death. (See, e.g., Wassaf, 518 / AyatT, 283; Qashanl, 35-38).
 177. On the religious tolerance of the Mongols see, e.g., 'Umārī, 82; Ratchnevsky, 197-98; Morgan, *Mongols*, 41.
 178. Dawson, 137-39; *Rubruck*, 148 ff.

179. Montgomery, 35; Grousset, 303; Cf. Budge, 49, 139.
180. For the text of the letter, see K.E. Lupprian, *Die Beziehungen der Päpste zu islamischen und mongolischen Herrschern im 13. Jahrhundert anhand ihres Briefwechsels* (Vatican City, 1981), 349; similar letters were sent to Qubilai and Arghun. It seems that the letter to Qaidu did not reach its destination. Dawson, XXIX-XXXI; Grousset, 410.
181. Rashīd/'Alizādah, 109-10.
182. Rashīd/'Alizādah, 131, 135 / Rashīd/Jahn, 15; Mirkhwand, V, 293; Waṣṣāf, 451 / AyatI, 266.
183. YS, 153/3619; *Qinzhai ji*, 3/14a-b. On Shi Tianlin see Chapter I, note 21; on An Tong see Chapter II, section 1, note 21.
184. YS, 153/3619.
185. See e.g., Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule*, 126-28; Vernadsky, 210.
186. Thus, e.g., Sarban son of Qaidu dwelt in the upper Oxus and the cities of Bughlān and Balkh also belonged to his appanage (Qashanl, 36); the Chaghadaid Yasa'ur the Great dwelt near Khojand and Farghāna (Qāshānī, 36); Baba, one of the descendants of Jochi Qasar, had an estate near Samarkand, as did Kuch Temūr, grandson of Yebe, son of Ögödei. (Qāshānī, 35, 37).
187. As determined by the *quriltai* of 1269, see note 1.
188. Qāshānī, 39.
189. On salaries for the Mongol troops in China see Hsiao, *Military*, 25-27; on the *Iqtā'* in Persia in Ghazan's time see Morgan, "Army," 92-95.
190. 'Umārī, 40. On the *Jasagh* (*Yasa*) see D. Ayalon, "The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan - A Reexamination," *Studia Islamica*, pt. a: 33 (1971), 97-140; pt. b: 34 (1971), 151-80; pt. c1: 36 (1972), 113-52; pt. c2: 38 (1973), 107-56; Morgan, "Yasa," *passim*; Morgan, *Mongols*, 96-99; Cf. Ratchnevsky, 186-95; I. de Rachewiltz, "Some Reflections on Chinggis Qan's *Jasagh*" *East Asian History*, 6 (1993), 91-104.
191. One specific reference, though not very instructive, is given by Natanzi. He states that Baraq was strict about observation of the *Jasagh*, and cites specific example to prove it. At the height of winter in the coldest place in Turan, Baraq's foot froze and he fell from his horse. Baraq hit the frozen foot eighty times because it violated the *Jasagh* (that it is forbidden to dismount). Natanzi, 105.
192. Wassaf, 66/ AyatT, 37.
193. Rashīd/Bloch, 7-8 / Rashīd/Boyle, 22. This approach does not differ from the usual Mongol custom, according to which each ruler presents himself as defender of the *Jasagh* and his rivals as its opponents. See Ayalon, pt. B, 152.
194. Wassaf, 452-53 / AyatI, 267. Emphasis on Chinggis's legacy of unity appears on other occasions in the sources, but not in relation to the *Jasagh* (see e.g., YS, 128/3135; Rashīd/'Alizādah, 109-10).
195. Waṣṣāf, 451 / AyatI, 265-66. In this context see also Ratchnevsky, 189, according to whom every Mongol *ulus* had its own *Jasagh*.
196. Pelliot, Po/o, I, 127-28; Qarshi, 138; Rashīd/'Alizādah, 109; Montgomery, 35; Budge, 59.
197. Qāshānī, 37 (*sira ordu*); Wassaf, 517 / AyatI, 291 (*sir ordu*).

198. Dawson, 5, 62, 81-82 (*sira ordu*); see also Rashīd/Bloch, 49 / Rashīd/Boyle, 63; Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, I, 194 / Juwaynī/Boyle, I, 239; and Doerfer, II, 34-35 for a comprehensive discussion of this term.
199. Wassaf, 452 / Ayati, 266 (where it is translated as "capital").
200. Rashīd/Boyle, 27, note 74.
201. Qarshi, 138.
202. See Chapter III.
203. Barthold (*Four Studies*, I, 131), citing Qashani, 54, mentions the palace of Yuldūz (= star), where Du'a's son Kb'nchek (Chaghadaid Khan, 1307-8) resided. This palace never appears in other texts, and it is possible that it serves only as a metaphor for the approaching end of Konchek (who set out for the palace of the star). My thanks go to Prof. Zand for this interpretation. A permanent capital in Central Asia dates from the time of the Chaghadaid Khan Kebek (1310-1326). It was Qarshi (Nekhsheb) in Transoxania. (Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 51-52, 133-34).
204. QarshT, 138, 143-44; Mirkhwand, V, 218.
205. Rashīd/Alizādah, 108; Wassaf, 68-69, 78 / Ayati, 38-39; Mirkhwand, V, 285-86.
206. On Alghu's rebellion see Chapter I, note 29.
207. On Mas'ūd Beg, see, e.g., XYS, 133/571-72; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 464, 472; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 102-3; J.A. Boyle, "Mas'ūd Beg," *EI2*, VI (1991), pp. 782-83; Th.T. Allsen, "Mas'ūd Beg," in I. de Rachewiltz et al. (eds), *In the Service of the Khan* (Wiesbaden, 1993), 128-30.
208. Qarshl, 139-40.
209. Qarshl, 139, although he may tend to be biased in favor of Mas'ūd and his sons.
210. On this institution see particularly Endicott-West, *Mongol Rule, passim* and also Morgan, *Mongols*, 108-11; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 72-73; on the importance of the population censuses for the Mongol administration, see e.g., Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 116-42.
211. Wassaf 68 / Ayati, 38. On the rulers of Bukhara see Chapter I, note 64. Daifu does not occur in the sources after Baraq's period, and he may have died in the raid on Bukhara carried out by Abaqa or by Alghu's sons.
212. Harawi, 314-16. The translation of the terms *umanā'* and *ummāl* is according to the Glossary in A.K.S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (Cambridge, 1988).
213. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 48; *idem*, *Turks*, 195; Qarshl, 140 (Bozar Khan and his sons in Almaliq, it is unclear whether the dynasty continued after 1274), 147 (king of Khotan), 148 (king of Khojand), 149 (king of Farghāna), 150 (king of Shāsh, apparently before Qaidu's time).
214. Wassaf, 80.
215. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 49.
216. O. Pritsak, "Al-i Burhān," *Der Islam*, 30 (1952), *passim*; C.E. Bosworth, "Sadr in Transoxania," *EI2*, VIII (1994), 748-49; *idem*, "Al-e Borhān," *EI2*, I (1985), 753-54; for the definition of the term see R. Dozi, *Supplements aux dictionnaires Arabes* (3rd. ed, Paris, 1967), I, 822.
217. Chekhovitz, 75, 82. For other mentions of *sadrs* in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries see Pritsak, 82-83; Bosworth, "Sadr," 754.
218. Qarshi, 142-50.
219. Qarshi, 143.
220. Chekhovitz, 75-76; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 210.
221. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 52; Davidovitch, 66-67; Chekhovitz, *ibid*.
222. Morgan, "Army," 90; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 194.
223. Chekhovitz, 75-76.
224. Rashīd/Alizādah, 109-10.
225. QarshT, 139; Wassaf, 80.
226. Rashīd/Alizādah, 135.
227. J.M. Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *HJAS*, 30 (1970), 54-55; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 153-54.
228. Rashīd/Bloch, 530 / Rashīd/Boyle, 296. On *tenge* see Doerfer, II, 587-92.
229. The "daily salary" Du'a allocated to Chapar, four heads of sheep, which were probably supplied from the taxes, reinforces this supposition. Qashani, 39.
230. On Mongol taxation, see e.g., H.F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the 13th Century," *HJAS*, 19 (1956), 304-89; Smith, "Taxation," *passim*; Petrushevski, 529-37; Morgan, *Mongols*, 100-3; Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism*, 144-88.
231. Rashīd/Alizādah, 135. On emissaries as part of the Golden Horde's administrative system, see Ch.J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde* (Bloomington, 1987), 40.
232. A.M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge, 1984), 224-25, according to whom this was also the system in the Golden Horde, where separation was likewise maintained between the nomads and the sedentary population.
233. Rashīd/Bloch, 502 / Rashīd/Boyle, 286. See also Chapter II, section 1.
234. As attested, e.g., by the actions of Malik Nāsir al-Dīn Kashgarī, and see Chapter II, section 1.
235. Davidovitch, 63, 64. Kanjak is one of the four small towns near Talas, which make up the urban complex called by the general name Talas. See 'Umārī, 38; Liu, "Chaghadaid Ulus," 49-50.
236. Davidovitch, 65-66.
237. *Op. cit.*, 46, 66.
238. *Op. cit.*, 66; Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 48. This was not a rare phenomenon in Central Asia. Under the Qara-Khitai, for example, the vassals were permitted to mint coins only with the name of the local ruler, without any evidence of the subjection to Qara-Khitai (K.A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-cheng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao* (Philadelphia, 1949), 667); Davidovitch indicates that Central Asian coins from Mbngke's time did not always bear his name, unlike coins from this period minted in Iran (Davidovitch, 61).
239. Davidovitch, 65. Davidovitch's study is based principally on hoards of coins found in Tajikistan in the 1950s and on the inventories of coins in

- the former Soviet Union. Most of the few coins from Qaidu's time mentioned in Zambaur also appear in Russian catalogues that were unavailable to me. (E. von Zambaur, *Die Münzprägungen des Islam* (Wiesbaden, 1968), 53, 110, 171, 202.)
240. Davidovitch, 67; Barthold, *Pour Studies* I, 48. It is possible that already from Kebek's period the names of the rulers also appear on the coins. On Chaghadaid coins from the mid-fourteenth century the name of the ruler appears followed by the title *Khāqān al-Adil*. See e.g., S. Lane-poole (ed.), *Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum* (London, 1881), VI, 200-2.
 241. Davidovitch, 66.
 242. Wassaf, 78, 80 / AyatI, 46; Qarshi, 139.
 243. YS, 119/2951; Rashid/Alizadah, 557.
 244. Barthold, *Turks*, 193; Rashid/Boyle, 300.
 245. See note 205.
 246. Rashid/Alizadah, 110.
 247. Rashid/Jahn, 13-14; Wassaf, 71 / AyatI, 40. See also Chapter I.
 248. See Chapter I, notes 119-21.
 249. Mirkhwand, V, 308.
 250. Wassaf, 68 / AyatI, 46.
 251. Chekhovitz, 75-82.
 252. See e.g., Qashani, 35.
 253. Wassaf, 517, 519 / AyatI, 294.
 254. 'Umarī, 123; Cf. Liu, "Peace Agreement," 33.
 255. Qarshi, 144, 147-49. Developed agriculture is attested to in Transoxania and Turkestan also in the accounts of *Nuzhat al-Qulub*, but it is difficult to establish to what period these descriptions apply. (Hamd Allah al-Mustawfi Qazwini, *Nuzhat al-Qulub* (ed. G. LeStrange, London, 1915), e.g. 238.) See also *Polo*, I, 169, 173-74; it is possible that Qarshi's account of the devastation of Kashgar relates to the years in which he dwelt there (from 1273 onwards), and he may perhaps be referring to the time of Hoqu's rebellion (ca. 1275, see Chapter II). The non-dated attack of the *Jete* (groups of nomads that left their tribes and became bandits) on Kashgar (Qarshi, 146) may also have some connection to this. On this subject, see Barthold, *Turks*, 195.
 256. *Polo*, I, 169, 173, 174.
 257. Wassaf, 454 / AyatI, 268. See also Chapter III.
 258. Dawson, 226-29.
 259. E. Endicott-West, "Merchant Associations in Yuan China: The Ortoq," *Asia Major*, n.s. 2 (1989), 147; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, 222-30.
 260. On this subject, see e.g., T.Th. Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners 1200-1260," *Asia Major*, n.s. 2 (1989), 83-126.
 261. Spuler, *Die goldene Horde*, 406; Amitai-Preiss, "PhD," I, 287-92; *idem*, *Mongols*, 207-11.
 262. Davidovitch, 66.
 263. Chekhovitz, 75-82.
 264. Wassaf, 519 / AyatI, 294.
 265. Qarshi, 147, 149, 151.

266. See e.g., Mirkhwand, V, 211, 213; Rashid/Bloch 542 / Rashid/Boyle, 301. On the role of the Central Asians under Qubilai, see e.g., Rossabi, "Muslims," 273-74; Ch'en Yuan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols* (Berkeley and LA, 1966), *passim*.
267. MTrkhwand, V, 218.
268. On this route see Ren Rongkang, "Yuanchu de Yuan-Yi lianmeng yu Zhongya jiaotong," *Zhongya xuekan*, 1 (1984), 184-93.
269. 'Umarī, 30.
270. Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde*, 406.
271. On this trade, see e.g., Ayalon, pt. C1, 126-27; Amitai-Preiss, "PhD," I, 103-4; *idem*, *Mongols*, 85-86.
272. See Chapter II, section 3.
273. Natanzi, 106; *Nuzhat al-Qulub*, 239; LeStrange, 465; Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 106. Qaidu's sympathetic attitude toward trade is also demonstrated by the bustling markets described by Rubruck in Qayaliq under Qaidu's rule (1253).
274. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 23, 50; *Turks*, 192. Unlike the building of Andijān, the restoration of Tirmidh, that took place sometime between its destruction by the Mongols in the 1220s and the visit of Ibn Battūta (d. 1377) in the first half of the fourteenth century, is nowhere connected specifically to Qaidu or Du'a. (Barthold, *Four Studies*, II, 4-7; cf. Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 106.)
275. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire," 133-34. Davidovitch also seems to ascribe all the credit to Mas'ūd Beg; Qaidu is not mentioned at all in her article.
276. On this subject see Petrushevski, 483-93.
277. Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 179 ff.
278. On these elements in Qubilai's rule, see Endicott-West, *Mongolian Rule*, 105-28.
279. See e.g., Rossabi, *Khubilai*, 125-26 on Qubilai's court.
280. Khazanov, *Nomads*, 213.
281. See e.g., Wittfogel and Feng, 660; Fletcher, "Mongols," 40-41.
282. Barthold, *Four Studies*, I, 51.

Conclusion

1. Rashid/Boyle, 27.

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